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ABSTRACT 
      The Automatic Identification System (AIS) employed onboard maritime vessels was 
designed to improve the safety of navigation at sea, but focused on functionality rather 
than cybersecurity. Previous research has revealed that the AIS technical architecture and 
protocol have significant vulnerabilities that have the potential to facilitate cyber attacks 
such as spoofing and denial-of-service against AIS-equipped maritime vessels and port 
facilities. AIS data manipulation could have significant negative impacts on the global 
economy, regional geo-political stability, and safety-of-navigation at sea.
     This thesis examines the technical and architectural feasibility of augmenting the 
current AIS architecture with data integrity and authentication capabilities to potentially 
mitigate AIS spoofing vulnerabilities. We assess the existing AIS architecture and 
lightweight cryptographic algorithms to determine an optimal, backwards-compatible 
authentication system. We then engineer a proof-of-concept AIS authenticator system 
using commercial AIS equipment and a physical testbench and demonstrate AIS message 
validation through public key digital signature verification.
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A significant vulnerability exists in the Automatic Identification System (AIS). The AIS
is an internationally used maritime radio-broadcast system designed to improve safety of
navigation at sea and does not incorporate any form of information assurance or cyber-
physical security.
This thesis proposes an AIS-specific application of a lightweight cryptographic algorithm
to potentially decrease the vulnerable attack surface area and thereby improve safety of
navigation at sea. The primary objective and goal of this research is to provide a proof-
of-concept for an AIS message authentication system that adds message integrity and
authentication capabilities. The need for this capability is illustrated by the recent AIS
spoofing attack in Shanghai [1] as well as other attack vectors identified in [2].
This research attempts to answer the following three questions: What should the overall AIS
technical architecture look like after the augmentation of data integrity and authentication
capabilities? Does the current AIS protocol possess sufficient flexibility to provide data
integrity and authentication without changing the overall technical architecture? To what
extent does the current AIS protocol and standard constrain the list of suitable cryptographic
algorithms?
1.1 Congested Maritime Cyber-Physical Security Envi-
ronment
Worldwide, there are approximately 400 maritime liner shipping services in operation [3].
These vessels transport 60 percent of all goods, by value, each year across the vast expanse
of ocean and territorial waters to feed the global economy [3]. In 2014, the top three
producers (China, the United States, and the Republic of South Korea) exported nearly 54
million shipping containers combined, a statistic accounting for approximately 42 percent
of all global containerized shipping [4].
Contrary to public perception, global trade routes occupy a minor fraction of the total
1
oceanic surface area due to the limited number of cost-efficient maritime trade routes, as
shown in Figure 1.1. As a result of these common trade routes and the resultant high-
density traffic areas (e.g., Dover, Hormuz, Malacca, Gibraltar), an opportunity exists for
malicious attackers to inflict significant damage to multiple maritime vessels through a
single AIS-directed cyber attack; [2] discusses various possible examples of AIS-directed
cyber attacks.
Figure 1.1. The global trade routes that container ships utilize to transport
trade goods around the world. Source: [5].
1.2 Reliance on Cyber-Physical Systems and Challenges to
Security in the Maritime Environment
Since 2000, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) required, through the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), certain vessels “to carry
AIS capable of providing information about the ship to other ships and coastal authorities
automatically” [6]. This international mandate facilitated the critical exposure necessary
for malicious actors to exploit any one of several possible attack vectors.
Maritime vessels and their crews rely heavily upon sophisticated Cyber Physical Sys-
tem (CPS) networks of specialized computers, application suites, and ship systems to safely
operate and navigate the narrow trade corridors and cross the oceans. However, the combi-
nation of cybersecurity deficiencies, undocumented variations, and heavy international use
2
introduce risks to the AIS. AIS-specific risk to maritime trade is the composite product of
1) vulnerabilities associated with the current AIS standards and manufacturer practices and
2) threats derived from exposure to capable malicious actors due to the system’s mandate
for international use.
Figure 1.2 depicts an example of the array of maritime cyber-physical interface stations
aboard the cruise ship Oasis of the Seas. The systems that comprise these complex CPS
networks do not incorporate any form of cybersecurity protections (i.e., confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation, or availability) and often vary by design and capa-
bilities depending on both the manufacturer and the installation location.
Manufacturers must conform to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)’s ITU-
R M.1371-5 [7] and National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA)’s NMEA-0183 [8]
published standards. The ITU-R M.1371-5 pertains mostly to the AIS protocol’s use
and propagation through the electromagnetic spectrum. Conversely, the NMEA-0183
provides manufacturers with technical specifications for maritime voyage network inter-
communications, design, and implementation.
Figure 1.2. Maritime voyage network interface on the bridge of Oasis of the
Seas. Source: [9].
Although the AIS and NMEA standards provide the technical and operational parameters
3
for shipboard equipment, the standard is only guidance and a set of recommendations.
Manufacturers are not bound to the standard and are free to design and engineer maritime
systems using proprietary technology as they see fit.
Each variation from the standard has the potential to create a new attack vector or vulnerabil-
ity, especially when the variation goes undocumented for various reasons. Consequently, the
AIS community of interest is unable to properly address and correct these possible system
vulnerabilities if the community is ignorant of the undocumented deviations. Another issue
exists when third-party developers and researchers have specific technical expectations, de-
rived from published standards, but encounter operational and technical abnormalities due
to undocumented, vendor-specific deviation from the standard, as discussed in Chapter 5.
1.3 Benefit to the Community
This research attempts to contribute to the maritime community by adding both data in-
tegrity and authentication, two of the five pillars of information assurance (i.e., confidential-
ity, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, and authenticity), to the current AIS technical
architecture. Additionally, the Department of the Navy would benefit from this research in
similar regards with the maritime community. The Department of the Navy would gain an
AIS message validation capability (i.e., the ability to verify the validity of the data source
and integrity). The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines integrity as the
“property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since it was created,
transmitted or stored” [10] and authenticity as the verification of “the identity of a user,
process, or device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information
system” [11].
Our proposed contribution supports novel AIS capabilities that would permit properly-
equippedmaritime vessels to discriminate againstmaliciousAIS traffic. These data integrity
and authentication capabilities would potentially reduce the attack surface area associated
with AIS vulnerabilities, which facilitates attacks such as spoofing, denial-of-service, hi-
jacking, and availability disruptions.
4
1.4 Overview
This research explored the feasibility of augmenting the current AIS technical architecture
with data integrity and authentication capabilities through an externally-integrated, modu-
lar, and Commercially-off-the-shelf (COTS)-sourced AIS authenticator system consisting
only of a laptop computer and associated software. Specifically, this research explored
the combination of lightweight cryptographic algorithm options, secret key distribution
system options, and the necessary system architecture that would provide an application-
specific hardware and software solution to potentially mitigate known AIS and NMEA
vulnerabilities.
This research designed, implemented, evaluated, and provided a proof-of-concept for anAIS
data validation system which incorporates an existing lightweight cryptographic algorithm
compatible with NMEA and ITU standards and recommendations.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes necessary informa-
tion regarding AIS background, device types, vulnerabilities, and prior related work, which
focused on specific NMEA and ITU vulnerabilities and possible attack vectors. Chapter 3
is a discussion of the proposed experimental design and considerations to include possible
lightweight cryptographic schemes and frameworks, message delivery methodology, tech-
nical and design constraints, and related research. Chapter 4 discusses the unique challenges
and limitations of available lightweight cryptographic algorithms, architectural constraints,
cryptographic tool sets and resources, and our subsequent compromises and alternate de-
sign proposition. Chapter 5 discusses the experimental methodology, results, unexpected
discoveries and abnormalities, and system performance. Lastly, Chapter 6 concludes our
research with discussions of our recommendations, possible future work, and experimental
weaknesses.
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This chapter provides background information on AIS use, carriage requirements, and
system types. Additionally, this chapter details previous research on the syntactical and
architectural vulnerabilities of the AIS and NMEA protocols.
Previous research (e.g., [2], [12]–[14]) established that the overall AIS architecture is
vulnerable to external threats. These four works identified and concluded that the current
AIS protocol does not feature any information assurance mechanisms or capabilities to
discriminate and protect against malicious data. Additionally, AIS data transmissions,
regardless of function, are accepted and processed if formatted according to ITU and
NMEA syntax structures [2], [12], [13]. Therefore, malicious actors may take advantage
of this vulnerability to conduct user-defined data injects by disguising malicious data as
properly formatted AIS messages [2], [13].
2.1 Automatic Identification System
AIS is an automated suite of transceivers and specialized application systems designed
for use in the maritime environment. AIS is intended to improve maritime safety and
navigation by facilitating the efficient exchange and broadcast ofmaritime static and dynamic
navigational data between ships, Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft, and shore stations [15].
In 2000, SOLAS Regulation 19 mandated the use of AIS technology on specific maritime
vessels:
All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages
and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international
voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size shall be fittedwith an automatic
identification system [6].
There are three basic types of AIS categories: A, B, and receive-only. Depending on the
category, the subject AIS system will have varying capabilities and technical requirements,
as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1. A comparison of technical capabilities and limitations between
AIS Class A and Class B. Source: [16].
8
Figure 2.1 vertically lists the AIS specifications on the left margin and the AIS class
types across the top margin. For clarification, Class B-SO is Class B - Self Organizing
Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and Class B-CS is Class B - Carrier Sense. The
differences between these two subcategories are not relevant to this research. The figure
was enlarged and rotated to enhance readability.
Class A AIS systems are the most capable, complicated, and costly (an example is shown
in Figure 2.2); conversely, Class B systems are a lower-cost and less capable alternative
for vessels not requiring a Class A system [17], [18]. Receive-only AIS devices, an
example shown in Figure 2.3, are primarily for recreational vessels whose operators require
situational awareness for safety of navigation but do not necessarily need to transmit their
voyage data. Figure 2.4 lists the inter-communication capabilities and limitations of each
AIS class.
Figure 2.2. A Raymarine AIS950 Class A Transceiver (Only user-system
interfacing unit shown). Source: [17].
Figure 2.3. A Raymarine AIS350 Receiver. Source: [17].
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2.2 Automatic Identification System Vulnerabilities
Previous research has shown that AIS is vulnerable to spoofing, hijacking, and availability
disruption [2]. These attacks are possible because the current AIS technical architecture and
standard does not incorporate the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-repudiation,
Authenticity (CIANA) pillars of information assurance; consequently, any receiving vessel
will trust and accept a properly-formattedAISmessage regardless of its payload or originator
[2], [12], [13]. Amalicious actor could utilize this security flaw to negatively affectmaritime
safety and navigation, global commerce, and international politics, such as in the Shanghai
incident [1].
2.2.1 Message Syntax and Architecture Vulnerabilities
Trend Micro, a multinational cyber security company with global headquarters in Tokyo,
Japan, reported in 2014 that AIS is vulnerable to spoofing, hijacking, and availability
disruption [2]. Their experiments confirmed and demonstrated the ease of AIS data packet
manipulation, replay attacks, and obfuscation via an Software-Defined Radios (SDR) and an
open source software. Trend Micro concluded that malicious actors could cause significant
economic and political damage globally, given the current AIS standard and technical
architecture.
In TrendMicro’s research, spoofedAIS data packets that encapsulated a fictitious ship’s nav-
igational track-over-ground, were broadcasted to a test receiver. The test receiver accepted
the spoofed AIS data packets and plotted the fictitious ship’s course. This stimulated attack,
when scaled to the real world, could potentially escalate political tensions between rival
governments when tracks of fictitious commercial or military ships venture into restricted
territorial waters or exclusive economic zones. Figure 2.5 represents the track-over-ground
of Trend Micro’s fictitious ship in the Mediterranean Sea.
Previous work at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) explored AIS to research the fea-
sibility of maritime voyage network exploitation through SDR and open-source software
utilization. Rubinstein [12] identified that “modern maritime vessels are floating [cyber-
physical systems]” and categorized the typical commercial voyage network using three main
functional areas: 1) voyage network, 2) engineering network, and 3) administrative net-
work, as shown in Figure 2.6. These voyage networks utilize complex embedded networks
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to monitor, regulate, and actuate critical shipboard functions.
Figure 2.4. AIS Class A and Class B comparison of interoperability and
limitations. Source: [19].
Rubinstein specifically explored how the NMEA-0183 standard affects maritime voyage
networks and causes AIS to be vulnerable. He concluded that shipboard voyage networks
are critically vulnerable to direct AIS message injections via radio-frequency apertures
[12]. These integrated networks are capable of interfacing with each other but often via
proprietary communication methods. Consequently, manufacturer design freedoms and
NMEA architectural similarities between individual ships introduced “unintended access
through common commercial systems” [12].
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Figure 2.5. An illustration of spoofed ship following a programmed path.
Source: [2].
Figure 2.6. A commercial shipboard network diagram. Source: [12].
Using an offensive cyber operations (OCO) approach, Rubinstein [12] developed an effective
experimental “AIS security research tool” to reverse engineer and replicate named NMEA
Messages. He successfully spoofed an experimental AIS network by injecting NMEA-
formatted, arbitrary, user-defined data strings.
His methodology included a custom Python script used to inject arbitrary, user-defined
static and dynamic navigational data into the experimental NMEA data streams. The
arbitrary data strings were formatted per ITU-R M.1371-5 and NMEA-0183 standards and
were validated for system acceptability through the transmitting AIS transponder. The test
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receiver accepted, parsed, and plotted the arbitrary data without error onto the Chart Plotting
Navigation (CPN) computer, producing results analogous to those in Figure 2.5.
In 2017 Heaney [13] extended Rubinstein’s research by exploring the “weaknesses in
the AIS protocol that allow for targeted or broadcast distribution of binary data to any
AIS”. He applied Rubinstein’s research to the concept of AIS “network amalgamation” of
disparate maritime equipment, which all utilize the NMEA-0183 standard to communicate
both internally and externally to the ship. Specifically, Heaney explored the issue of
“unintended access through common commercial systems” [12] through arbitrary, user-
data injections. He concluded that it is theoretically possible to gain unauthorized access
to any networked NMEA-0183 compliant system utilizing malicious, user-data injections
made possible through AIS-specific binary data Messages (i.e., Message 6, 8, 25, and 26).
His theory is analogous to a potential cyber-attack scenario whereby a malicious payload
establishes a reverse Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) shell with inherited privilege
and access to the attacker. In a maritime context, one possible scenario is when an attacker
establishes a remote access connection to any critical navigation system or subsystem to
execute code via AIS binary data Messages [13].
In 2019, Harris reported that AIS spoofing is a common occurrence around Shanghai
and that many vessels conduct these activities to avoid interdiction by local maritime
authorities while transporting illicit goods (e.g., sand dredged from the Yangtze River) [1].
Harris highlighted an event when the captain of MV Manukai reported strange AIS data
abnormalities while transiting through the Chinese territorial waters surrounding Shanghai
[1]. While docked, the MV Manukai discovered that its identity and public maritime
information were propagating from a spoofed nearby location. Similarly, other instances of
spoofed AIS data involved ship voyage information suggesting transit through the Huangpu
River while the physical ship was located on the Yangtze River a few miles away [1].
2.3 Standardization and Clarification of Technical AIS
Nomenclature
This section provides standard nomenclature for the use of “message”, “sentence”, and
“packet” for the succeeding chapters of this thesis.
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The ITU-R M.1371-5 and NMEA-0183 utilize the terms “message” and “sentence” inter-
changeably. Often, “message” and “sentence” are used to refer to named AIS Message
types; e.g., Message 1, Message 2; NMEA input/output sentences, e.g., ABM, ACK, BBM,
DTM; AIS and NMEA encapsulated data; fully formatted AIS and NMEA data trans-
missions; sentence/message fragmentation sequencing; cumulative sentence counters; and
multi-message sentence sequencing. Effectively, there is no proper uniformity or standard-
ization of terminology between the two standards. If a specific section of either standards’
documentation is not explicit with its terminology, contextual clues are typically required
for clarification.
For clarity throughout this work, we adopt the following terminology and provide Figure 2.7
as a visual aid regarding our chosen terminology. This figure details a scenario that features
an AIS Message 6 requiring fragmentation and transmission via four AIS data packets.
Figure 2.7. Visual representation of the differences between the adopted
terminology (i.e., data packet, Message, and sentence).
“Message”, a proper noun, refers to all specifically named and implemented AIS Message
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types, e.g., Message 1, Message 2, Message 3, and NMEA-0183 Input/Output Messages,
e.g., ABM, ACK, BBM, DTM.
“Data packet(s)” or “packet(s)” refer(s) to a properly-formatted AIS transmission. A packet
is the transmission-ready data that includes all header, footer, and encapsulated AIS and
NMEA information. Example: “The current AIS or NMEA protocols and standards do
not offer data integrity or authentication capabilities to transmitted or received AIS data
packets.”
“Sentence(s)” refer(s) to the encapsulated data located between the AIS header and footer
fields inside an AIS data packet. Sentences are strictly used in situations involving the
NMEAdata to be encapsulated exceeds the payload size limitation of anAIS data packet; the
individual NMEA data fragments are referred as sentences. Multi-sentence AIS Messages
are typically of types 6, 8, 12, and 14. Example: “AIS Message 6 is one of many user-
definable AIS Message types. Often these Message 6 exceeds the payload size limitation of
an AIS data packet and requires fragmentation under NMEA and ITU rule sets for handling
multi-sentence AIS messages.”
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CHAPTER 3:
Experimental Design and Considerations
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that the current AIS protocol and standard possess
sufficient flexibility to add a novel data integrity and authentication capability through an
external and modular AIS authentication system. This experimental AIS authentication
system should incorporate specific design features and mechanisms which align with a
number of AIS technical and operational constraints. These constraints include system
scalability, compliance with standards, and bandwidth constraints while underway.
This chapter details the research questions, technical considerations, design methodology,
and application of cryptography required for the creation of a functional AIS message
authentication system which utilizes AIS Message 6 and Message 8 to encapsulate and
deliver authenticated AIS data packets.
3.1 Research Questions
This thesis intends to answer the following three research questions.
What would the overall AIS technical architecture look like after the addition of
data integrity and authentication? Integrity and authenticity are novel and inorganic AIS
capabilities; current commercially-available AIS devices do not support these two pillars
of information assurance.
Does the current AIS protocol possess sufficient flexibility to provide data integrity
andauthenticationwithout changing the overallAIS technical architecture? The ITU-R
M.1371-5 and NMEA-0183 standards provide the technical and operational recommenda-
tions for the AIS. This research was restricted to the existing capabilities and protocols
documented in these two standards. This research does not desire to introduce foreign
technologies to the overall design and risk standard nonconformity and non-functionality.
To what extent do the ITU-RM.1371-5 and NMEA-0183 standards constrain the pop-
ulation of suitable cryptographic algorithms? This research explored and implemented
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lightweight cryptographic algorithms to determine the extent of the AIS’s compatibility and
feasibility of supporting cryptography.
3.2 Security Design and Considerations
This research identified various considerations that directly influence the proposed AIS
authenticator’s security design, implementation, and authentication capability. These con-
siderations are discussed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. A table of various considerations that affect the proposed AIS
authenticator’s security design, implementation, and authentication capabil-
ities.
Proposed Authenticator Design Constraints and Considerations
Constraint Information
Scalability
The proposed system must operate aboard every AIS-
equipped vessel concurrently, scale proportionally with
the growth or decline of the maritime community,




Queried AIS transmissions increase the computational
overhead associated with the proposed solution. The proposed
design architecture must utilize cryptographic schemes and
algorithms that are optimized and efficient to support operation
in high-density maritime traffic areas such as the straits of
Malacca, Dover, and Gibraltar.
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Table 3.1 continued from previous page
Confidentiality
The proposed design architecture will not provide
confidentiality to AIS message traffic. AIS’s primary function
is to provide safety of navigation through direct or broadcast
maritime static and dynamic voyage data. Confidentiality
would detract from the AIS’s intended purpose if other vessels
are unable to decrypt the ciphertext. Furthermore,
confidentiality would potentially interfere with maritime
assistance if the assisting vessel is not properly equipped to
decrypt the AIS ciphertext.
Forward
Compatibility
The proposed design architecture must possess a characteristic
that allows for transfer to and integration with all future AIS




The system design must conform and operate within the limits
of this standard. Specifically, this standard applies to how
voyage information and data structures are utilized and shared




The ITU-R M.1371-5 standard provides the guidance
necessary for Radio-frequency (RF) communication between
AIS stations. This is a design constraint that directly
influences which cryptographic algorithm would be possible
for design implementation due to AIS packet size limitations.
Modular
Design
The overall design architecture must be highly modular to
provide a “plug and play” capability. Its removal must not




The ITU-R M.1371-5 standard imposes bandwidth
requirements on how much data any AIS station may
transmit. The proposed system design must account for,
comply with, and adapt to the 27 existing AIS Messages [20].
Appendix A details the 27 different AIS Messages and
their use.
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Table 3.1 continued from previous page
Minimalist
System
The proposed system must only utilize protocols, processes,
and capabilities organic to the current AIS and NMEA
standards. Manufacturer adoption is more likely with
minimal invasiveness to the current AIS architecture.
Receive-only
AIS Users
This design consideration prioritizes both Class A and
Class B AIS devices over receive-only AIS devices.
Research efforts will focus primarily on the requirements
and capabilities associated with both Class A and Class B
AIS transceivers.
Bandwidth Constrained
Typically, vessels in port have higher bandwidth availability
than underway vessels. RF propagation is the only means
available to an underway vessel for off-ship communications.
The proposed system should employ a message validation
mechanism (i.e., key management and acquisition) that does
not burden the vessel’s bandwidth limitations.
With regards to confidentiality, some authors [21] argue for the benefits of confidentiality
in areas where pirates have been known to operate. Although the argument is sound,
this research argues that current mitigation and protection mechanisms provide layers of
defense-in-depth against possible pirate attacks (e.g., route diversion, on-board security
personnel, and Combined Task Force 151 anti-piracy efforts [22]).
This research acknowledges and agrees with Bruce Scheiner’s assessment and caveat emptor
regarding the advancement of technology and its impact on the notion of cryptographic
bit-size security: Cryptographic algorithms or mechanisms used today could be obsolete
tomorrow [23]. Thus, forward compatibility is a necessity for the longevity of this proposed
system design.
3.3 Proposed AIS Authenticator Mechanism and Design
The overall proposed AIS authenticator design integrates a modular security system into
the current AIS architecture. This novel security system has the potential to mitigate
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against some possible attacks (discussed in [1], [2]) by means of cryptographic protection
of outgoing AIS data packets.
Figure 3.1 is a high-level, component-based, visual abstraction of how a common, inte-
grated shipboard voyage network currently communicates to another using the current AIS
architecture. The middle blocks (i.e. binary, NMEA-0183, and ITU-RM.1371-5) represent
the data state required by each shipboard component (i.e., Shipboard System, Shipboard
Network, and AIS device).
Figure 3.1. Inter-protocol conversions and data exchanges in the current AIS
architecture.
The proposed AIS authenticator requires an architecture that resembles and incorporates
capabilities depicted in Figure 3.2. The difference between Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 is
the incorporation of an “authenticator” block between the “shipboard network” and “AIS
device” blocks.
The “authenticator block” is analogous to a transponder, adding supplemental responses
and capabilities to the AIS that either permit or block received AIS data packets based on
user-implemented rule sets.
During experiments in this work, the proposed authenticator was instantiated via a stan-
dalone laptop and several Python scripts. The proposed AIS authenticator functions as a
broker and virtual “demilitarized zone.” It receives and passes data from the ship’s voyage
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network to the AIS transponder and vice versa. The AIS authenticator filters and protects
the integrated voyage network from illegitimate data by only allowing validated data packets
to reach the voyage network from the AIS transponder.
Figure 3.2. Inter-protocol conversions and communications in proposed de-
sign architecture.
There are multiple conceivable approaches to accomplishing authentication. The trade-offs
associated with a particular AIS authenticator design can be evaluated by considering the
number of mechanisms required to accomplish authentication.
3.3.1 One-Mechanism Design Architecture
Figure 3.3 depicts a high-level, visual abstraction of a one-mechanism AIS authenticator
design. A one-mechanism architecture would require the combined encapsulation of the
normalAIS data packet and its cryptographic value into the originally-intendedAISMessage
type. For example, if Vessel A intends to transmit AIS Message 1 (i.e., an AIS Position
Report broadcast), the AIS transponder would have to encapsulate the navigational voyage
data and its cryptographic value within the technical parameters of AIS Message 1.
A one-mechanism design is not an optimal choice because this design violates the ITU-
R M.1371-5. Each AIS Message type has a specific task, purpose, and payload data
specifications and size limitation. The incorporation of a cryptographic value with the
original AIS message’s payload would require modifying the ITU-R M.1371-5’s regulation
of the AIS message’s syntax and composition. AIS Message 1 is for navigational data
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reports; its data payload is a constant 168 bits and the overall AIS data packet size is 256
bits. These values are constant regardless of the maritime environment.
Furthermore, a one-mechanism design would not be feasible with other AIS message types
that feature a variable message payload because the one-mechanism solution would need
to function with all 27 AIS Message types. Additionally, the majority of the 26 other AIS
Message types do not permit variable message payloads.
Figure 3.3. Basic visual abstraction of a one-mechanism design architecture.
3.3.2 Two-Mechanism Design Architecture
Figure 3.4 depicts a high-level, visual abstraction of a two-mechanism AIS authenticator
design. A two-mechanism architecture features two separate transmissions: 1) the normal
AIS data packet and 2) a separate, second AIS data packet encapsulating the cryptographic
value of the first normal AIS data packet. For example, if Vessel A intends to transmit
Message 1, it would have to transmit Message 1 normally and follow up the initial trans-
mission with a separate AIS data packet that encapsulates the cryptographic value as the
AIS message’s authentication payload.
The first of two messages adheres to standard AIS data packet transmission procedures.
This unaltered AIS transmission would allow receive-only vessels to operate normally and
maintain safe situational awareness.
The two-mechanism design architecture is not an optimal design choice because this design
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Figure 3.4. Basic visual abstraction of a two-mechanism design architecture.
is inefficient with TDMA; the design wastes limited AIS transmission slots in congested
traffic situations and for messages of zero interest.
3.3.3 Three-Mechanism Design Architecture
Figure 3.5 depicts a high-level, visual abstraction of a three-mechanism design architec-
ture. This three-mechanism design features a standard AIS data packet transmission, an
interrogation message (challenge), and message authentication response.
As discussed, this first message flow is not special or unique to the current AIS architecture
and permits normal operations and maintaining situational awareness.
The second message flow is an interrogation message. A receiving vessel equipped with the
an AIS authenticator generates this challenge message, as desired, after receipt of a normal
AIS data packet. (During the experiment, the authenticator prototype will be configured
to automatically authenticate every received message; this configuration is implemented to
measure and assess the prototype’s capability of continuous authentication.) The proposed
challenge message is a combined encapsulation of the initial normal data packet and a
timestamp. The timestamp is measured coarsely so that, in absence of an attacker, it should
match the sending timestamp. Although the addition of a timestamp in the interrogation
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message does not provide true non-repudiation, the timestamp provides a degree of replay
protection.
Figure 3.5. Basic visual abstraction of a three-mechanism design architec-
ture.
The third message flow is a response message that incorporates a cryptographic authentica-
tion value. A vessel equipped with an AIS authenticator can generate this response message
automatically upon receipt of the challenge message. The proposed response message is
an encapsulation of a generated authentication cryptographic value over the original AIS
data packet. The response message includes the concatenation of a timestamp with the
original AIS data packet. This timestamp provides a degree of replay protection and an
input the challenging vessel can evaluate against the time that the original AIS data packet
was received.
3.3.4 Selecting the Three-Mechanism Design Architecture
This work evaluates the proposed three-mechanism design architecture as requiring the
fewest possible message exchanges without violating established message protocols while
limiting bandwidth inefficiencies. This three-mechanism design permits normal AIS mes-
sage transmission, benefiting vessels that are either not equipped with the proposed AIS
authentication system or fitted with a receive-only AIS device. In sum, as specified, this
three-mechanism design fulfills the following design constraints: compliancewith ITU stan-
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dards, compliance with NMEA standards, bandwidth economy, and scalability (including
receive-only users).
3.3.5 A Detailed Explanation of the Three-Mechanism Design Archi-
tecture
With regards to the three-mechanismdesign, inspiration for the second and thirdmechanisms
originated from military “challenge and response” procedures used in situations when one
party encounters another of unknown identity. These challenge and response procedures,
using the methodology and three mechanisms illustrated in Figure 3.6, were modified and
implemented in our developed AIS authentication algorithm.
Figure 3.6 visually details each mechanism and how the three-mechanism design processes
various AIS Messages to incorporate data integrity and authentication. As shown, Ship
A records each transmission-ready AIS data packet into a buffer with a timestamp before
the data packet’s RF transmission because the inclusion of a timestamp provides some
protection against replay attacks and various authenticator verification check points for the
originator and recipient.
Upon receipt of the initial, standard AIS data packet, Ship B may choose to challenge the
legitimacy of the received data packet. This challenge is an encapsulation of the in-question
AIS data packet. After challenge message creation, Ship B sends the challenge data packet
to Ship A.
Upon receipt of a challenge data packet, Ship A parses the challenge data packet to identify
the original AIS transmission then conducts a buffer query to verify the challenger’s claim.
If the in-question AIS data packet exists within Ship A’s buffer, Ship A responds to Ship B
with an AIS data packet encapsulating a cryptographic authentication value of the initial,
standard AIS data packet and sending timestamp.
However, if this data does not exist within the buffer, Ship A takes no further action. The
transmission of a “true-negative” message would require RF bandwidth and computational
resources to transmit. In our minimalist approach, this proposed methodology renders
the lack-of-response from Ship A sufficient for Ship B to assume data validation error or
illegitimacy.
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Figure 3.6. Abstraction of the proposed AIS authenticator’s functions and
mechanisms utilized to challenge and validate an AIS message between two
ships.
3.4 Delivery Method
This section examines the proposal to use AIS Message 6 to transmit the challenge message
and AIS Message 8 to transmit the response message. Message 6 and Message 8 were
ultimately selected because of their payload size, functional flexibility, and designated uses
in the current architecture. We begin by evaluating the encapsulation space available in all
AIS messages.
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3.4.1 Message Types and Available Payload
According to ITU-R M.1371-5, AIS utilizes the concept of a frame that equals one minute.
Each frame is divided into 2,250 time slots and each time slot may carry up to 256 bits—the
maximum size of one standard AIS data packet [7]. The AIS protocol permits using up to
four additional time slots to accommodate more data [7] (i.e., a multi-sentence message.
Therefore, the AIS protocol is theoretically capable of transmitting up to 1,280 consecutive
bits. Figure 3.7 provides a visual representation of how the AIS protocol fragments large
consecutive data packets.
Figure 3.7. Encapsulation and fragmentation for AIS data packets exceeding
the 256-bit limit.
However, not every bit within a standard AIS data packet is used for data transmission.
Some bits are reserved and allocated for application layer and physical layer overhead. This
significantly lowers the number of bits available to encapsulate our proposed cryptographic
value. Table 3.2 depicts the various 27 in-use AIS message types and their corresponding
maximum payload size given the restrictions discussed in Section 3.2.
A review of the 27 AIS message types reveals that AISMessages 6 (Binary Addressed Mes-
sage), 8 (Binary Broadcast Message), 12 (Addressed Safety-related Message), 14 (Safety-
related Broadcast Message), and 26 (Multiple Slot Binary Message with communication
state) possess the largest possible payload sizes.
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Table 3.2. Maximum AIS payloads for specific AIS Message types. Adapted
from [7].
Maximum Payload Size for Various AIS Message Types





























3.4.2 Application Specific Messages
ITU-R M.1371-5 [7] states that Application Specific Messages (ASM) are
AIS messages where the data content is defined by the application are ASM.
Examples of this are binary Messages 6, 8, 25, and 26. The data content does
not affect the operation of the AIS. AIS is a means for transferring the data
content between stations. An ASM’s data structure consists of an application
identifier followed by the application data.
A 16-bit application identifier uniquely classifies ASM, a feature that could be used to
uniquely identify the challenge and response messages in our proposed system. This
application identifier is comprised of two parts. The first part is a 10-bit Designated Area
Code (DAC) that identifies a specific internationally or regionallymanaged area. The second
part is a 6-bit Function Identifier (FI) that identifies the “data content structure within an
application under a DAC assignment” [7]. Table 3.3 is a tabulation and description of the
two components included in all ASM.
Table 3.3. A table detailing an application identifier bit 0’s through 15’s fit




Designated area code (DAC). This code is based on the maritime identification digits (MID).
Exceptions are 0 (test) and 1 (international). Although the length is 10 bits, the DAC codes
equal to or above 1 000 are reserved for future use
5 - 0 Function identifier. The meaning should be determined by the authority which is responsiblefor the area given in the designated area code
Each DAC may support up to 64 unique Function Identifiers (FIs) [7]; Table 3.4 represents
all registered FIs in use. The ITU reserved FIs 33 through 63 for future use.
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Table 3.4. Tabular summary of 64 AIS ASM. Adapted from [24].
Function Identifier Message Name
11 Meteorological / Hydrological
12 Dangerous cargo indication
13 Fairway closed
14 Tidal window
15 Extended ship static and voyage-related data
16 Number of persons on board
17 VTS-generated/synthetic targets
18 Clearance time to enter port
19 Marine traffic signal
20 Berthing data
21 Weather observation report from ship
22 Area notice - broadcast
23 Area notice - addressed
24 Extended ship static and voyage-related data
25 Dangerous cargo indication
26 Environmental
27 Route information - broadcast
28 Route information - addressed
29 Text description - broadcast
30 Text description - addressed
31 Meteorological and Hydrographic data
32 Tidal window
33 - 63 Reserved for future use
No application identifiers exist to support our proposed system. Therefore, a custom 16-bit
code is necessary.
As we consider message types for our scheme, we note that AIS Messages 6, 8, and 26 have
both the longest variable payloads and are ASM. We will now evaluate the suitability of
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the ASM messages in more detail.
3.4.3 Message 6: Binary Addressed Message
Message 6 is a suitable choice for use as a “challenge” message because an interrogating
ship should not broadcast a challenge message as not all vessels in the vicinity may need
to see the challenge. As such, a challenge message should address a specific vessel and
include a return address (which the interrogated ship will use to respond). The Message 6
format permits fulfilling these two requirements.
AIS Message 6 has two 30-bit source and destination identifier fields and a useful payload
limit of 920 bits [7]. The source and destination identifier fields serve a similar purpose
as the source and destination fields in TCP. Additionally, this message contains a 16-bit
application identifier field. Figure 3.8 is a detailed breakout of the utilization and purpose
of each bit in Message 6.
3.4.4 Message 8: Binary Broadcast Message
Message 8 is an optimal choice as the “response” message because of the presence of a
source field and lack of a destination field. One might argue that Message 6 could serve as
both the challenge and response messages, but Message 8 is a better choice for the following
reasons.
A broadcast of the response is more efficient than a single addressed message. There may
be other ships in the area that also want to verify the integrity and source authenticity
of a particular message. A broadcasted response services multiple vessels, effectively
conserving time slots for other users. This is analogous to a school teacher answering one
student’s question while efficiently responding to several other shy students.
Similar to Message 6, Message 8 also contains the 16-bit application identifier field. How-
ever, Message 8 has only one 30-bit source identifier field and a useful payload of 952
bits [7]. The absence of a 30-bit destination field allows for a larger cryptographic value to
be transmitted, giving Message 8 a payload limit 32 bits larger than Message 6. Figure 3.9
is a detailed breakout of the utilization and purpose of each bit in Message 8.
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Figure 3.8. Detailed breakdown of AIS Message 6. Adapted from [20].
3.4.5 Message 25: Single Slot Binary Message
The ITU-R M.1371-5 primarily utilizes Message 25 for short, infrequent data transmis-
sions [7], [20]. Although this AIS message is capable of addressed and broadcast data
applications, its useful payload capacity is limited to 80 bits for addressed applications
and 112 bits for broadcast applications. This limit is less than Message 6’s 920-bit useful
payload and Message 8’s 952-bit useful payload. Message 25 is not an optimal choice
for the proposed AIS authenticator design because of its smaller useful payload size and
designation for short, infrequent data transmissions. Figure 3.10 is a detailed breakout of
the utilization and purpose of each bit in Message 25.
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Figure 3.9. Detailed breakdown of AIS Message 8. Adapted from [20].
3.4.6 Message 26: Multiple Slot BinaryMessage with Communication
State
Message 26 possesses the capability for addressed and broadcast applications and features
a useful payload capacity for a 952-bit addressed-variant message and a 984-bit broadcast-
variant message. Figure 3.11 is a detailed breakout of the utilization and purpose of each
bit in Message 26.
The ITU-R M.1371-5 standard primarily utilizes Message 26 for scheduled binary data
transmissions by automated broadcast stations using either the SelfOrganizedTimeDivision
Multiple Access (SOTDMA) or Incremental Time Division Multiple Access (ITDMA)
schemes [7], [20]. SOTDMA is the basic RF TDMA scheme for scheduled repetitive
transmission from an autonomous AIS station (e.g., shore station broadcasting harbor
information). The ITU-R M.1371-5 recommends that SOTDMA should be used by AIS
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stations “operating in autonomous and continuous mode” [7]. AIS message types that use
the SOTDMA scheme are of “a repeatable character and are used in order to supply a
continuously updated surveillance picture to other users of the data link” [7].
Figure 3.10. Detailed breakdown of AIS Message 25. Adapted from [20].
Conversely, the ITU-R M.1371-5 recommends that AIS stations use the ITDMA scheme
“to pre-announce transmission slots of non-repeatable character” [7] for autonomous and
continuous AIS transmissions. The current AIS standard recommends the utilization of
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ITDMA (i.e., Message 26) for three occasions: data link network entry, temporary changes
and transitions in periodic reporting intervals, and pre-announcement of safety related
messages [7]. Essentially, Message 26 ITDMA is reserved for alerting messages vice
normal information exchange.
Figure 3.11. Detailed breakdown of AIS Message 26. Adapted from [20].
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Given the ITU-R M.1371-5 restrictions on its role and utilization, Message 26 is not an
optimal choice for the propose AIS authenticator. The recommended use and application of
Message 26 does not support the prioritized function and application of the challenge and
response messages. The challenge and response messages from a maritime vessel are not
autonomous and periodic, but are dependent upon the cumulative frequency of all received
data packets in the maritime environment. This cumulative frequency is not constant and
varies in time depending on the environment; this cumulative frequency is not periodic.
Furthermore, the SOTDMA and ITDMA schemes do not easily support implementation of
the proposed challenge and response messages. Instead of SOTDMA or ITDMA, the chal-
lenge and responsemessages aremore suited for theRandomAccess TimeDivisionMultiple
Access (RATDMA) scheme. The ITU-RM.1371-5 recommends that the RATDMAscheme
is used when an AIS station needs to allocate a unannounced time slot [7].
3.5 Choosing between Asymmetric or Symmetric Authen-
tication Schemes
To this point, this work utilized the term “cryptographic authentication value” to avoid any
unnecessary bias towards any one of two broad categories of cryptography: asymmetric
and symmetric. While it is possible to incorporate both types of cryptography into the novel
AIS authenticator design, one is more appropriate for the maritime environment.
Before progressing further, it is important to recognize that these two categories of cryp-
tography cannot be compared on equal footing due to their advantages and disadvantages
for specific applications, problems, and the functional environment [23]. Therefore, this
research must make the comparison and decision in the context of the constraints and
considerations discussed in Section 3.2.
This section does not intend to provide a detailed discussion of each possible asymmetric or
symmetric algorithmic variant. However, this section examines the unique characteristics,
advantages, and disadvantages of asymmetric and symmetric cryptography with respect to
implementation in the proposed system and application in the maritime environment.
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3.5.1 Asymmetric Cryptography
In asymmetric cryptography, there is an unprotected public key and a protected private key;
the asymmetric system must ensure the security of the private key insofar that private key
generation from the public key is infeasible. Thus, the public key can be made public and
available to all entities. Anyone with access to the public key can validate the source of a
digital signature because only the signatory should have access to the private key.
When used for authentication, asymmetric algorithms refer to digital signatures, where
cryptographic keys are used for signing (private key) and verifying (public key) to ensure
data integrity and the validity.
There are three satisfactory characteristics that make digital signatures a compelling option
for the proposed system:
• Authenticity. The concept of paired cryptographic keys ensure authenticity because
only a private key is capable of signing and only the originator has possession of the
private key [23], [25]. This also implies unforgeability. If the private key has not
been compromised only the signatory has access and knowledge of it [23], [25].
• Uniqueness. The generated digital signature is a unique arithmetic product of the
algorithmic function over a specific plain text [23], [25].
• Non-repudiation. Digital signature verification relies on the access to the public key,
so the signer is the only entity possessing the private key. Generally, the public key
is available to everyone and the verification process is independent of the signature’s
originator [23], [25].
There are two positive attributes of digital signatures that are complimentary to themaritime
environment. First, the use and acquisition of cryptographic public keys do not require prior
coordination of participating parties before initial communication at sea. A vessel may take
advantage of message integrity and authentication from digital signatures as long as they
have access to the corresponding public key, regardless of whether or not the sender and
receiver have communicated before. Second, trusted third-parties provide the trust necessary
for public key authentication and eliminate the need for vessel-to-vessel trust.
Conversely, there are three unique, negative attributes of digital signatures that are un-
desirable in the maritime environment. First, to verify a digital signature, a vessel must
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possess the corresponding public key. If an underway vessel does not have the public key
it must utilize valuable shipboard computational resources and RF bandwidth to acquire
the key, typically from the message originator or a shore-based distribution node. Second,
the compromise of a private key could have widespread ramifications if all messages are
signed using a persistent private key. Third, asymmetric cryptography and digital signatures
require significantly more processing power than symmetric cryptography, and signature
size is a consideration factor under AIS Message format limitations.
3.5.2 Symmetric Cryptography
Contrary to asymmetric cryptography, symmetric cryptography does not utilize digital
signatures for authentication, but instead achieves authentication through use of a Message
Authentication Code (MAC). A MAC is a key-dependent one-way function, requiring a
shared secret key between both parties [23].
There are four satisfactory characteristics that make MACs a compelling option for the
proposed AIS authenticator design:
• Low computational cost. MACs are typically utilize block ciphers or hash functions;
therefore, they require fewer computational resources than digital signatures [23],
[26].
• Authenticity. Any alterations of the transmitted message are detectable through
verification of the authentication tag and message [23], [26].
• Uniqueness. The generated MAC is a unique function over a specific plain text [23],
[25].
• Fixed Output Length. Regardless of the size the input message, the generated MAC
is always the same length [23], [26].
There are three positive attributes of MACs specific to the maritime environment. First, in
the event of a compromised secret shared key, only the data associatedwith the compromised
shared key is affected. Therefore, the effects in the maritime environment are confined only
to the two or more vessels that utilized the same compromised secret and do not extend
further. Second, MAC generation is computationally less intensive compared to digital
signatures in asymmetric cryptography. Finally, the output size of the MAC is attractive
due to the space restrictions of the AIS message format.
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Conversely, there are two negative attributes of MACs specific to the maritime environment.
Namely, key management introduces an administrative overhead that may become too
excessive in areas of high-density traffic. If separate key pairs are used for each pair of
vessels in the maritime environment, this would introduce scaling and usability issues.
A maritime operating environment of n users would require n2−n2 distinct shared keys.
Maritime key management implies a level of pre-coordination and planning associated
with key distribution and usage among various vessels, particularly as the AIS bandwidth
is inhibiting for on-the-spot key exchange. This raises potential issues associated with
unnecessary bandwidth usage for key coordination and acquisition in unexpected encounter
cases, such as two or more vessels unexpectedly encountering each other during passage
making.
Second, the disadvantage of a shared secret key is that the risk of a compromised key
increases proportionally with the number of users utilizing the secret key; each user has a
number of associated threat vectors that affect the cumulative threat calculus of a shared
key scenario.
Given these concerns, there are at least two undesirable scenarios that exist within symmetric
cryptography that pose a significant disadvantage to either key management or excessive
key sharing.
The first scenario involves the maximization of shared symmetric keys among a number of
existing entities in an environment. In this case, the number of uniquely shared symmetric
keys is maximized and the number of entities sharing these keys is minimized. This
situation effectively minimizes the extent of the damage from a compromised key, but
creates an environment saturated with unique shared symmetric keys and administrative
overhead. It also inhibits message broadcast.
The second scenario is effectively the inverse of the first. In this case the number of uniquely
shared symmetric keys is minimized and the number of entities is maximized. This situation
allows for reduced administration of key management, but the number of vessels that share
the same shared symmetric key is greater. This case creates an environment where all
participants must be intensely scrutinized for trust and reliability, due to the increased risk
of the secret key being shared to a malicious actor.
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3.5.3 Selecting Asymmetric Cryptography
Given the concerns discussed in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, asymmetric cryptography is the
preferred choice for the current AIS architecture and associated challenges of the maritime
domain. Specifically, asymmetric cryptography is selected over symmetric cryptography
to mitigate against the following unique maritime challenges: limited bandwidth at sea and,
very importantly, administrative overhead.
Limited Available Bandwidth at Sea. RF Bandwidth for Internet Protocol (IP) services at
sea is a premiumcommodity. According to [27], the averageU.S. broadband internet average
bandwidth is 11.7Mb/s; some area-specific service providers are capable of providing more
than 1,000 Mb/s through fiber optic media. Conversely, a typical maritime vessel may have
up to 2 Mb/s via a commercial satellite service provider [27]. Due to the limited bandwidth
for underway maritime vessels, key acquisition becomes a critical issue and concern for
both types of cryptography. One could argue that this concern may be mitigated while
vessels are in port and have access to shore-based IP services and capabilities. However,
this mitigation is effective only if all vessels encountered while on passage are known
and accounted for. This mitigation becomes ineffective when one vessel unexpectedly
encounters another vessel and consequently needs ad hoc acquisition of the corresponding
cryptographic key. While this issue affects both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography,
it is more pronounced in symmetric cryptography. In an asymmetric system, public keys
are available to everyone and can be pre-loaded without any ship-to-ship coordination in
port; however, shore-based services are unlikely to be able to facilitate key exchange for all
potentially encountered underway vessels.
Administrative Overhead. In dense traffic areas, such as Singapore or Dover, the number
of unique secret keys would create a significant burden on a vessel’s voyage management
systems. In an area that experiences 100 vessels per day, there would be 4,950 uniquely
shared secret keys (i.e. n2−n2 keys). For example, [28] reports that Dover Strait sees the
passage of approximately 400 ships daily. In this scenario, there would be up to 79,800
uniquely shared secret keys. The selection of an asymmetric cryptographic system over
a symmetric cryptographic system eliminates this administrative overhead because of the
concept of asymmetric key pairs and the possibility for any receiving vessel to validate
the validity of a message using the appropriate public key. Message integrity is facilitated
through the utilization of one signing key and one verification key for all users.
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3.6 Asymmetric Cryptographic Signature Algorithm Se-
lection
This section discusses various signature algorithm solutions. It is important to focus on the
characteristics and technical limitations that may disqualify common algorithms from use
in the current AIS standard and the proposed authenticator. This section therefore also con-
siders identity-based and certificateless public key infrastructures as possible alternatives.
3.6.1 Digital Signature Length Limitations to Choosing a Scheme
Regardless of the strengths or benefits of any existing or future cryptographic algorithm or
scheme, the hard technical limitation is the AIS standard for message payload size. The
selected digital signature algorithm must not generate a digital signature that exceeds Mes-
sage 8’s 952-bit payload limit. In Section 3.4, this research selectedMessage 6 andMessage
8 for the challenge and response messages, respectively. Message 8 will encapsulate the
digital signature and its payload limitation is the main discriminator of all possible digital
signature algorithms. This payload size constraint significantly narrows the amount and
type of eligible digital signature algorithms. Any attempts to increase Message 8’s 952-bit
payload size require a revision of the ITU-R M.1371-5.
Generally, the bit-level security of a cryptographic algorithm scales according to the size
of algorithm’s key, modulus, or f in the case of Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), RSA,
and Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), respectively [29]. Similarly,
the scaling of the bit-wise security level also affects the generated digital signature size.
Therefore, the AIS standard limits the maximum possible bit-level security of any eligible
algorithm.
In the following comparisons for PKI based signatures, identity-based signatures, and
certificateless signatures, we compare on the points of ease of key distribution, revocation,
bandwidth economy, and signature length.
Computational costs for signature verification and key storage are also considerations with
signature algorithm selections [30], but less critical in the AIS context. In particular,
modernAISClassA andClass Bmaritime vessels possess the computation and transmission
capabilities to support the transference and processing of digital signatures.
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3.6.2 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
This research compares the RSA digital signature scheme [31], ECDSA [32], and DSA
[33] within traditional PKI as potential alternatives. These are common digital signature
algorithms used in applications such a web computing or email exchange. Elliptic curve
variants such as ECDSA are implementations of existing public key algorithms (e.g. DSA)
using an elliptic curve [23]. The elements of an elliptic curve over a finite field facilitate the
computationally less intensive processing and the faster generation of smaller key sizes [23].
The concept of PKI is applicable and compatible with the maritime environment.
• Distribution Each vessel may be treated as an independent party and eligible for
both public and private keys. There are trusted international maritime organizations
(e.g., IMO, International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse
Authorities (IALA)) that may act as a trusted-third party key certification authority
and repository for public keys.
• Signature Length National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-57
Part 1, Rev 3 is an open source cybersecurity publication published by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, a branch of the U.S. Department of Commerce,
and provides recommendations in cryptographic key management guidance. This
publication recommends the utilization of cryptographic algorithms that offers at least
112-bit security for applications from 2014 to 2030 [29]. In order for applications
to achieve at least 112-bit security, NIST recommends that DSA algorithms utilize a
public key of 2048 bits and a private key of 224 bits; RSA utilize a modulus of 2048
bits; and ECDSA an f from 224 bits to 255 bits [29].
• Bandwidth EconomyWhile an AIS-equipped maritime vessel is in port, bandwidth
economy is not a concern because the maritime vessel would have access to land-
based communication methods (e.g., fiber or copper pier-side internet) to acquire all
necessary digital certificates of all PKI-enabled maritime vessels. However, when a
maritime vessel is underway, bandwidth economy would become a concern for digital
certificate acquisition, with the potential consequence of not obtaining a certificate.
We recommend, to the maximum extent possible, that maritime vessels acquire all
available digital certificates in port in order to minimize bandwidth usage while
underway. While underway, bandwidth is utilized to acquire the digital certificates of
unexpected maritime vessels. Commercial maritime vessels typically follow a pre-
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determined route; this predictability provides insight into which digital certificates
are unnecessary while a vessel is underway.
• Public Key Revocation A digital certificate and the corresponding public key have a
shelf-life before expiry. TheCertificateAuthority sets an expiration date to each issued
digital certificate. However, it is possible for a private key to be compromised before
the expiry date, leading to need for revocation. Due to the bandwidth constraints,
revocation at sea may be inhibited. Consequently, access to a Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) may be limited to time in port, enabling a compromise window of use
while the vessel is in transit and unable to access the CRL.
The current AIS protocol only supports a limited payload size. As noted under Signature
Length, the three common PKI algorithms (i.e., RSA, ECDSA, DSA) have a critical
problem: The generated digital signatures are too large for the current AIS protocol to
support. Therefore, this research must consider alternative PKI solutions.
Within the maritime environment and AIS protocol is the Maritime Mobile Service Iden-
tity (MMSI), an ITU-R M.585-8 standardized vessel identification method. Maritime orga-
nizations, local authorities, and vessels utilize the MMSI to identity and publish a vessel’s
administrative data (e.g., country of origin, registered owner, vessel type, callsign). Any
feasible alternative to the three common PKI algorithms should be able to accommodate
the MMSI identifier as part of the subject’s public values.
3.6.3 Identity-Based Public Key Infrastructure
In 1984, Adi Shamir introduced the identity-based cryptographic scheme [34]. This scheme
“enables any pair of users to communicate securely and to verify each other’s signatures
without exchanging private or public keys, without keeping key directories, and without
using the services of a third party” [34]. Shamir explained that the public key is generated
from a specific attribute associated with that entity’s public identity. Within the maritime
community and AIS protocol, theMMSI is a vessel’s unique public identifier and thus could
be used to calculate an entity’s public key for digital signature verification.
Conversely, the “corresponding secret key is computed by a Key Generation Center (KGC)”
[34]. This characteristic makes the KGC a possible point of failure in the cryptographic
system because a singular third-party entity has knowledge of the private key. Therefore,
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trust is particularly necessary for this cryptographic system to function properly.
Goudossis and Katsikas [21] propose a similar solution to what is discussed in this work
for securing AIS through identity-based public key cryptography. Goudossis and Katsikas
discuss the theoretical application of identity-based public key cryptography providing the
following advantages and benefits for identity-based digital signatures:
• Distribution The authors state there would not be a requirement for numerous “cer-
tificate authorities, sub-certificate authorities, and cross certificate authorities” [21]
required by traditional PKI. They suggest that the National Maritime Registers/Au-
thorities may be suited as the trusted third party and therefore simplifying and re-
ducing the infrastructure. Figure 3.12 shows the authors’ suggested hierarchy for the
identity-based cryptography infrastructure. The authors state that with the absence
of multiple certificate authorities, the adoption of this proposed infrastructure would
not be necessarily hindered by a typical certificate authority’s technical, political, or
financial requirements. As an example, note that National Private Keys Generators
may co-exist with a root IMO-Private Key Generator.
• Signature Length The signature size of an identity-based digital signature is depen-
dent on the specific choice of implementation of bilinear pairing groups based on
elliptic curves [35]. For instance, in 2001 Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham proposed an
identity-based scheme based on the Weil Pairing that yield signature lengths of 126
bits, 154 bits, 237 bits, 259 bits, and 265 bits with discrete-log bit-wise security of
752 bits, 923 bits, 1417 bits, 1551 bits, and 1589 bits; respectively [35].
• Bandwidth Economy An infrastructure utilizing identity-based public key cryptog-
raphy would not have to consume precious bandwidth for transmission of public keys
if such keys are not already loaded in port. Under identity-based PKI, maritime
vessels have the ability the generate the public keys of any other registered maritime
vessel through the use of the publicly identifiable MMSIs. All valid AIS Messages
incorporate a MMSI and would not require additional bandwidth resources to acquire
other types of publicly identifiable information to generate a public key.
• Public Key Revocation Unlike in PKI, the public key here is the vessel’s identity,
e.g. MMSI. Identity revocation for an identity-based AIS authenticator system would
utilize a CRL, similar to traditional PKI. Using this CRL, a trusted international
maritime agency (e.g., IALA, IMO) could then provide the list of invalid MMSIs to
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participating vessels [21]. In cases of private key compromise, but still valid MMSI,
the vessel can update their private key through contact with the KGC [36].
Figure 3.12. Goudossis’s and Katsikas’s proposed maritime identity-based
cryptography architecture. Source: [21].
3.6.4 Certificateless Public Key Infrastructure
In 2003, Sattam Al-Riyami and Kenneth Patterson introduced certificateless public key
cryptography [37]. The authors discussed that this certificateless concept relies on the
use of a trusted third-party, but “does not require the use of certificates to guarantee the
authenticity of public keys” [37]. Certificateless key infrastructures aim to solve some of
the key escrow issues of identity-based key infrastructures.
For identity-based public key cryptography, the trusted third-party organization (i.e., the
KGC) generates the entity’s private key and securely delivers it to that entity. Conversely,
anyone may generate the entity’s public key from certain aspects of that entity’s public
information (e.g., MMSI). However, for certificateless cryptography, the public and private
key generation process is slightly different. The trusted third-party KGC generates a partial
private key from its own master secret key and the entity’s public identity [37]. Once the
entity received the partial private key from the KGC, the entity will generate its full private
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key from a confidential value and the partial private key. With thismethod, the certificateless
concept provides a higher degree of security for the private key than identity-based because
the KGC does not have knowledge of the full private key.
Conversely, this system is not identity-based though it possesses similar traits and processes.
Specifically, the most significant difference between certificateless and identity-based is the
public key is not computable from an identity alone [37]. The entity derives its own public
key from the confidential string value and the KGC’s public parameters. The public key
may be made available to the public either through direct exchange or a publicly accessible
database.
Certificateless cryptography provides the following advantages and benefits:
• Distribution The certificateless scheme is nearly identical to the identity-based
scheme [37] in terms of initial contact with a KGC for obtaining a partial secret
key, and mirrors PKI in terms of public key distribution. The proposed AIS system
would utilize trusted third party maritime authorities and agencies to simplify and
maintain the overall certificateless infrastructure. Within a certificateless framework,
an entity’s public key is not initially available to others because the public key is
derived from the entity’s secret information and the KGC’s public parameters [37].
However, once the entity generates its own public key it may be available to all other
entities via a trusted, secure public repository (such as via in-port loading of public
keys) or as attachments in secure messages.
• Signature Length Similar to the identity-based scheme, a certificateless digital signa-
ture length is dependent on the specific choice of cryptography (see lengthsmentioned
in Section 3.6.3). Certificateless schemes are constructed from bilinearmaps based on
groups [37]. In [37], the authors implemented their proposed certificateless scheme
using Weil and Tate pairings on elliptic curves [37].
• Bandwidth Economy Within the certificateless framework, maritime vessels would
not have to consume precious bandwidth for public key acquisition if the public
keys of other entities are pre-loaded in port (as discussed for PKI in Section 3.6.2).
Typically, this public key pre-loading is a feasible option because maritime vessels
often transit the same trade routes like city buses on its daily circuit. Conversely,
bandwidth resources are necessary when a maritime vessel needs to obtain the public
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key of unexpected vessels while on voyage. In circumstances where another vessel’s
public key is obtained while at sea, a secure transmission method is necessary to
ensure the integrity of the public key. Although the certificateless framework is
slightly disadvantaged against the identity-based frameworkwith regards to bandwidth
economy, the certificateless framework gains a significant security advantage over
identity-based in that the KGC does not have knowledge of an entity’s private key
because the actual private key is derived from a partial private key and the entity’s
secret information [37].
• Public Key Revocation The certificateless public key revocation methodology would
resemble that of the identity-based revocation methodology [37]. The trusted third-
party maritime agencies would provide the system users with regularly validated and
regulated MMSIs in order to maintain the security of the public-private key pair.
3.6.5 Selecting the Certificateless Public Key Infrastructure
A certificateless public key infrastructure would ensure that our AIS authenticator does not
violate the constraints and considerations, discussed in Section 3.2, while also ensuring that
the KGC does not have access to all private keys.
A certificateless public key infrastructure would reduce private key vulnerability to the
KGC; only the entity has knowledge of its own private key. However, this cryptosystem will
require that ships procure the public keys of all possible encounters during its voyage. For
the situations involving unexpected contact with another vessel a separate web based public
key repository is required to allow ships to acquire any missing public keys not acquired
while in port.
3.7 CharmCryptographic Library: Selection, Utilization,
and Limitations
The standard Python library does not provide the necessary commands, functions, and
backend processing to support the complex mathematics required for cryptography. Con-
sequently, this research needed a cryptographic library and tool set to process experimental
cryptographic values for implementation into the AIS authenticator.
Therefore, this research utilized GitHub, an open source software development platform
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and repository, to locate an appropriate Python library that supports the complex computing
and processing of various forms of cryptography. The Charm Cryptographic Library [38]
is one such tool set.
The Charm Cryptographic Library is a Python-based, collaborative cryptographic tool set
and repository for cryptographers and software developers. The Charm Cryptographic
Library provides the developer with a range of digital signature algorithms to test for
compatibility and potential with the AIS protocol. The Charm Cryptographic Library has
adequate support and documentation because its community of developers is fairly active.
One significant positive decision point for utilizing the Charm Cryptographic Library is the
inclusion of various cryptographic pairing group options, which provide this research with
increased flexibility for compatibility determination of certain cryptographic algorithms.
Parings are often used in identity-based and certificateless cryptography, where “pairings
map pairs of points on an elliptic curve into the multiplicative group of a finite field” [39].
Within the CharmCryptographic Library there are a limited number of useful pairing groups
available via a Python class object that allows the developer to instantiate a cryptographic
scheme under specific pairings:
• Super Singular Curve (SS) 512 or 1024,
• Miyaji, Nakabayashi, and Takano (MNT) 159, 201, or 224,
• Barreto and Naehrig (BN) 254.
This research acknowledges that these six pairing options do not represent an exhaustive
list of all possible pairing options and therefore recommend further exploration and imple-
mentation of other possible pairings to find an optimal solution in any future research. This
research focuses on these built-in implementations to support the proof of concept.
The Charm Cryptographic Library is not frequently updated with new cryptographic algo-
rithms or optimizations of existing ones. Even though there are numerous implementations
of various algorithms in the Charm Cryptographic Library, these algorithms are not an ex-
haustive collection to test for AIS authenticator compatibility, but provide a starting basis.
Any existing algorithm not found in the CharmCryptographic Librarymust be implemented
from scratch and is subject to developer design, coding inefficiencies, and errors.
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CHAPTER 4:
A Necessary Alternate Research Methodology
Chapter 3 argued for the development and implementation of an experimental AIS authen-
ticator with a digital signature and identified benefits of using a certificateless approach.
The completion of this research requires a feasible implementation of a digital signature
algorithm that is compatible with the current AIS and NMEA protocols and standards.
In the following sections, and using the selected open source tools, we walk through our
process of identifying a particular scheme for implementation and testing. The CharmCryp-
tographic Library contains over 50 unique cryptographic schemes and respective Python
implementation source code; however, the library does not provide for any certificateless
digital signature variant. Thus, while the recommendations of the previous chapters point
to a certificateless infrastructure, the immediately available testing tool limits this option
for the experimental AIS authentication system.
Consequently, we start this chapter by exploring Chapter 3’s second-choice cryptographic
implementation and test the scheme [40] for possible compatibility with the proposed
authenticator.
As will be shown, among those schemes we were unable to generate an identity-based
digital signature implementation that did not exceed the current AIS and NMEA data
packets’ payload size restrictions. Thus we conclude this chapter by discussing the selection
and implementation of our third choice Weil-Pairing [35] public key digital signature as a
suitable alternative test scheme to further this research.
4.1 Implementation of an Identity-based Digital Signa-
ture(IBC_BLS04)
Here we explore our second-best option of an identity-based digital signature implementa-
tion as a suitable substitute for the recommended certificateless scheme (our first choice).
The research referenced [40] as the primary technical documentation in developing an
identity-based digital signature for AIS authenticator testing.
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The signature script, IBC_BLS04.py, is documented in Appendix M and contains four
primary functions: setup(), keygen(), sign(), and verify(). In a true application of this
scheme, various entities would access each function at separate instances. However, this
script consolidated the four functions into a singular script to facilitate efficient and repetitive
iterations of tests and evaluations.
With IBC_BLS04.py, the discriminator for usability with the experimental AIS authenticator
is the maximum size of the digital signature outputs for each of the available and compatible
Charm Cryptography pairing groups: SS512, MNT159, MNT201, MNT224, and BN254.
We tested IBC_BLS04.py with the MMSI value “338999999” and the message “HELLO
WORLD”. The resultant digital signature samples were verified and their respective sizes
recorded. TheMNT159 pairing group consistently generated the smallest, functional digital
signature amongst the four pairing groups.
Table 4.1 displays the maximum size of each digital signature output for the various com-
patible pairing groups available through the Charm Cryptographic Library. Chapter 5
discusses the significance of Broadcast BinaryMessages (BBM) with regard to AIS authen-
ticator digital signature encapsulation and transmission; however, in Chapter 4, the relevant
information concerning BBM is its 52-character payload limit. Each BBM character rep-
resents a 6-bit ASCII character and the 52-character limit is equivalent to 312 bits or 39
bytes.
Table 4.1. Various maximum sizes of identity-based cryptographic digital
signature based on the IBC_BLS04 scheme [40].
IBC BLS04 Digital Signature Size Outputs
Available Charm Cryptography Library Pairing Groups
SS512 MNT159 MNT201 MNT224 BN254
Maximum Size (bytes) 480 360 412 444 400
The IBC_BLS04 (using MNT159) digital signature is too large for the current AIS and
NMEA standards to support; the digital signature size exceeds the 39-byte payload limit
for BBM. Even if the digital signature was fragmented and evenly distributed over five
consecutive BBM sentences, the 195-bytes cumulative limit is insufficient to support the
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360-byte IBC_BLS04 (MNT159) digital signature.
This research caveats that the 360-bytes identity-based digital signature was the result of the
IBC_BLS04 and MNT159 combination. There are other pairings available from various
sources that may reduce the digital signature size sufficiently to enable an IBC scheme, but
the exploration of options external to the Charm Cryptographic Library is outside the scope
of this research.
Due to the lack of compatibility and functionality for ready-to-test certificateless and
identity-based digital signature schemes, our discussion now shifts to exploring the BLS04
[35] public key signature as a possible third-choice solution for the proposed AIS authenti-
cator.
4.2 BLS04 Digital Signature Selection and Implementa-
tion
This research continues by testing the alternate short digital signature scheme based on the
Weil-Pairing [35] known as BLS04 after its authors: Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham. Unlike the
IBC_BLS04 scheme tested in Section 4.1, BLS04 is not an identity-based digital signature
scheme, nor is it a certificateless digital signature scheme. Therefore, it does not possess
the unique mitigations against the documented problems of key management, distribution,
and administrative overhead of the PKI as discussed in Section 3.6. However, the BLS04
scheme potentially generates a 160-bit digital signature that provides a bit-wise security
level similar to the 320-bit DSA [35].
The BLS04 scheme may not be the ideal cryptographic implementation for the proposed
AIS authenticator, but this alternativemethodology supports and validates the idea for future
compatibility and AIS flexibility. Effectively, the proposed BLS04 scheme can serve as a
placeholder and simulation for more AIS-compatible digital signature schemes developed
in the future.
With regard to the scope of the research and BLS04 implementation, we simulate and
simplify the cryptographic infrastructure required through a one-time Python key generation
and distribution script. However, a real-world implementation of the BLS04 scheme with
the proposed AIS authenticator would require 1) a certified, trusted third-party certificate
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authority to validate public keys, 2) a computationally and bandwidth affordable method to
acquire public keys while underway or in port, 3) a public key revocation process, and 4) a
backend system for vessels to manage and store valid public keys.
4.2.1 Selection Process of BLS04
Within the Charm Cryptography Library, there are seven pre-implemented and available
short digital signature schemes for immediate use and testing [35], [41]–[46].
This research acknowledges that these seven schemes are not an exhaustive list of all existing
digital signature schemes that may be functional and compatible with the experimental AIS
authenticator. Therefore, this research recommends further exploration and implementation
of other existing schemes to find an optimal solution. However, due to their availability,
the research focused on and explored each of these schemes to determine their viability
for the experimental AIS authenticator. The main discriminator for a functional alternative
solution (i.e., digital signature scheme and pairing group) is the generated digital signature
size.
The BLS04 selection involved collecting data on digital signature sizes while evaluating
each of the seven schemes 30 times under every available Charm Cryptographic Library
pairing group. Our authenticator was designed to place the received digital signature
fragments into a five-position queue which initiates the reassembly of the digital signature
fragment for verification when full. Appendix I contains the code for the signature fragment
queue.
In the tests, the observed digital signature sizes vary up to 10 percent below the maximum
value recorded for a specific combination. Due to this variation, the total number of trans-
mitted digital signature fragments, discussed inChapter 3, varies between two fragmentation
values (e.g., four and five or five and six). Chapter 5 discusses the steps taken to discover
the fragment proportions. However, what is relevant to this section is the fragmentation
value of five because this value is aligned with and supports the five time slot allowance
that was discussed in Section 3.4.
Table 4.2 is a tabulation of the various generated maximum digital signature sizes for each
available scheme and pairing group combination.
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Table 4.2. Digital signature length comparison utilizing various available
digital signature schemes and pairing groups from Charm Cryptography Li-
brary. Note that the “blacked-out” portions represent the combinations that
resulted in a system fragmentation fault and did not produce a signature.
Digital Signature Length Comparison (in Bytes)
Schemes
Charm Cryptography Library
Pairing Groups [35] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46]
SS512 280 478 288 640 632 636 472
SS1024 1088 1100 796
MNT159 160 244 156 612 500 304 240
MNT201 176 272 176 740 600 348 268
MNT224 184 284 188 792 640 376 284
BN254 188 308 196 640 1148 396 304
The Charm Cryptography Library implementations of the [35] and [42] schemes generated
the smallest digital signatures for every pairing group compared to the other five signature
schemes. We selected the BLS04 [35] signature scheme as our primary test signature
implementation because it generated smaller digital signature sizes for the SS512, MNT224,
and BN254 pairing groups.
We determined that the BLS04 and MNT159 pairing group combination consistently gen-
erated a digital signature size that varied between four and five fragments. The maximum
signature size for four fragments is 156 bytes, but the maximum digital signature size for the
BLS04 scheme using MNT159 is 160. As a result, the 10 percent variation causes the total
fragment amount to fluctuate causing frequent malfunctions during multiple test iterations.
For a digital signature to qualify for five fragments it must be greater than 156 Bytes but less
than or equal to 195 bytes. BLS04 with MNT201, MNT224, and BN254 qualified for five
fragments and their size variations did not cause a fragmentation issue. Although longer
than MNT159, MNT201 generated a consistent number of fragments —thus reduction in
implementation malfunctions due to varying fragmentation. Thus, our proof-of-concept
utilized MNT201 because it generates a smaller signature size compared to MNT224 and
BN254.
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Based on the observations and constraints, the tested design architecture for the AIS au-
thenticator consists of the following: 1) AIS Message 6 and Message 8 as the “challenge
and response” delivery method and 2) utilization of the implemented BLS04 Charm Cryp-
tography script derived from [35] with the MNT201 pairing group.
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CHAPTER 5:
Experiment Design and Results
Chapter 5 discusses the decisions made to develop the final research methodology and
the resultant system performance. Topics include the discovered technical abnormalities;
research test plan; the required equipment, tools, and setup; architecture redesigns and
mitigations; and the measured metrics of each test phase.
5.1 Experiment Resign due to Equipment Design and
Technical Challenges
Section 5.1 discusses the various unexpected findings, technical abnormalities, and mod-
ifications to the proposed AIS authenticator design. The topics include CAMINO-701
unsupported named AISMessages, feasibility of end-to-end testing, and indiscernible Mes-
sage 12, FA-150 technical deviations from the NMEA standard, and FA-150 inability to
transmit six consecutive AIS data packets. End-to-end time is defined as the duration of
elapsed time between initial normal AIS data packet transmission and digital signature
verification.
5.1.1 ALLTEK Marine AIS Class A CAMINO-701
For an unknown reason, theALLTEKMarine ClassAAIS transponder does not support AIS
Message 6 andMessage 8, but does support AISMessage 12 andMessage 14. Consequently,
the proposed design, discussed in Chapter 3, was modified to mitigate this lack of support;
Message 12 replaced Message 6 and Message 14 replaced Message 8.
There are no major technical differences between the original and alternate AIS Message
types. Message 6 and Message 12 have the same overhead requirements and payload
capacity; this is also the case for Message 8 and Message 14. However, there is a functional
difference between the original and alternate Message types. Message 12 and Message 14
are Safety Related Messages and do not support DAC and FI codes. The AIS prototype
system can function with the alternate AIS Message types, but the DAC and FI codes would
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be required in a commercial application of our proposed solution, as discussed later in this
chapter.
5.1.2 End-to-End Flexibility and Indiscernible Type 12 Messages.
Wedesired to conduct an unrestricted end-to-end test to better simulate the live environment.
However, a compromise was required to progress the experiments and the authenticator
prototype. Ideally, the proposed system would not depend on Message 12 encapsulation,
but its own message type (e.g., Message 1, Message 2, Message 3, Message 4) for data
encapsulation and transmission.
In the experiment, Message 12 is used to encapsulate the ordinary and challenge messages.
The absence of the DAC and FI fields eliminates any practical capability to differentiate
between ordinary and challenge messages during an unrestricted end-to-end test.
Without the DAC and FI fields, a receiving AIS transponder will confuse an ordinary
message with a challenge message. Effectively, this decision introduces an “indiscernible
message” bug into the test environment. This bug results in false positives for both challenge
and ordinary messages.
For the case of challenge message false positives, if the receiving transponder initiates
the parsing of an ordinary message that was supposed to be a challenge message, the
authenticator script will incorrectly parse encapsulated data from an ordinary message.
This will result in failed signature validations because the actual and expected strings are
different during the hash comparison phase of the signature verification process.
For the case of ordinary message false positives, if the receiving transponder initiates the
parsing of a challenge message that is supposed to be an ordinary message, the authenticator
script will incorrectly initiate the challenge message creation process and ultimately create a
double encapsulated challenge message. This would potentially exceed the message length
requirement, cause the AIS transponder device to skip message transmissions, and result in
failed signature verification.
This research recommends that follow-on work be performed using fully compliant and late-
model AIS devices. Our work was limited to the FA-150 and CAMINO-701 transponder;
a requisition order for a late-model FURUNO Class A AIS transponder was submitted, but
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the device was not received prior to completion of this research due to substantial lead and
delivery times.
Note that a subsequent action following the Message type replacement was the modification
of the authenticator script into two specialized scripts specific to a host AIS transponder
and this research. Section 5.1.5 discusses this action in more detail.
5.1.3 Abnormality in Published NMEA Technical Standards
Per the NMEA-0183 standard, the maximum number of characters in a NMEA sentence
should be 82: two initiating deliminators (i.e.,”$” or “!”), 70 6-bit ASCII characters, and
two terminating deliminators (i.e., 〈CR〉〈LF〉) [8]. Addressed Binary Messages (ABM)
and BBM are two types of NMEA Message types.
If multi-sentence AIS data packets (i.e., singular AIS packet transmissions with sequen-
tial, fragmented data) are used, the AIS transponder device needs to modify the following
three fields in order for the multi-sentence data packet transmissions to be received and
reassembled appropriately. First, the “Total Number of Sentences” field indicates the total
number of sentences utilized in order to encapsulate the entire multi-sentence message.
Second, the “Sentence Number” field indicates the current message’s “fragmentation posi-
tion” in the multi-sentence message series. Third, the “Sequential Message Identifier” field
is identical for each message of the same serial; this field is intended to distinguish between
consecutively-received multi-sentence message sequence.
Multi-sentence ABM data packets must be formatted so that the “first sentence may contain
up to 48 valid Six Bit codes” and the “following sentences may contain up to 60 valid Six
Bit codes” [8]. Conversely, multi-sentence BBM data packets must be formatted so that the
“first sentence may contain up to 58 valid Six Bit codes” and the “following sentences may
contain up to 60 valid Six Bit codes” [8].
We conducted a preliminary test to verify the FA-150’s transponder device’s ability to con-
struct multi-sentence data packet transmissions. This auxiliary experiment was necessary to
certify that the authenticator’s coding and construction supported the digital signature frag-
mentation, transmission, and reconstruction sub-functions. The FA-150 was the primary
test transponder.
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This auxiliary experiment involved the construction of an eight part BBM multi-sentence
data packet transmission, which contained a cumulative payload of 400 randomNMEA-0183
ASCII characters to represent a possible response message. The auxiliary test script divided
the 400-character payload into multiple 58-character sets and modified the corresponding
multi-sentence fields in accordance with the NMEA-0183 standard for correctness of BBM
Message construction.
The resulting sentence series was created and passed to the transponder for transmission.
The FA-150 accepted the sentence series, but it did not transmit the consecutive data packets.
This was confirmed via the transmitting transponder’s diagnostics menu and the lack of an
auditory alert from the receiving transponder. Multiple tests were performed on the FA-150
transponder, but each failed.
An assessment of the auxiliary test script was conducted for syntax and function errors.
We referenced [8] for a possible technical solution but were unable to determine the cause
of error. Follow-on troubleshooting steps involved revisiting Maritec’s online ABM/BBM
NMEA Message encoding tool [47] to formulate known, valid NMEA and AIS Message
types of various lengths to confirm the cause of failure.
The initial set of sample sentences was a Message 14 type encapsulating a rudimentary
“HI” data string. The first test message was copied and pasted into the auxiliary test script
for transmission and the test ended in success. Successive attempts to find the cause of
failure involved incremental concatenations of the “HI” string to “HIHI”, “HIHIHI”, and
et cetera until the point of failure was encountered. The subsequent tests revealed that the
FA-150 transponder device’s BBM limit is 52 characters vice 58.
The next subsequent auxiliary experiments were designed to verify that the FA-150 multi-
sentence data packet transmission capability functions and operates in accordance with the
NMEA-0183 standard. First, we crafted a two-sentence data packet for fragmentation and
consecutive transmission. We modified the multi-sentence message fields, and passed both
to the transponders but this first test failed. Second, we tried a modified approach utilizing
a 50-character sentence. We constructed the sentence as a two-sentence multi-sentence
message (two messages each containing a 25-character payload and sent in sequential
order). This second test failed as well. Third, we utilized the same 50 character message,
but crafted it to be two singular messages (no modification of the multi-sentence fields) and
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passed it to the transponder. The third test was successful.
The research surmised that the issue was related to how themulti-sentence fields are utilized.
We reviewed [8] again, but did not find any clear technical or procedural information detail-
ing the process governing multi-sentence message construction. Other possible reasons for
this abnormality are that FURUNO did not follow the recommendations published in [8]
and/or FURUNO uses a 52-character design as a form of anti-reverse engineering. Due to
time and functional necessity, we did not test for this abnormality on the CAMINO-701
because the CAMINO-701 functioned as expected with regards to the receiving and sending
of specific Message types used in this research.
Next, the research tested the transmission of the original 400 character sentence as seven
separate single-sentence data transmissions. In a fourth auxiliary experiment, the test script
was modified to transmit the single sentences at 1 second intervals per specifications [8].
The test was a success, but only the first five sentences were transmitted. This discovery
led to the next issue regarding the FA-150’s buffer limitations.
5.1.4 Limitations on Consecutive Data Packet Transmissions
The research hypothesized that the FA-150 AIS transponder was only able to transmit five
consecutive data packets due to its internal buffer limitations.
A fifth auxiliary experiment attempted to consecutively inject valid single-sentence mes-
sages to the FA-150 transponder device. The research consistently observed that the
transponder would transmit packets number one through five and eight, but fail packets
six, seven, and nine. The research surmised that there must be a manufacturer design
implementation that clears the buffer state after a certain amount of time or number of
transmitted data packets relative to the buffer state. Similar tests were not performed on the
CAMINO-701 because it was not essential to the completion of the experiment.
The research did not pursue this issue further because this unforeseen design abnormality
did not severely impact our experiment or the overall script. The FA-150’s five-data-
packet buffer limitation was aligned with our original five consecutive data packet technical
constraint discussed in Chapter 3.
61
5.1.5 Authenticator and Experimental Redesign
Due to the discussed issues and technical abnormalities, we modified our authenticator
script to continue the experiment. Consequently, we omitted specific functions from Chal-
lenger.py and redesigned the single script into two specialized scripts: A_Challenger.py
and B_Challenger.py. The CAMINO-701 would utilize A_Challenger to accept ordinary
data packets and send challenge messages; this modification avoids the false positive sce-
narios discussed previously because A_Challenger would only have to listen for ordinary
(Message 12) and response messages (Message 14). Conversely, the FA-150 would utilize
B_Challenger and would exclusively listen for challenge messages (Message 12).
This modification limits the experimental possibilities of conducting unrestricted end-to-
end testing such as the simulation of the continuous transmissions of two maritime entities
and the potential measurement of maximum system load before failure. However, this
modification was essential to continue the research and experiments. Additionally, it must
be noted that this research will continue to utilize “Challenger.py” when referring to the
authenticator scripts in order to emphasize the theoretical feasibility of a fully integrated
script to generate challenge and response messages. Distinctions between A_Challenger.py
and B_Challenger.py are made when necessary.
The source code for A_Challenger.py is included in Appendix G and its process flow graph
is included in Appendix H. Similarly, the source code for B_Challenger.py is included in
Appendix I and its process flow graph is included in Appendix J.
5.2 Testing Plan
This section discusses the one administrative phase (Phase 0) and four operational phases
(Phase 1 - 4) that comprise the overall research testing plan. The testing plan incorporates
all necessary mitigations and modifications discussed in previous sections. Additionally,
this section introduces the term AIS VHF Data-link Message (AIVDM), a NMEA-0183
sentence designed to transfer the entire contents of a received AIS data packet, on the VHR
Data Link, to various other maritime vessels.
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5.2.1 Phase 0: Key Generation Authority and Simulated Secure Pri-
vate Key Distribution
The KeyGenerationAuthority.py script, documented in Appendix C, was designed to simu-
late and simplify all the necessary backend administration and processing involved with pri-
vate and public key creation, management, distribution, and certification. J. Ayo Akinyele,
a Charm Cryptography Python primary contributor and collaborator, developed the cryp-
tographic portions of the source code for KeyGenerationAuthority.py based on the Boneh-
Lynn-Shacham Identity Based Signature [40].
As discussed in Chapter 4, this research utilizes the BLS04 scheme [35] to mitigate previ-
ously discussed issues and provide validation for a proof-of-concept.
Phase 0 provides each entity (Ship A and Ship B) with their respective private keys and each
other’s public keys. This necessary initial phase is required for an operational system. The
design and implementation of a trusted third-party entity to provide the necessary backend
administration is outside the scope of this research but is commonly available and used in
industry.
5.2.2 Phase 1: User-defined NMEAMessage Injections, Transmission
and Receipt of AIVDM
The Phase 1 criteria for success are the successful injection, acceptance, conversion, trans-
mission, and receipt of any user-defined data packet from one experimental AIS authenti-
cator to the other. Specifically: The FA-150 AIS transponder and authenticator pair will
transmit converted user-defined data packets to the CAMINO-701 AIS transponder and
authenticator pair.
Verification of Phase 1 success involves checking the CAMINO-701 device’s receive logs
and message alerts; when an AIS transponder receives a data packet it generates an audible
and visual alert. This is the definitive method to accurately verify that an AIS transponder
received an AIS data packet. Figure 5.3 shows an example visual alert on the CAMINO-701
display.
During Phase 1, we utilized InputEncoder.py, documented in Appendix E. InputEncoder.py
is a custom Python3 script designed for text file parsing, conversion, and encoding. Ap-
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pendix F documents the script’s process flow. InputEncoder.py executes the following
functions:
• Reads from a user-generated text file containing 50 lines of arbitrary, iterative string
data (e.g., “ONE,” “TWO,” “THREE”). For the experiment, stringdata.txt is the
designated text file.
• Converts each line of string data from 8-bit ASCII into its corresponding 6-bit NMEA-
0183 ASCII representation. See Appendix B for a detailed explanation of the con-
version scheme involved with a typical AIS data packet.
• Generates an ABM embedded with the converted string data as its payload. The
ABM will manifest in the following format:
“!AIABM,x,x,x,xxxxxxxxx,x,x.x,s...s,x,*hh〈CR〉〈LF〉”. Note: s...s is the arbitrary
string data payload converted to 6-bit NMEA-0183 ASCII sentence.
• Passes the ABM to the AIS transponder for automatic AIVDM conversion and im-
mediate RF transmission.
• Records the outgoing AIVDM and transmission timestamp into an output file for the
purpose of verifying data packet transmissions in later phases. For this experiment,
Outfile.txt is the designated outfile. This designated file contains all the previously
sent data packets from the arbitrary string data text file.
The FA-150will initiate the start of Phase 1with the execution of the InputEncoder.py script.
Phase 1 concludes with the FA-150’s successful transmission of a normal user-defined AIS
data packet.
5.2.3 Phase 2: Creation and Transmission of Challenge Message
The CAMINO-701’s successful receipt of the AIVDM initiates Phase 2. Phase 2 criteria
for success are the CAMINO-701’s successful creation and transmission of a challenge
message derived from the FA-150’s output AIVDM in Phase 1.
Phase 2 involves the CAMINO-701 receiving the AIVDM from the FA-150 transponder, the
relaying of the received AIVDM to the CAMINO-701’s experimental AIS authenticator, the
creation of a corresponding challenge message, and the transmission of the corresponding
challenge message to the FA-150. Verification of successful challenge message creation
is through the A_Challenger.py’s diagnostic print statements. Verification of successful
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AIVDM transmission is through the CAMINO-701’s diagnostics menu and transmission
logs.
The relaying of the initial AIVDM to the CAMINO-701’s authenticator requires the use
of the serial.readline() Python function. Conversely, the creation of a challenge mes-
sage requires the use of Challenger.py. Challenger.py is a multi-purpose application for
challenge and response message generation. However, because of the issues discussed in
previous sections, the CAMINO-701 uses A_Challenger.py to actively listen for incoming
AIVDM from the FA-150 transponder and to generate the corresponding challengemessage.
A_Challenger.py parses the AIVDM, records the time received, converts, and encapsulates
the entirety of the received AIVDMwithin a new ABM. After the creation of the challenge
message, A_Challenger.py routes the ABM to the CAMINO-701 AIS transponder device
for transmission to the FA-150.
5.2.4 Phase 3: Receipt of Challenge Message, Digital Signature Cre-
ation, and Transmission
Phase 3 makes the first implementation of cryptography in this test. Previous phases were
primarily concerned with the adaptation and integration of the authentication system’s
software and hardware with the two AIS standards’ electro-physical constraints and manu-
facturer design limitations. Phase 3 criteria for success are the FA-150’s successful receipt
of the challenge message originating from the CAMINO-701, the parsing and referencing
of the challenge message’s payload against the log of previously transmitted data packets
within the designated outfile, the FA-150 authenticator’s automated decision to either cre-
ate a digital signature or not based on the results of the outfile check function, and the
transmission of the response message containing the digital signature to the CAMINO-701.
The FA-150’s receipt of the challenge message from the CAMINO-701 initiates Phase 3.
B_Challenger.py intercepts the received AIVDM and parses the AIVDM for the in-question
data packet, which A_Challenger.py encapsulates in the previous phase. B_Challenger
references the in-question data packet against the array of sent data packets in the designated
outfile. WhenB_Challenger.py references the outfile, it searches for the in-questionAIVDM
and automatically determines whether to create a response message or not based on the data
packet’s existence in the outfile. Note that for each test iteration, the designated outfile
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contains every ordinary data packet created during Phase 1 as a controlled variable.
When the B_Challenger.py locates the in-question data packet within the outfile, it
extracts the data packets’ stored timestamp (when the data packet was sent dur-
ing Phase 1) and signs the concatenation of that timestamp and AIVDM as the re-
sponse message’s payload. The resulting sentence manifests in the following format:
“!AIBBM,x,x,x,x,x.x,s...s,x,*hh〈CR〉〈LF〉”. Lastly, B_Challenger.py forwards the resul-
tant digital signature to the FA-150 transponder device for transmission to theCAMINO-701.
If B_Challenger.py is not able to locate the data packet within the outfile, it prints a status
message and take no further action. The test protocol measures this outcome as a failure
via a negative performance mark.
B_Challenger.py was not programmed to transmit a “fail” message to the CAMINO-701 in
the event of an error in response message creation. The first reason for a lack of response is
unnecessary redundancy in experimental error reporting of the experimental AIS authen-
ticator’s code. Second, a negative response is a suitable minimalist approach to reducing
bandwidth usage and establishing an implicit “fail” response between the CAMINO-701
and FA-150. Other researchers may implement a “fail” response function; however, “fail”-
response implementation is not aligned with the research constraints discussed in Chapter
3.
Verification of results is provided by monitoring the CAMINO-701 for successful receipt of
the response messages and the FA-150 authenticator’s diagnostic Python print statements
of the resulting digital signatures and response messages prior to transmission.
5.2.5 Phase 4: Receipt and Verification of Digital Signature
Phase 4 is the final experimentation phase of this research. The successful completion and
validation of Phase 4 demonstrates that the current AIS protocol has sufficient flexibility
to add integrity and authenticity to AIS data packets without introducing changes to the
current standards.
Verification of successful digital signature receipt and verification are the final steps of
A_Challenger.py’s signature verify function. This verification function will either return an
indication of success or failure.
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Phase 4 criteria for success are the successful receipt of the response message originating
from the FA-150, the parsing of the digital signature payload, and verification of the digital
signature.
5.3 Experimental Setup
We have now defined the test phases and criteria for success. Section 5.3 discusses all
equipment, tools, and libraries used during this research. This includes all important
configuration settings and connections between each experimental device.
5.3.1 Equipment and Tool List
The following is an itemized list of the all equipment and tools utilized.
• Figure 5.1 provides a basic visual representation of the overall experimental connec-
tions and setup.
• ALLTEK Marine CAMINO-701 Class A AIS Transponder, as shown in Figure 5.2
• ALLTEK Marine Junction Box, as shown in Figure 5.3
• FURUNO FA-150 Class A AIS Transponder, as shown in Figure 5.4
• Three RS422 Serial to USB Converters, as shown in Figure 5.5
• Faraday Cage, as shown in Figure 5.6. Figure 5.7 provides a closer look at the ports
used to connect each AIS transponder units via a coaxial wire.
• Two laptops with at least two free USB ports each
• Two Ubuntu Linux Virtual Machines: 1) 1.90GHz single-core processor assigned to
FA-150 transponder, 2) 2.0 GHz single-core processor assigned to CAMINO-701.
• Two RF Antennas
• Python3 Programming Language
• Charm Cryptography - Python3 module and library
• Stanford University’s Pairing-Based Cryptography Library
• Python3 “Subversion” library (Charm Cryptography dependency)
• Python3 “M4” library (Charm Cryptography dependency)
• Python3 “python3-setuptools” library (Charm Cryptography dependency)
• Python3 “python3-dev” library (Charm Cryptography dependency)
• The GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic library
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Figure 5.1. Basic outline of the layout and connections of all experiment
tools and devices.
Figure 5.2. ALLTEK Marine: CAMINO-701 Class A AIS Transponder, Junc-
tion Box, and Laptop.
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5.3.2 Experimental Configuration, Connections, and General Setup
Figure 5.4 shows the basic setup for the FA-150 AIS transponder, its supporting tools, and
devices. Each of the laptop’s two free USB ports were connected to the FA-150 either
directly via the PC port or indirectly via the RS422 adapter to COM1/COM2.
Figure 5.3. Junction Box and the “DISP” and “PILOT” serial connection
ports.
Figure 5.4. FURUNO FA-150 connected via RS422 to Operator Laptop
Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 document a close up depiction of the connections to the FA-150
AIS transponder while Figure 5.10 is the wiring diagram for COM1 and COM2 (located
under the bottom cover of the FA-150 AIS transponder). Only wiring points one through
five were utilized for both COM1 and COM2. Specifically, the AIS “TX” wiring points
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were connected to the RS422’s “RX” wiring points and vice versa. Ground was connected
to ground for both devices.
Figure 5.5. Close up depiction of the RS422 Serial-to-USB converter.
Figure 5.6. The Faraday cage enclosure utilized to house the two RF anten-
nas in order not to interfere nearby maritime traffic in Monterey Bay.
The FURUNO installation manual provides information regarding which NMEA Message
types each port supports. Figure 5.11 details one of the port information pages. The COM1,
COM2, and PC ports support the input of an ABM and BBM as well as the output of VHF
Data Message (VDM)s. This fact influenced the decision to utilize the COM1, COM2, and
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PC ports instead of the other available FA-150 ports.
The FA-150 serial port connections utilize a number of different device mode settings
depending on the specific application or device in use. This research utilizes either EXT
DISPLAY or STANDARD mode to transmit either ABMs or BBMs. Serial ports COM1,
COM2, COM3, and COM4 support EXT DISPLAYmode and are NMEA Input and Output
Message capable. Similarly, the PC serial port is capable of both NMEA Input and Output
Messages while in STANDARD mode.
Figure 5.7. A closer look at the ports used to connect the two coaxial wires
from the AIS transponders to the RF antennas inside the Faraday cage.
Figure 5.8. FA-150 serial COM ports. Only COM1 and COM2 were utilized.
For the experiment, NMEA sentence injects occurred on PC (STANDARD mode). The
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monitoring of the AIVDM occurred on both COM1 (EXT DISPLAY mode) and COM2
(MONITOR) to test and verify the differences and functionality of EXT DISPLAY and
MONITOR.
Figure 5.9. FA-150 PC port.
Figure 5.10. FA-150 wiring diagram for COM1 and COM2 found underneath
the removal cover. Utilized to connect to serial side of RS422 adapter.
The following is the FURUNO FA-150 transponder’s pertinent configuration settings and
information:
• MMSI: 338999999
• TX power: 1W
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• COM1 port mode: EXT DISPLAY; speed: IEC 61162-2
• COM2 port mode: MONITOR; speed: IEC 61162-2
• PC port mode: STANDARD; speed: 38400 baud
Figure 5.2 shows the basic setup for the ALLTEK Marine CAMINO-701 transponder, its
supporting tools, and devices. Each of the laptop’s two free USB ports were connected to
the CAMINO-701 indirectly via the RS422 adapter to DISP IN/OUT and PILOT IN/OUT
within the junction box. The junction box was connected to the AIS transponder unit via a
39-pin parallel port cable.
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.12 detail how the wires are connected from both RS422 to each of
the IN/OUT positions of DISP and PILOT ports.
Unlike the FURUNO FA-150, the CAMINO-701 does not have many ports that support
ABM, BBM, and AIVDM. The ALLTEK Marine installation manual, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.13, states that only the DISP and PILOT ports are capable of supporting ABM, BBM,
and AIVDM; the tests used the DISP and PILOT ports for this reason. The NMEA sen-
tence injects occurred on the CAMINO-701’s PILOT port while the monitoring of outgoing
AIVDMs occurred on the DISP port.
The following is the ALLTEK Marine CAMINO-701 Class A AIS transponder’s pertinent
configuration settings and information:
• MMSI: 366123000
• TX power: 1W
• DISP port baud rate: 38400
• Pilot port baud rate: 38400
5.4 Procedures, Results, and Phase Completion
Section 5.4 discusses the completion of the four operational phases and includes details
regarding the methodology, required inputs, and output data of each phase’s completion.
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Figure 5.11. FURUNO FA-150 technical manual depicting the supported
NMEA Input and Output Messages specific to the available serial port con-
nections. Source: FURUNO FA-150 Installation and Operation Manual.
5.4.1 Phase 1 Completion: User-defined NMEA Message Injections,
Transmission, and Receipt of AIVDM
Prior to conductingPhase1, both laptopswere loadedwithA_Challenger.py,B_Challenger.py,
and InputEncoder.py. The laptop connected to the CAMINO-701 required the utilization
of A_Challenger.py. The laptop connected to the FA-150 also required InputEncoder.py
and B_Challenger.py. After the initial staging of the three Python3 scripts, the following
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Figure 5.12. A closer view of the CAMINO-701 junction box.
Figure 5.13. ALLTEK Marine CAMINO-701 technical manual depicting the
supported NMEA Input and Output Message specific to the available serial
port connections. Source: ALLTEK Marine CAMINO-701 Installation and
Operation Manual edition 1.14.
commands were used to run each script:
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For A_Challenger.py:
• “sudo python3 A_Challenger.py -mmsi 366123000”
For B_Challenger.py:
• “sudo python3 B_Challenger.py -mmsi 338999999”
For InputEncoder.py:
• “sudo python3 InputEncoder.py -f stringdata.txt -sm 338999999 -dm 366123000 -o
Outfile.txt”
The authenticator script was designed and programmed to require minimal user input. the
“-mmsi” Python argument is necessary to synchronize all of the authenticator’s functions
to the paired AIS transponder.
For InputEncoder.py, “-sm” represents source MMSI and “-dm” represents destination
MMSI. “-sm” was passed 338999999 to represent the FA-150 AIS transponder and “-dm”
was passed 366123000 to represent the CAMINO-701 AIS transponder. These two Python
arguments are required to synchronize the InputEncoder.py script to the twoAIS transponder
in the test environment. The purpose of InputEncoder.py is to simulate a generic application
on a vessel’s integrated maritime voyage network, which passes data to the AIS transponder
for transmission.
A_Challenger.py and B_Challenger.pymay be executed simultaneously or sequentially, but
these two scripts must run prior to executing InputEncoder.py. If InputEncoder.py was
executed before the two authenticator scripts, the CAMINO-701 authenticator’s listening
function would not receive the first ordinary data packet transmission and would have to
wait one minute before the next ordinary data packet transmission from the FA-150.
Phase 1 goals were successfully achieved. The FA-150 authenticator, via InputEncoder.py,
parsed the designated text file stringdata.txt and successfully converted the 8-bit ASCII
data strings into its corresponding NMEA-0183 6-bit ASCII equivalent. After 6-bit ASCII
conversion, the data string was encapsulated into properly formatted ABM and AIVDM.
There are two reasons for this test. First, the FA-150 transponder device requires an ABM
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Input Message to generate an AIVDM. Second, it was necessary to certify the accuracy of
the InputEncoder.py’s data conversation and encoding functions.
The certification process involved comparing InputEncoder.py’s generated AIVDM with
the received AIVDM from the CAMINO-701. The test certified that InputEncoder.py’s
data converting and encoding functions are reliable and accurate.
After the generation of the ABM, the FA-150 AIS authenticator forwarded the ABM to the
FA-150 transponder device for transmission to the CAMINO-701.
Phase 1 concluded successfully and there were no noteworthy events or new abnormalities.
Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 show python print notifications for A_Challenger.py and
B_Challenger.py, respectively, during its active listening state. Figure 5.14 displays three
“heartbeat” data packets from the FA-150 transponder. These “heartbeat” data packets are
independent of this research and are a manufacturer-programmed feature. In these two
figures, A_Challenger.py and B_Challenger.py did not take additional actions and continues
its active listening loop because the two transponders did not detect any conditional data
packets (i.e., Message 12 and Message 14).
Figure 5.16 is a screenshot of InputEncoder.py’s various parsing, converting, and encoding
subfunctions to transform an 8-bit ASCII data string into a 6-bit ASCII ABM and AIVDM.
Figure 5.17 depicts a sample of InputEncoder.py’s generated AIVDM stored in the desig-
nated outfile. Note that each AIVDM was stored with a corresponding timestamp of when
the AIVDM was transmitted from the FA-150 to the CAMINO-701.
The designated outfile was used to validate the accuracy of InputEncoder.py. The AIVDM
Messages in the outfile was compared to the received AIVDMs on the CAMINO-701.
5.4.2 Phase 2 Completion: Creation and Transmission of Challenge
Message
The research transitioned immediately into Phase 2 with the successful completion of
Phase 1. Upon receipt of the AIVDM from the FA-150, the CAMINO-701 transponder
immediately forwarded the data packet to the authenticator. A_Challenger.py parsed the
received AIVDM and generated an appropriate challenge message for transmission to the
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FA-150.
Figure 5.18 is a screenshot of various portions of Phase 2 via A_Challenger.py’s print
notifications. The first notification shows that the CAMINO-701 received the Message 12
from the FA-150. The second and third notifications show the initiation of the data packet
analysis and challenge message creation process. The final notifications show the various
steps and subfunctions required to generate the challenge ABM that was encapsulated with
the in-question string. Later, this ABM was routed to the CAMINO-701 transponder for
automated conversion into an AIVDM for RF propagation to the FA-150.
Figure 5.14. CAMINO-701 (laptop) display of received AIS data packets
from FA-150 transponder.
With regards to the actual payload of A_Challenger.py’s generated challenge message, it
is important to discuss the necessity of the A_Challenger.py’s double conversion function.
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Commas (,) are not represented in the NMEA 6-bit ASCII alphanumeric scheme, but are
represented in the AIS 6-bit ASCII alphanumeric scheme. It is not possible to directly pass
a AIS 6-bit ASCII formatted AIS data packet to transponder for transmission because all
data passed to the transponder for transmission must be in the NMEA 6-bit ASCII format.
This process is detailed in Appendix B.
Figure 5.15. FA-150 (laptop) display of received AIS data packets from
CAMINO-701 transponder.
Double conversion is the process of converting AIS 6-bit ASCII to binary then to NMEA
6-bit ASCII. The double conversion function provides the CAMINO-701 transponder with
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a properly formatted ABM sentence for transmission.
Phase 2 concluded as expected and there were no additional noteworthy events or ab-
normalities. Phase 2 goals were successfully achieved. Reviewing the CAMINO-701’s
transmission logs as well as the FA-150’s message receive logs verified the success of Phase
2 goals. The CAMINO-701 transponder and authenticator pair received the initial AIVDM,
generated a challenge message, and sent it to the FA-150. Similarly, the FA-150 transponder
authenticator pair received the challenge message from the CAMINO-701.
Figure 5.16. A display of InputEncoder.py ’s process readouts regarding the
data inputs, conversions, and outputs.
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5.4.3 Phase 3 Completion: Receipt of Challenge Message, Digital Sig-
nature Creation, and Transmission
Upon receipt, B_Challenger.py parsed the received challenger message from the CAMINO-
701 for information such as the MMSI, AIS Message type, and original AIVDM (Phase 1).
Once B_Challenger.py acquired the requisite information, it initiated the digital signature
generation and BBM creation processes.
Figure 5.19 is a screenshot of the various steps required to generate and transmit five
digital signature fragments. The first print notification represents the instance when the
FA-150 authenticator received the challenge message from the CAMINO-701. The second
notification depicts B_Challenger.py’s extraction of the MMSI and payload information,
which feeds the subsequent digital signature creation and transmission steps.
Figure 5.17. A partial display of Outfile.txt. This shows a sample of the
data strings converted from simple 8-bit ASCII to final AIVDM sentences
that are expected on the CAMINO-701 receiving end.
The digital signature generation process utilized the Charm Cryptography Library and the
Weil pairing cryptographic signature scheme discussed in Chapter 4. J. Ayo Akinyele
developed the Weil pairing scheme from [35] and implemented it for use with the Charm
Cryptography Library. This scheme was exercised independently multiple times prior to
performing test Phases 0 - 4 to validate the reliability of the implemented scheme and the
authenticator’s digital signature verification functions. These tests were completed without
any issues or errors.
Since the generated digital signaturewas larger than the FA-150’s 52 character BBMpayload
limit, B_Challenger.py fragmented the resultant digital signature into five fragments and
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were transmitted to the CAMINO-701. Phase 3 concluded as expected without errors
or abnormalities and Phase 3 goals were successfully achieved. Verification of success
involved reviews of the FA-150 transponder’s and CAMINO-701 transponder’s received
messages logs. For the FA-150, the review involved a positive confirmation of receipt
for the CAMINO-701’s challenge message. For the CAMINO-701, the review involved a
positive confirmation of receipt for the FA-150’s five transmitted digital signature fragments.
Figure 5.20 is a screenshot of the five Python printouts on the CAMINO-701 that represents
the receipt of the response messages, which contains the fragmented digital signatures.
5.4.4 Phase 4
This phase certified the success of A_Challenger.py’s digital signature verification function
by reviewing the Python print notifications for positive indicators and the lack of negative
indicators (e.g., Python script crash errors due to verification failures).
When the CAMINO-701 received the response messages (Message 14) from the FA-150,
A_Challenger.py parsed the five separate response messages and reconstructed the frag-
mented digital signatures into a continuous digital signature pairing-object for digital sig-
nature verification. Figure 5.21 is a screenshot of A_Challenger.py’s digital signature
re-assembly and verification status messages.
Phase 4 concluded as expected without any abnormalities or noteworthy events. Phase 4
goals were successfully achieved. Positive verification of the CAMINO-701’s receive logs
and positive observation of visual and auditory alarms validates Phase 4 success.
5.5 System Metrics
Section 5.5 discusses the recorded system metrics and juxtaposes the experimental AIS
authenticator’s performance against codified AIS data packet reporting and operational
requirements in [7].
The ITU requires maritime vessels equipped with AIS to have regular data packet reporting
intervals based on the vessel’s dynamic conditions (e.g., velocity, course change) and
equipped AIS transponder class. Ideally, the performance of the proposed AIS authenticator
needs to either meet or exceed the ITU requirements in order to operate in a high traffic
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Figure 5.18. Various process states of Phase 2.
maritime environment. Due to time constraints, this research only measured end-to-end
time and CPU-load percentages to determine the authenticator’s suitability of practical
operation in a traffic maritime environment and compliance with ITU standards.
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Figure 5.19. A display of B_Challenger’s readout indicating the receipt of
a challenge message from the CAMINO-701 transponder followed by the
digital signature creation process.
5.5.1 Overall Successful Challenge Response Rate
Out of six trials (60 transmissions), the proposed system was operationally successful in
41.67 percent of the trials. Our research identified that the failures were caused by a
problematic “checkfile” function. We identified the problematic function by referencing
data strings in laptop buffers.
The FA-150 AIS authenticator script features a checkfile() function, which represents the
experimental AIS authenticator’s buffer used to store the initial, normal data packet trans-
mission. During the experiments, the checkfile() function was often unreliable and could
not locate an existing string value. This malfunction is the sole cause of failed test iterations
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Figure 5.20. This figure depicts the five digital signature fragments originat-
ing from the FA-150.
during the experiments. The remaining portions of the authenticator functioned as designed.
When the checkfile() function did not fail, the authenticator scripts created, fragmented,
transmitted, reconstructed, and verified the digital signatures without errors or issues.
The validation process involved locating the data string contained in the challenge message
with the contents of the outfile, which simulates the authenticator’s internal buffer.
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Figure 5.21. This figure depicts the successful reassembly and verification
of the five digital signature fragments.
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In all instances, regardless of success or failure, the designated outfile contained the targeted
string value. We surmised that the 41.67 percent operational success rate may be improved
through re-design and optimization of the checkfile() function.
5.5.2 System Response Time
The FA-150 was configured to transmit the ordinary data packets to the CAMINO-701
for challenge at one-minute intervals. A one-minute transmission interval was selected to
provide sufficient time to observe and record both AIS authenticators’ status messages and
end-to-end times.
With regards to the transmission of the response messages, the FA-150’s AIS authenticator
was configured to transmit each digital signature fragment at one-second intervals. This
transmission frequency was selected because it allowed for sufficient time to record data and
observe various authenticator operational states. Furthermore, this transmission frequency
produced reliable, positive results; whereas a higher frequency would cause data packet
transmission irregularities.
Figure 5.22 depicts the data collected over six different test sessions. Each session included
ten sets of data packet exchanges.
The resultant end-to-end times specify the time required to complete Phase 1 – 4 and provide
an operational limitation of the proposed AIS authenticator prototype because this time
describes how quickly the prototype is capable of processing one challenge-and-response
data packet set before another arrives.
Table 5.1 summarizes the recorded metrics for system performance over six trial sets (60
transmissions):
Table 5.1. Summary of averaged recorded metrics for proposed system per-
formance over 60 transmissions.
Summary of Recorded Metrics for System Performance over Six Trials Sets
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6
Overall Success Rate 50% 10% 60% 50% 20% 60%
Average End-to-End Time 4.4 seconds 6 seconds 4.67 seconds 7 seconds 6 seconds 6 seconds
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Figure 5.22. AIS authenticator test data from 60 iterations.
Table 5.2 summarizes the overall testing results:
Table 5.2. Summary of overall system performance over six trial sets (60
transmissions).
Summary of Overall System Performance over Six Trials Sets
Success Rate 41.67%
Average End-to-End Time 5.67 seconds
Lowest End-to-End Time 3 seconds
Highest End-to-End Time 8 seconds
Median End-to-End Time 6 seconds
For commercial implementation, the end-to-end time must be less than or equal to the AIS
transponder’s class-specific reporting interval because a slower time will not support the
ITU’s requirements for AIS transmission frequency. Figure 5.23 represents the Class A
transponder’s periodic reporting interval and Figure 5.24 represents the Class B transpon-
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der’s periodic reporting interval. The ITU specifies each transponder class’s reporting
interval on the vessel’s dynamic data (e.g, heading change, velocity, moored, anchored).
Various factors such as organizational policy, cargo load, weight, fuel costs, route, and other
global economic factors influence each vessel’s cruising speed. Thus, the proposed AIS
authenticator should support various contact densities with an end-to-end time that meets
various Class A and B reporting intervals.
Agarwal [48] estimates the cruising speed of various Class A maritime vessels as follows:
• Bulk carriers – 13 to 15 knots
• Container ships – 16 to 24 knots
• Oil and chemical tankers – 13 to 17 knots
• “Roll on roll off” vessels – 16 to 22 knots
• Cruise ships – 20 to 25 knots
Figure 5.23. Class A AIS shipboard mobile equipment reporting intervals
based on various dynamic vessel states. Source: [7].
Given the cruising speed estimates, it is fair to assume that the majority of commercial
vessels’ transit speed ranges from 14 to 23 knots. Therefore, the majority of commercial
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vessels transmit AIS data packets at a six-second interval (two seconds, if changing course),
and other vessels transmit AIS data packets at 10 second intervals.
Based on the experimental results, shown in Figure 5.22, the AIS authenticator prototype
is capable of reliably supporting vessels that are either stationary or at cruising speeds up
to 14 knots. However, the prototype is currently not suitable for faster vessels whose transit
requires faster end-to-end processing speeds.
Conversely, the authenticator prototype is capable of reliably supporting Class B-equipped
vessels cruising up to 23 knots because the Class B reporting intervals are greater than the
highest recorded end-to-end time.
Figure 5.24. Class B AIS shipboard mobile equipment reporting intervals
based on various dynamic vessel states. Source: [7].
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5.5.3 System CPU Load
Appendix K documents the CAMINO-701 authenticator’s CPU load data and Appendix L
documents the FA-150 authenticator’s CPU load data. The research implemented a multi-
threadedCPU loadmeasuring function into the authenticator source codes for theCAMINO-
701 and FA-150. Both authenticators’ load data were captured utilizing the Python3 “psutil”
library. The CPU load data was recorded at ten second intervals and it was automatically
recorded into a designated text file. A ten-second interval was selected to provide sufficient
sample points over a 30 minute test session.
The CPU load tests were conducted while utilizing two Virtual Machine (VM)s that were
configured for one CPU core and 10 GB of virtual system memory. The VM supporting
the CAMINO-701 authenticator possessed a CPU at 1.9GHz and the VM supporting the
FA-150 authenticator possessed a CPU at 2.0GHz.
The research conducted a 30-minute stress test tomeasure three separate VM states: passive,
idle, and active. Passive describes the idle state of theVMwithout the activated authenticator
script. Idle describes the VM state when the authenticator script is actively listening for AIS
data packets. Active describes the VM state when the authenticator script is fully listening,
processing, and transmitting AIS data packets. Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26 depict the CPU
load metrics over 30 minutes for the CAMINO-701 authenticator and FA-150 authenticator,
respectively. Noteworthy statistics for the CAMINO-701 authenticator’s CPU load are given
in Figure 5.27.
The CAMINO-701 authenticator’s CPU load over a continuous 30 minute operational test
resulted in an average percentage of 1.0 (passive), 0.6 (idle), and 3.1 (active); a minimum
percentage of 0.0 (passive), 0.0 (idle), and 0.1 (active); and a maximum percentage of 6.1
(passive), 7.5 (idle), and 17.2 (active).
Noteworthy statistics for the FA-150 authenticator’s CPU load are given in Figure 5.28. The
FA-150 authenticator’s CPU load over a continuous 30 minute operational test resulted in
an average percentage of 1.9 (passive), 1.0 (idle), and 3.7 (active); a minimum percentage
of 0.5 (passive), 0.2 (idle), and 0.8 (active); and a maximum percentage of 9.7 (passive),
6.1 (idle), and 24.1 (active).
Given the statistics, we conclude that the proposed authenticator prototype may function
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adequately in low-density traffic environments because the simulated testing environment
was equipped with two transponders programmed to communicate at one-minute inter-
vals. Notwithstanding multiple outlying data points, both authenticators’ active CPU load
percentages consistently remained below 15 percent.
We expect that the CPU load for both authenticators may increase if the testing environment
is reconfigured to resemble a high-density traffic environment. Currently, both authenti-
cators’ average and median active CPU load are between 2.4 percent and 3.7 percent per
data packet processed. Additionally, the maximum CPU loads recorded were between 10
percent and 25 percent. From these experimental results, the authenticator prototype is not
currently capable of supporting areas such the Strait of Dover, which is one of the many
busy maritime routes in the world with a transit of approximately 400 vessels daily [28].
Although the research provided a proof-of-concept and added integrity and authenticity to
AIS data packets without changing either the AIS standard or protocol, the proposed AIS
authenticator is neither scalable nor capable of supporting high-density traffic environments
under its current system specifications and un-optimized state. We expect that increasing
the CPU cores, utilizing application-specific hardware instead of a general-use laptop VM,
and optimizing the authenticator’s code to increase efficiency and load-sharing capabilities
will significantly improve performance times and scalability.
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Figure 5.25. Recorded CPU load of the VM assigned to the CAMINO-701.
CPU load was recorded under three conditions: passive, idle, and active.
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Figure 5.26. Recorded CPU load of the VM assigned to the FA-150. CPU
load was recorded under three conditions: passive, idle, and active.
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Figure 5.27. Key statistics for recorded CPU load percentages of the VM as-
signed to the CAMINO-701. CPU load was recorded under three conditions:
passive, idle, and active.
Figure 5.28. Key statistics for recorded CPU load percentages of the VM
assigned to the FA-150. CPU load was recorded under three conditions:
passive, idle, and active.
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This research has explored the addition of integrity and authentication capabilities to the
AIS protocol without modification of the ITU-R M.1371-5 or NMEA-0183 standards.
It showed how standard-compliant messages could be used to implement the protocol,
examined possible cryptographic mechanisms for use in the protocol, and provided an
initial proof-of-concept prototype.
The research prioritized and focused on validating system functionality through a proof-
of-concept system using COTS AIS transmitters in the Engineering Enclave for Maritime
Security (EEMS) Laboratory at the Naval Postgraduate School. The experimental results
present performance metrics that may be improved upon through further development and
optimization of the testbed components and the Python source codes.
The final authenticator design incorporated the use of ABM Input Messages to inject the
challenge message and a BBM Input Message to inject the digital signature into the two AIS
transponder test devices. The use of ABM and BBM resulted in a VDM Output Message
that supports AIS RF transmissions from the transponder devices.
The research recorded an average experimental success rate of 41.67 percent and an average
end-to-end time of 5.67 seconds over 60 test iterations. The overall test results demon-
strate that the experimental AIS authenticator is compatible with the current AIS standard,
functions as designed, and is capable of authenticating user-defined AIS data packets from
current commercial AIS transponders.
Various mitigating actions were implemented to address a number of technical challenges
(e.g., apparent manufacturer noncompliance with standards, AIS device design inadequa-
cies, and AIS internal buffer limitations) that negatively affected the measured system
performance (defined by success rate, end-to-end time, and CPU load percentage).
The collected data for average end-to-end time, success rate, and CPU-load indicates that
the current design and implementation of the AIS authenticator is not currently capable of
operating efficiently in a high-density traffic environment and therefore not supportive of
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Class AAIS operating requirements. The CPU load on the prototype platform indicates that
the AIS authenticator prototype may only be capable of reliable operation in low-density
traffic environments without code or component optimization.
Our findings and recommendations are discussed in more detail in the following sections.
6.1 Research Questions
The following is a revisit of the three research questions introduced in Chapter 3 and a
summary of the respective answers to the three questions.
What would the overall AIS technical architecture look like after the addition of
message integrity and authentication? With a modified AIS authenticator design, AIS
hardening features a three-mechanism data exchange between two entities to automatically
challenge and respond appropriately against any AIS data packet via a cryptographic digital
signature.
Does the current AIS protocol possess sufficient flexibility to provide message integrity
and authentication without changing the overall architecture? The current AIS protocol
and standard, outlined in ITU-R M.1371-5 and NMEA-0183, does provide sufficient flexi-
bility to add integrity and authenticity to AIS data packets. A successful AIS authenticator
prototype was engineered without any modifications to either AIS or NMEA standards.
To what extent does the current AIS protocol constrain the list of suitable crypto-
graphic algorithms? The ABM’s 48-character limit and BBM’s 52-character limit for all
ASM variant AIS Messages constrains the list of eligible cryptographic schemes for AIS
authenticator implementation.
6.1.1 Design Constraints, Concerns, and Considerations
This research and the resultant AIS authenticator prototype is not currently scalable and
capable of supporting Class A AIS vessels or operating in high-density traffic environments
without code revision and optimization.
Given the CPU load measurements, this research concludes that an approximate 4 percent
average CPU load, a 25 percent maximum CPU load, and consistent active CPU load
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percentages between 5 and 15 percent are computationally intensive values given the singular
ship-to-ship testing environment.
This research was able to engineer and implement an AIS authenticator prototype that
complies with both the NMEA-0183 and ITU-R M.1371-5 standards. With regards to
forward compatibility, the AIS authenticator is limited only by the current AIS protocol
and standard. Despite the limitations of the AIS protocol and standard, the implemented
authenticator is modular and possesses the flexibility to adapt over time to future changes to
theAIS standard. Notwithstanding the technical issues during the research, the authenticator
tested and operated well with legacy AIS devices as expected.
Although this research only tested and certified using one AIS message variant, the im-
plemented AIS authenticator is capable of supporting the remaining 26 message types.
This is possible because the authenticator’s delivery methods and message encapsulation
mechanisms function in a way that does not discriminate against different AIS message
types.
The implemented AIS authenticator fulfilled the minimalist system constraint. The authen-
ticator only utilized mechanisms and methods organic to the AIS protocol without the need
for modifications.
6.2 Recommendations and Areas for Future Work
This section provides a discussion on the various recommendations and areas applicable for
future work and further research. The following discussion will include recommendations
and topics such as development of lightweight cryptographic algorithms, procurement and
utilization of modern AIS equipment, simulation of real maritime traffic, utilization of
application-specific integrated circuit boards, the optimization of Challenger.py’s search
function, and the implementation of a dynamic digital signature fragmentation function.
6.2.1 Identification and Development of Lightweight Cryptographic
Algorithms
Future research on identifying suitable certificateless schemes or developing lightweight
cryptographic algorithms may expand the list of AIS-compatible cryptosystems. The
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AIS payload size, specifically, the ABM and BBM sentences constrain the list of eligible
cryptographic schemes. The two standards limit the maximum possible digital signature
size of any cryptographic algorithmor scheme to 1560 bits or 260 6-bit ASCII characters. As
has been discussed in Chapter 3, certificateless-based schemes may be particularly relevant
to the AIS environment, and identification and implementation of a relevant certificateless
short signature scheme is a future research direction with excellent potential.
6.2.2 Procurement and Utilization of Modern AIS Equipment
Due to lengthy procurement and delivery times, this research only had access to two legacy
AIS transponders models (i.e, FURNUO FA-150 and ALLTEK CAMINO-701). This was
a research weakness because the newer FURUNO models, vice the CAMINO-701, would
have provided support to both AIS message type 6 and 8. Therefore, it is recommended that
future researchers have access to more than one late-model AIS transponder variant from
any given manufacturer.
6.2.3 Simulate Real Maritime Traffic
NPS is located in Monterey, California and is in close proximity to the AIS traffic in
Monterey Bay. However, this research did not make use of available, real maritime traffic.
Instead, this research utilized simulated user-generated traffic from a pre-staged text file as
an experimental control.
Even though both AIS transponders were within receiving range of Monterey Bay’s AIS
traffic, this research did not want to contaminate the maritime operating environment with
spoofed AIS data packets. Each phase of the experiment generated volumes of experimental
voyage data. This data, if leaked, would introduce irregularities, phantom ships, and hazards
to real vessels and systems.
Therefore, a recommended improvement to this research is the implementation of maritime
traffic that is more representative of a high-density maritime traffic area (e.g. Strait of
Dover). Perhaps follow-on research could incorporate a maritime-traffic generator.
MarineTraffic (https://www.marinetraffic.com) is a ship tracking and maritime intelligence
service provider that can supply future researchers with the necessary volumes of real
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maritime traffic data. Additionally, MarineTraffic provides an application programming
interface that allows developers and researchers to access and extract maritime data from a
common repository.
6.2.4 Utilization of Application Specific Integrated Circuit Boards
In the beginning ofChapter 5, this thesis discusses the resultant CPU load percentages during
active AIS message processing. The CPU load percentages measured as high as 25 percent
and consistently between 5 and 15 percent. The prototype AIS authenticator’s shared CPU
and VM resources directly influenced these experimental results. Specifically, a single-
core 2.0 GHz CPU on a Linux-based VM provided the processing power and resources
to A_Challenger.py and a single-core 1.9 GHz CPU on a Linux-based VM provided the
processing power and resources to B_Challenger.py.
This research recognizes that these system specifications and shared computational re-
sources are not an optimal solution for the AIS authenticator. We recommend that future
work and improvements to the AIS authenticator’s hardware utilize application-specific in-
tegrated circuit boards and multi-core processors to reduce and load share CPU resources.
This research recommends that future researchers utilize the Raspberry Pi 4 (RP4) as a
possible low-cost hardware improvement if custom application-specific integrated circuit
boards are not available. The RP4 is a flash-card sized integrated circuit board and light-
weight computer solution. For example, Canakit (https://www.canakit.com/), an online
electronics vendor, advertises a RP4 starter kit for approximately 120 US Dollars. This
RP4 starter kit has the following pertinent system specifications: 1.5 GHz 64-bit quadcore
ARMv8 CPU, 4GB RAM, and 32GB storage.
6.2.5 Optimization and Integration of AIS Authenticator Source
Codes
This research utilized four distinct Python3 scripts (i.e., KeyGenerationAuthority.py,
A_Challenger.py, B_Challenger.py, InputEncoder.py) to accomplish the specified research
goals.
The AIS authenticator’s code (i.e., A_Challenger.py and B_Challenger.py) prioritized func-
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tionality rather than efficiency and optimization because this research was primarily focused
on providing a proof-of-concept than a field-ready prototype.
KeyGenerationAuthority.py requires the least amount of future work due to its function of
simulating the secure creation of a private key and the prior acquisition of a public key.
Similarly, InputEncoder.py does not require significant additional attention because its
primary function was to simulate maritime traffic by generating custom user-defined ABM.
Any improvement to InputEncoder.py should involvemodifying the script to broadcast more
frequently and provide scalable volumes of maritime traffic that better represents various
maritime locales.
Futurework should focus on the optimization ofA_Challenger.py’s static, hard-coded digital
signature queue and B_Challenger.py’s search function.
A_Challenger.py’s digital signature fragment queue was designed as a static five-position,
first-in-first-out queue that stored the digital signature fragments prior to reassembly and
verification. We recommend further development and optimization of a dynamic digital
signature queue and data reassembly mechanism to better accommodate future-developed,
light-weight cryptographic algorithms that would require fewer consecutive messages than
the maximum five time slots that the AIS protocol allows.
B_Challenger.py’s search function was designed to take the challenge message’s payload
as an argument and then reference the designated outfile for the in-question data string’s
existence. The average experimental success rate was 41.67 percent because of the search
function’s inconsistencies. Even though the designated outfile always contained the in-
question data string, the search function would occasionally fail to locate the targeted data
string. We were unable to identify the specific cause of this failure. Consequently, this
failure-to-locate generated a false-negative signal to follow-on functions and processes that
triggered the AIS authenticator to ignore valid challenge messages.
Lastly, recall from Chapter 3 the proposal for Message 6 andMessage 8 utilization and from
Chapter 5 the reason for the deviation from the original proposal toMessage 12 andMessage
14. If future research has access to late-model AIS transponders, this research recommends
the use of Message types 6 and 8 and integration of A_Challenger.py and B_Challenger.py
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as a possible area for improvement of the AIS authenticator prototype. The integration of
these two scripts would allow for true end-to-end testing and the prevention of mechanism
confusion and message indiscernible (discussed in Section 5.4.2).
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APPENDIX A:
AIS Message Types and Description
Table A.1. AIS message types and their descriptions. Adapted from: [20].
AIS Message Types and Descriptions
Message ID Name Description
1 Position report
Scheduled position report;
Class A shipborne mobile equipment
2 Position report
Assigned scheduled position report;
Class A shipborne mobile equipment
3 Position report
Special position report, response
to interrogation;
Class A shipborne mobile equipment
4 Base station report
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Table A.1 continued from previous page




Position report for airborne
stations involved in
SAR operations only
10 UTC/date inquiry Request UTC and date
11 UTC/date response















Safety related data for
broadcast communication
15 Interrogation
Request for a specific message
type can result in multiple responses
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18
Standard Class B equipment position
report
Standard position report
for Class B shipborne
mobile equipment to be used
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There are four parts to Appendix B.
B.1 Overall AIS to NMEA Conversion Process
This first of four figures details a high level diagram that describes the overall AIS and
NMEA character conversion process of AIS Message 12 and Message 14. This first part
also details the breakout of a NMEA ABM and BBM type Input Messages; this breakout
includes where with the NMEA sentence the sample text, “THIS IS A TEST MESSAGE”,
is located and how it appears after 6-bit ASCII conversation.
B.2 Detailed Breakout of the AIS to NMEA Conversion
Process
This second of four figures details the data conversion process identified in part 1 of
Appendix B. This figure represents the normal process that a user performs via the AIS
user-system console to create user-defined messages (e.g., a bridge operator inputs “Hello,
World” to broadcast to another ship). The AIS protocol utilizes a specialized 6-bit ASCII
alphabet while the NMEA protocol utilizes a different 6-bit ASCII alphabet.
In this example, “THIS IS A TEST MESSAGE” serves as the sample message. The
first necessary step is to identify the 6-bit binary representation of each character in the
sample message. The first character, “T”, is equivalent to “010100” in the AIS alphabet.
The second step is to identify the NMEA 6-bit ASCII representation of “010100”; “D”
represents “010100”.
Repeating the 2-step translation process for the remaining characters (including spaces) in
the sample text yields: “D89CP9CP1PD5CDP”.
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B.3 Conversion of Digital Signatures to NMEA 6-bit
ASCII
This third of four figures details the digital signature to NMEA sentence format. This
conversion process is a slight modification of the process detailed in the Section B2 of this
appendix.
The proposed authentication system assumes each digital signature takes an 8-bit ASCII
alphanumeric format. The first step of the digital signature to NMEA conversion process is
to convert each 8-bit ASCII in the digital signature to its binary representation. The second
step is to translate each 6-bit binary set to its appropriate NMEA 6-bit ASCII representation.
If the digital signature binary data is not a perfect factor of six, filler bits (“0”) are used.
The 8-bit ASCII sample text, “0123456789:;<=” (requiring four filler bits) translates to
“klu6WEcnK@”.
B.4 Detailed Breakout of DAC and FI Codes
This fourth figure details how DAC and FI codes are applied to the conversion process and
are embedded into the NMEA sentence.
The ITU-R M.1371-5 and NMEA-0183 do not explicitly mention how the DAC and FI
codes are converted and embedded into the NMEA sentence structure for transmission via
ABM or BBM Input Messages. This figure represents the results of the reverse engineering
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The majority of the Python source code found in this appendix is from the Charm Cryptog-
raphy Library and utilizes the Stanford PBC Library.
This script was designed to simulate a key generation authority and generate the KGA’s
master public key and each of the two ships’ private keys.
Our modification to this code is found under the main() function. Specifically, we added
the nine lines of code that interacted with “privatekey.txt”, “privatekey1.txt”, and “pri-
vatekey2.txt”.
The additional lines of code located under the execution of main() were “commented out”
and used as reference during the research.
’ ’ ’
The f o l l ow i n g code i s from t h e Charm Cryp tog r aphy Python
Module , which u t i l i z e s t h e S t a n f o r d PBC L i b r a r y .
KeyGene r a t i o nAu t ho r i t y . py was d e s i gn ed t o s imu l a t e a Key
Gene r a t i o n Au t h o r i t y . Th i s s c r i p t w i l l g e n e r a t e and w r i t e
i n t o f i l e t h e KGC’ s mas t e r p u b l i c key and each of t h e two
sh ip ’ s p r i v a t e keys . The u t i l i z a t i o n o f a . t x t f i l e
s im u l a t e s t h e s e c u r e t r a n sm i s s i o n and r e c e i p t o f t h e
p r i v a t e key from KGC to each un ique e n t i t y .
: Boneh−Lynn−Shacham I d e n t i t y Based S i g n a t u r e
| From : "D. Boneh , B . Lynn , H. Shacham Sho r t S i g n a t u r e s
| from t h e Weil P a i r i n g "
| P u b l i s h e d i n : J o u r n a l o f C ryp to l ogy 2004
| Av a i l a b l e from : h t t p : / /
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| Notes : Th i s i s t h e IBE (2− l e v e l HIBE ) imp l emen t a t i o n o f
t h e HIBE scheme BB_2 .
∗ t y p e : s i g n a t u r e ( i d e n t i t y −based )
∗ s e t t i n g : b i l i n e a r g roups ( a symmet r i c )
: Au tho r s : J . Ayo Ak inye l e
: Date : 1 /2011
’ ’ ’
from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t Pa i r i ngGroup , ZR , G1 ,
G2 , p a i r
from charm . co r e . e ng i n e . u t i l impo r t o b j e c tToBy t e s
from charm . t o o l b ox . IBSig impo r t ∗
c l a s s BLS01 ( IBSig ) :
d e f _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , groupObj ) :
IBSig . _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f )
g l o b a l group
group = groupObj
de f dump ( s e l f , ob j ) :
r e t u r n ob j e c tToBy t e s ( obj , g roup )
de f keygen ( s e l f , secparam=None ) :
g , x = group . random (G2) , group . random ( )
g_x = g ∗∗ x
pk = { ’ g^x ’ : g_x , ’g ’ : g , ’ i d e n t i t y ’ : s t r ( g_x ) , ’
secparam ’ : secparam }
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sk = { ’x ’ : x}
r e t u r n ( pk , sk )
de f main ( ) :
groupObj = Pa i r i ngGroup ( ’MNT159 ’ )
b l s = BLS01 ( groupObj )
( pk , sk ) = b l s . keygen ( )
x = ob j e c tToBy t e s ( sk [ ’ x ’ ] , g roup )
g = ob j e c tToBy t e s ( pk [ ’ g ’ ] , g roup )
gx = ob j e c tToBy t e s ( pk [ ’ g^x ’ ] , g roup )
wi th open ( " p r i v a t e k e y . t x t " , "wb+" ) a s sk :
sk . w r i t e ( x )
sk . c l o s e ( )
w i th open ( " pub l i c k e y1 . t x t " , "wb+" ) a s pk1 :
pk1 . w r i t e ( g )
pk1 . c l o s e ( )
w i th open ( " pub l i c k e y2 . t x t " , "wb+" ) a s pk2 :
pk2 . w r i t e ( gx )
pk2 . c l o s e ( )





Waters − I d e n t i t y −based s i g n a t u r e s
| From : "B . Waters − E f f i c i e n t i d e n t i t y −based e n c r y p t i o n
w i t h ou t random o r a c l e s "
| P u b l i s h e d i n : EUROCRYPT 2005
| Av a i l a b l e from : Vol 3494 of LNCS, pages 320−329
| Notes :
∗ t y p e : s i g n a t u r e ( ID−based )
∗ s e t t i n g : b i l i n e a r g roups ( a symmet r i c )
: Au tho r s : J . Ayo Ak inye l e
: Date : 11 /2011
from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t Pa i r i ngGroup , ZR ,G1 , G2
, p a i r
from charm . t o o l b ox . i t e r a t e impo r t do t p r od
from charm . t o o l b ox . hash_module impo r t Waters
from charm . co r e . e ng i n e . u t i l impo r t ∗
debug = Fa l s e
c l a s s Wate r sS ig :
d e f _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , groupObj ) :
g l o b a l group , lam_func
group = groupObj
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l am_func = lambda i , a , b : a [ i ] ∗∗ b [ i ]
d e f s e t u p ( s e l f , z , l =32) :
g l o b a l wa t e r s
wa t e r s = Waters ( group , z , l )
a lpha , h = group . random (ZR) , group . random (G1)
g1 , g2 = group . random (G1) , group . random (G2)
A = p a i r ( h , g2 ) ∗∗ a l ph a
y = [ group . random (ZR) f o r i i n r ange ( z ) ]
y1t , y2 t = group . random (ZR) , group . random (ZR)
u1 t = g1 ∗∗ y1 t ; u2 t = g1 ∗∗ y2 t
u = [ g1 ∗∗ y [ i ] f o r i i n r ange ( z ) ]
u1b = g2 ∗∗ y1 t ; u2b = g2 ∗∗ y2 t
ub =[ g2 ∗∗ y [ i ] f o r i i n r ange ( z ) ]
msk = h ∗∗ a l ph a
mpk = { ’ g1 ’ : g1 , ’ g2 ’ : g2 , ’A’ :A, ’ u1t ’ : u1t , ’ u2t ’ : u2t
, ’u ’ : u , ’ u1b ’ : u1b , ’ u2b ’ : u2b , ’ ub ’ : ub , ’ z ’ : z , ’ l
’ : l }
r e t u r n (mpk , msk )
de f keygen ( s e l f , mpk , msk , ID ) :
i f debug : p r i n t ( " Keygen a l g . . . " )
k = wa t e r s . hash ( ID ) # r e t u r n l i s t from k1 , . . . , kz
i f debug : p r i n t ( " k = >" , k )
r = group . random (ZR)
k1 = msk ∗ ( ( mpk [ ’ u1t ’ ] ∗ do t p r od ( 1 , −1 , mpk [ ’ z ’ ] ,
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lam_func , mpk [ ’ u ’ ] , k ) ) ∗∗ r )
k2 = mpk [ ’ g1 ’ ] ∗∗ − r
r e t u r n ( k1 , k2 )
de f s i g n ( s e l f , mpk , sk , M) :
i f debug : p r i n t ( " S ign a l g . . . " )
m = wa t e r s . hash (M) # r e t u r n l i s t from m1 , . . . , mz
i f debug : p r i n t ( "m = >" , m)
( k1 , k2 ) = sk
s = group . random (ZR)
S1 = k1 ∗ ( ( mpk [ ’ u2t ’ ] ∗ do t p r od ( 1 , −1 , mpk [ ’ z ’ ] ,
lam_func , mpk [ ’ u ’ ] , m) ) ∗∗ s )
S2 = k2
S3 = mpk [ ’ g1 ’ ] ∗∗ −s
r e t u r n { ’S1 ’ : S1 , ’S2 ’ : S2 , ’S3 ’ : S3}
de f v e r i f y ( s e l f , mpk , ID , M, s i g ) :
i f debug : p r i n t ( " Ve r i f y . . . " )
k = wa t e r s . hash ( ID )
m = wa t e r s . hash (M)
( S1 , S2 , S3 ) = s i g [ ’ S1 ’ ] , s i g [ ’ S2 ’ ] , s i g [ ’ S3 ’ ]
A, g2 = mpk [ ’A’ ] , mpk [ ’ g2 ’ ]
comp1 = do t p r od ( 1 , −1 , mpk [ ’ z ’ ] , lam_func , mpk [ ’ ub
’ ] , k )
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comp2 = do t p r od ( 1 , −1 , mpk [ ’ z ’ ] , lam_func , mpk [ ’ ub
’ ] , m)
l h s = ( p a i r ( S1 , g2 ) ∗ p a i r ( S2 , mpk [ ’ u1b ’ ] ∗ comp1 ) ∗
p a i r ( S3 , mpk [ ’ u2b ’ ] ∗ comp2 ) )
# i f ( ( p a i r ( S1 , g2 ) ∗ p a i r ( S2 , mpk [ ’ u1b ’ ] ∗ comp1 ) ∗
p a i r ( S3 , mpk [ ’ u2b ’ ] ∗ comp2 ) ) == A) :
i f l h s == A:
r e t u r n True
r e t u r n F a l s e
de f main ( ) :
groupObj = Pa i r i ngGroup ( ’MNT159 ’ )
wat = Wate r sS ig ( groupObj )
( ma s t e r _pub l i c _key , m a s t e r _ s e c r e t _ k e y ) = wat . s e t u p ( 5 )
MMSI1 = "366123000" #These v a l u e s a r e ha rd coded i n t o
t h i s s c r i p t t o accommodate
MMSI2 = "338999999" # f o r t h e two AIS t r a n s p o n d e r u n i t s .
# Gene r a t i o n o f un ique p r i v a t e keys f o r each AIS
t r a n s p o n d e r u n i t s .
o n e _ s e c r e t _ k e y = wat . keygen ( ma s t e r _pub l i c _key ,
ma s t e r _ s e c r e t _ k e y , MMSI1)
two_ s e c r e t _ k ey = wat . keygen ( mas t e r _pub l i c _key ,
ma s t e r _ s e c r e t _ k e y , MMSI2)
# Conve r s i on o f un ique p r i v a t e keys i n t o by t e o b j e c t s i n
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o r d e r t o w r i t e t o f i l e .
o n e _ s e c r e t _ k e y _ b y t e s = ob j e c tToBy t e s ( one_ s e c r e t _k ey ,
group )
two_ s e c r e t _ k e y _ by t e s = ob j e c tToBy t e s ( two_sec r e t _key ,
group )
# Conve r s i on o f KGC’ s mas t e r p u b l i c key i n t o by t e o b j e c t
i n o r d e r t o w r i t e t o f i l e .
mpk_bytes = ob j e c tToBy t e s ( ma s t e r _pub l i c _key , group )
wi th open ( " ShipONE . t x t " , "wb+" ) a s w1 :
w1 . w r i t e ( o n e _ s e c r e t _ k e y _ b y t e s )
w1 . c l o s e ( )
w i th open ( " ShipTWO . t x t " , "wb+" ) a s w2 :
w2 . w r i t e ( two_ s e c r e t _ k e y _by t e s )
w2 . c l o s e ( )
w i th open ( " m a s t e r p u b l i c . t x t " , "wb+" ) a s wmpk :
wmpk . w r i t e ( mpk_bytes )
wmpk . c l o s e ( )
i f __name__ == " __main__ " :





KeyGenerationAuthority.PY Process Flow Graph
The figure located in this appendix details the overall process flow for KeyGenerationAu-
thority.py. The cryptographic portions of this source code is found within the Charm
Cryptography Library.
The Charm Cryptography module generates cryptographic values as pairing objects and
dictionary objects. However, in order to write the digital cryptographic keys to a text file
the information requires conversion to byteobject format.
All technical specifics of the module is found within Charm Cryptogrpahy Library’s docu-
mentation.
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# Th i s s c r i p t s t a k e s an i n p u t t e x t f i l e and c r e a t e s a 6 b i t
# ASCII e q u i v a l e n t .
# ABM − Addressed b i n a r y and s a f e t y r e l a t e d message
# Used t o i n p u t NMEA fo rma t messages i n t o AIS t r a n s p o n d e r
# f o r o u t p u t a s RF .
# For AIS Message Types 6 , 12 , 25 , 26
#
# !AIABM, x , x , x , xxxxxxxxx , x , x . x , s−−s , x ,∗ hh<CR><LF>
# | | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | | ‘−Number o f f i l l b i t s
(0 −5)
# | | | | | | ‘−−Enc ap s u l a t e d d a t a
# | | | | | ‘−−VHF d a t a l i n k message number
( 6 , 12 , 25 , 26) , s e e ITU−R M1371
# | | | | ‘−−AIS channe l f o r b r o a d c a s t o f
t h e r a d i o message (0 −3)
# | | | ‘−−The MMSI of d e s t i n a t i o n AIS u n i t f o r
t h e ITU−R M1371 message (9 d i g i t s ; 30 b i t s )
# | | ‘−− S e q u e n t i a l message i d e n t i f i e r , 0 t o 3
# | ‘−−Sen t ence Number , 1 t o 9
# ‘−−To t a l Number o f s e n t e n c e s needed t o t r a n s f e r
message , 1 t o 9
# BBM − UAIS b r o a d c a s t b i n a r y message
# Used t o i n p u t NMEA fo rma t messages i n t o AIS t r a n s p o n d e r
# f o r o u t p u t a s RF .
# For AIS Message Types 8 , 14 , 25 , 26
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#
# !AIBBM, x , x , x , x , x . x , s−−s , x ,∗ hh<CR><LF>
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | ‘−−Number o f f i l l b i t s (0 −5)
# | | | | | ‘−−Enc ap s u l a t e d d a t a
# | | | | ‘−−VHF d a t a l i n k message number ( 8 , 14 ,
s e e ITU−R M1371
# | | | ‘−−AIS channe l f o r b r o a d c a s t o f t h e r a d i o
message
# | | ‘−− S e q u e n t i a l message i d e n t i f i e r , 0 t o 9
# | ‘−−Sen t ence Number , 1 t o 9
# ‘−−To t a l Number o f s e n t e n c e s needed t o t r a n s f e r
message , 1 t o 9
impo r t b i n a s c i i
from a r g p a r s e impo r t Argumen tPa r se r
impo r t s e r i a l
impo r t os
impo r t t ime
###########################################################
###########################################################
de f I n pu tConve r s i o n (FN , srcMMSI , dstMMSI , chan , o u t f i l e ) :
# Th i s f u n c t i o n c o n v e r t s and a l i g n s t h e d a t a s t r i n g s
# p r e s e n t i n t h e i n p u t f i l e t o NMEA−0183 a l p h a b e t f o rma t .
# Conve r s i on t o b i n a r y wi th 6− b i t a l i g nmen t and t h en t o
#NMEA−0183
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# Pa r s e I n p u t
i n S t r i n g s = [ ]
p r i n t ( " I n i t i a t i n g f i l e read , c onve r s i on , and
t r a n sm i s s i o n p r o c e s s . . . \ r " )
w i th open (FN , ’ rb ’ ) a s f :
f o r l i n e i n f :
# The f o l l ow i n g l i n e s a r e a work around f o r t o
# r e t a i n t h e l e a d i n g 0 i n hex t o b i n a r y
c o nv e r s i o n .
# Python3 does no t keep t h e l e a d i n g z e r o . Th i s
i s
# n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e t h a t i n f o rm a t i o n i n t e g r i t y
i s
# r e t a i n e d t h r ough mu l t i p l e c o nv e r s i o n
i t e r a t i o n s .
z e r o = b ’0 ’
l i n e = ze r o + l i n e . decode ( " u t f −8− s i g " ) . encode ( "
u t f −8") . s t r i p ( ) # Removes UTF−8 BOM and \ n
l i n e _ b i n a r y = b in ( i n t ( b i n a s c i i . h e x l i f y ( l i n e ) ,
16) ) [ 8 : ] # Conve r t s each l i n e t o b i n a r y
i n S t r i n g s . append ( l i n e _ b i n a r y )
f o r d a t a S t r i n g s i n i n S t r i n g s :
# C a l c u l a t e f i l l b i t s t o ma i n t a i n 6− b i t " by t e "
a l i g nmen t
f i l l = 0
b i n a r y _ s t r i n g s = d a t a S t r i n g s
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i f l e n ( d a t a S t r i n g s ) %6 != 0 :
f i l l = 6 − ( l e n ( d a t a S t r i n g s ) %6)
d a t a S t r i n g s += "0"∗ f i l l
# Conve r t t o 6 b i t NMEA 0183 Alphabe t f o rma t :
NMEA_payload = Convert2NMEA0183 ( d a t a S t r i n g s )
# C r e a t i o n o f !AIABM message
createAIABM (NMEA_payload , f i l l , srcMMSI , dstMMSI ,
chan , b i n a r y _ s t r i n g s , o u t f i l e )
r e t u r n
###########################################################
###########################################################
de f createAIABM (AIABMpayload , f i l l , s r c , d s t , chan ,
b i n a r y _ s t r i n g s , o u t f i l e ) :
p r i n t ( " C r e a t i n g AIABM pay load and s e n t e n c e . . . \ r " )
t o t a l = 1
i f l e n ( AIABMpayload ) > 82 :
t o t a l = i n t ( l e n ( AIABMpayload ) / 82)
i f l e n ( AIABMpayload ) % 82 != 0 :
t o t a l += 1
f o r i i n r ange ( t o t a l ) :
s e n t e n c e = " !AIABM, " + s t r ( t o t a l ) + " , " + s t r ( i + 1 )
+ " , " + "0" + " , " + d s t + " , " + chan + " , " +
"12" + " , " + AIABMpayload + " , "
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# Th i s p o r t i o n o f code i s d e s i gn ed t o en s u r e t h a t
# t h e f i l l b i t i n f o rm a t i o n i s added on c o r r e c t l y
# i f t h e r e a r e more t h an two s e n t e n c e s . The f i l l
# b i t i n f o needs t o be on t h e l a s t f r agmen t o f a
# s e n t e n c e s e r i e s .
i f i == t o t a l − 1 :
s e n t e n c e += s t r ( f i l l )
e l s e :
s e n t e n c e += "0"
s e n t e n c e += "∗" + checksum ( s e n t e n c e )
p r i n t ( "AIABM Sen t ence c r e a t i o n s u c c e s s f u l . Ready f o r
t r a n sm i s s i o n . . . \ r " )
t r a n sm i t 2T r a n s p o n d e r ( s en t en c e , s r c , d s t ,
b i n a r y _ s t r i n g s , o u t f i l e )
r e t u r n
###########################################################
###########################################################
de f t r a n sm i t 2T r a n s p o n d e r ( txmsg , s r c , d s t , b i n a r y _ s t r i n g s ,
o u t f i l e ) :
s e r i a l S t r e am = s e r i a l . S e r i a l ( ’ / dev / ttyUSB0 ’ , b a u d r a t e
=38400 , t imeou t =1)
p r i n t ( " T r a n sm i t t i n g AIABM now . . . \ r " )
i f s e r i a l S t r e am :
s e r i a l S t r e am . f l u s h I n p u t ( )
s e r i a l S t r e am . f l u s hOu t p u t ( )
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i f True :
txmsg = txmsg + " \ r \ n "
p r i n t ( " Send ing " + txmsg + " ove r s e r i a l now . \ r \
n " )
outputAIVDM ( s r c , d s t , b i n a r y _ s t r i n g s , o u t f i l e )
s e r i a l S t r e am . w r i t e ( txmsg . encode ( ) )
p r i n t ( "AIABM s e n t t o t r a n s p o n d e r . . . \ r \ n " )
s e r i a l S t r e am . c l o s e ( )
t ime . s l e e p ( 1 )
e l s e :
p r i n t ( " P o r t i s no t open . \ r \ n " )
r e t u r n
###########################################################
###########################################################
de f checksum ( s e n t e n c e ) : # Adapted from Dosch−man ’ s Blog .
# h t t p : / / doschman . b l o g s p o t . com
/ 2 0 1 3 / 0 1 / c a l c u l a t i n g −nmea−
s en t e n c e −checksums . h tml
# Accessed : August 9 , 2019
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p r i n t ( " C r e a t i n g CHECKUM . . . \ r " )
checksumda ta = s e n t e n c e [ 1 : ] # d rops t h e l e a d i n g " ! " o r
" $ "
csum = 0 # i n i t i a l i z i n g f i r s t XOR va l u e
# For each cha r i n checksumdata , XOR a g a i n s t t h e
p r e v i o u s XOR’ s c h a r a c t e r .
# The f i n a l XOR of t h e l a s t c h a r w i l l be t h e checksum to
v e r i f y a g a i n s t .
f o r chk i n checksumda ta :
csum ^= ord ( chk )
csum = s t r ( hex ( csum ) ) [ 2 : ]
p r i n t ( "CHECKSUM c r e a t i o n s u c c e s s f u l . . . \ r \ n " )
r e t u r n csum
###########################################################
###########################################################
de f Convert2NMEA0183 ( d a t a s t r i n g s ) :
p r i n t ( " Conve r t i n g s t r i n g d a t a t o NMEA−0183 6− b i t f o rma t
. . . \ r " )
NMEA0183_alphabet = "0123456789: ; <= >?
@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW‘ abcde f gh i j k lmnopq r s t uvw "
encode = ""
f o r i i n r ange ( i n t ( l e n ( d a t a s t r i n g s ) / 6 ) ) :
k = i ∗6
ch = i n t ( " 0 0 " + d a t a s t r i n g s [ k : k +6 ] , 2 )
encode += NMEA0183_alphabet [ ch ]
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p r i n t ( " Conve r s i on t o NMEA−0183 6− b i t f o rma t comp le t e . . . \
r \ n " )
r e t u r n encode
###########################################################
###########################################################
de f outputAIVDM ( srcMMSI , dstMMSI , pay load , name ) :
p r i n t ( " I n i t i a t i n g AIABM to AIVDM sen t e n c e c o nv e r s i o n
p r o c e s s f o r o u t f i l e . . . \ r " )
z e r o = b ’0 ’
srcMMSI = srcMMSI . encode ( )
srcMMSI = ze r o + srcMMSI
dstMMSI = dstMMSI . encode ( )
dstMMSI = ze r o + dstMMSI
s o u r c e _ b i n a r y = s t r ( b i n ( i n t ( b i n a s c i i . h e x l i f y ( srcMMSI ) ,
16) ) [ 8 : ] )
d e s t i n a t i o n _ b i n a r y = s t r ( b i n ( i n t ( b i n a s c i i . h e x l i f y (
dstMMSI ) , 16) ) [ 8 : ] )
b i n a r y I n f o rm a t i o n = ’001100 ’ + ’00 ’ + s o u r c e _ b i n a r y +
’00 ’ + d e s t i n a t i o n _ b i n a r y + ’0 ’ + ’0 ’ + pay load
AIVDM_fill = 0
i f l e n ( b i n a r y I n f o rm a t i o n ) %6 != 0 :
AIVDM_fill = 6 − ( l e n ( b i n a r y I n f o rm a t i o n ) %6)
b i n a r y I n f o rm a t i o n += "0"∗ AIVDM_fill
AIVDMmessagePayload = Convert2NMEA0183 ( b i n a r y I n f o rm a t i o n
)
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to ta lAIVDMlength = 1
i f l e n ( AIVDMmessagePayload ) > 82 :
to ta lAIVDMlength = i n t ( l e n ( AIVDMmessagePayload ) /
82)
i f l e n ( AIVDMmessagePayload ) % 82 !=0 :
to ta lAIVDMlength += 1
createAIVDM_Msg ( AIVDMmessagePayload , to ta lAIVDMlength ,
AIVDM_fill , name )
r e t u r n
###########################################################
###########################################################
de f createAIVDM_Msg ( AIVDMmessagePayload , to ta lAIVDMlength ,
AIVDM_fill , name ) :
p r i n t ( "AIVDM message be ing c r e a t e d . . . \ r " )
# C r e a t e s t h e a c t u a l AIVDM message t o be s t o r e d i n a f i l e
a s r e f e r e n c e f o r l a t e r s i g n a t u r e v e r i f i c a t i o n
f o r i i n r ange ( to ta lAIVDMlength ) :
MsgPayload = AIVDMmessagePayload [ ( i ∗ 82) : ( i ∗ 82) +
82]
s e n t e n c e = " !AIVDM, " + s t r ( to ta lAIVDMlength ) + " , " +
s t r ( i +1) + " , ,A" + MsgPayload + " , "
i f i == to ta lAIVDMlength − 1 :
s e n t e n c e += s t r ( AIVDM_fill )
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e l s e :
s e n t e n c e += "0"
s e n t e n c e += "∗" + checksum ( s e n t e n c e )
wi th open ( ’ { } ’ . f o rma t ( name , ’ a + ’ ) ) a s f :
f . w r i t e l i n e s ( s t r ( t ime . t ime ( ) ) + " | " + s e n t e n c e )
p r i n t ( "AIVDM message c r e a t e d and w r i t t e n t o f i l e w i th
t imes t amp . . . \ r \ n " )
r e t u r n
###########################################################
###########################################################
i f __name__ == " __main__ " :
p r i n t ( " S c r i p t I n i t i a t i n g . . . \ r " )
# Requ i r ed Arguments
p a r s e r = Argumen tPa r se r ( d e s c r i p t i o n =" Conve r t s u s e r
i n p u t s t o NMEA i n p u t messages t o t r a n s p o n d e r f o r
c o n v e r s i o n and t r a n sm i s s i o n . " )
p a r s e r . add_argument ( " AIS " , n a r g s = ’∗ ’ , h e l p =" i n p u t
message " )
p a r s e r . add_argument ("− f " , "−− f i l e " , d e s t =" f i l e n ame " ,
n a r g s =1 , t ype = s t r , h e l p =" r e ad i n p u t from a f i l e " )
p a r s e r . add_argument ("−sm" , "−− source_mmsi " , d e s t ="
source_mmsi " , d e f a u l t ="338999999" , t yp e = s t r , n a r g s =1 ,
h e l p =" I n p u t s o u r c e mmsi . ( D e f a u l t : 338999999) " )
p a r s e r . add_argument ("−dm" , "−− d e s t i n a t i o n _mms i " , d e s t ="
d e s t i n a t i o n _mms i " , d e f a u l t ="366123000" , t yp e = s t r ,
n a r g s =1 , h e l p =" I n p u t d e s t i n a t i o n mmsi ( D e f a u l t :
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366123000) " )
p a r s e r . add_argument ("−o " , "−− o u t f i l e " , d e s t =" o u t f i l e " ,
n a r g s =1 , t ype = s t r , h e l p =" s p e c i f y a f i l e t o w r i t e
s e n t e n c e s t o . " )
p a r s e r . add_argument ("− c " , "−−chan " , d e s t =" chan " , n a r g s
=1 , t ype = s t r , d e f a u l t ="1" , h e l p =" s p e c i f y t h e AIS
t r a n sm i s s i o n channe l . ( D e f a u l t \ "A \ " ) " ) #0=No
p r e f e r e n c e 1=A 2=B 3=Both
a r g s = p a r s e r . p a r s e _ a r g s ( )
#Check f o r minimum argumen t s
p r i n t ( " Checking f o r minimum argument l e n g t h . . . \ r " )
i f l e n ( a r g s . AIS ) < 1 :
p r i n t ( " Add i t i o n a rgumen t s r e q u i r e d . " )
q u i t ( )
p r i n t ( "Minimum argument l e n g t h met . . . \ r \ n " )
#Check i f o u t f i l e c u r r e n t l y e x i s t s
p r i n t ( " Checking i f " + a r g s . o u t f i l e [ 0 ] + " e x i s t s . . . \ r " )
i f os . p a t h . e x i s t s ( a r g s . o u t f i l e [ 0 ] ) :
p r i n t ( a r g s . o u t f i l e [ 0 ] + " c u r r e n t l y e x i s t s .
I n i t i a t i n g d e l e t i o n . \ r " )
os . remove ( a r g s . o u t f i l e [ 0 ] ) # De l e t e s o u t f i l e
p r i n t ( a r g s . o u t f i l e [ 0 ] + " d e l e t e d . \ r \ n " )
p r i n t ( a r g s . o u t f i l e [ 0 ] + " does no t e x i s t . I t was e i t h e r
d e l e t e d o r d i d no t a l r e a d y e x i s t s . . . \ r \ n " )
I n pu tConve r s i o n ( a r g s . f i l e n ame [ 0 ] , a r g s . source_mmsi [ 0 ] ,
a r g s . d e s t i n a t i o n _mms i [ 0 ] , a r g s . chan [ 0 ] , a r g s . o u t f i l e
[ 0 ] )
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p r i n t ( " S c r i p t F i n i s h e d . . . \ r \ n " )
136
APPENDIX F:
InputEncoder.PY Process Flow Graph
This appendix features the processes and functions found within InputEncoder.py. This
figure intends to logically organize the flow and construction of the Python source code.
Figure F.1. InputEncoder.py Process Flow Graph
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This appendix displays the code utilized for the CAMINO-701 proposed AIS system.
impo r t s e r i a l
impo r t queue
impo r t m u l t i p r o c e s s i n g
# impo r t sy s
from a r g p a r s e impo r t Argumen tPa r se r
impo r t b i n a s c i i
from d a t e t im e impo r t d a t e t im e
’ ’ ’
from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t Pa i r i ngGroup , ZR ,G1 , G2
, p a i r
from charm . t o o l b ox . i t e r a t e impo r t do t p r od
from charm . t o o l b ox . hash_module impo r t Waters
from charm . co r e . e ng i n e . u t i l impo r t ∗
’ ’ ’
from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t Pa i r i ngGroup , ZR ,G1 , G2
, p a i r
from charm . co r e . e ng i n e . u t i l impo r t ∗
from charm . t o o l b ox . IBSig impo r t ∗
de f conver tToASCII ( b i n a r y ) :
p r i n t ( " Conve r t i n g D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e from b i n a r y t o 8− b i t
ASCII . . . \ r " )
r e t u r n ’ ’ . j o i n ( ch r ( i n t ( b i n a r y [ i ∗8 : i ∗8+8] , 2 ) ) f o r i i n
r ange ( i n t ( l e n ( b i n a r y ) / 8 ) ) )
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de f createAIVDMBinary (AIVDM) :
AIVDM = s t r (AIVDM. encode ( ) ) [ 2 : − 5 ] . encode ( )
z e r o = b ’0 ’
l i n e = ze r o + AIVDM
p r i n t ( l i n e )
l i n e _ b i n a r y = b in ( i n t ( b i n a s c i i . h e x l i f y ( l i n e ) , 16) ) [ 8 : ]
r e t u r n l i n e _ b i n a r y
de f conve r tToB ina r y ( a i s _ d a t a ) :
NMEA0183_alphabet = "0123456789: ; <= >?
@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW‘ abcde f gh i j k lmnopq r s t uvw "
decode = ""
f o r c i n a i s _ d a t a :
decode += ’{0: b } ’ . f o rma t ( NMEA0183_alphabet . f i n d ( c ) ) .
r j u s t ( 6 , ’ 0 ’ )
r e t u r n decode
# de f S i gVe r i f y (MMSI, msg ) :
d e f S i gVe r i f y (msg , s i g , MMSI) :
g l o b a l t i m e _ d i c t
t imes t amp = t im e _ d i c t . g e t (msg )
msg0 = msg . s t r i p ( )
msg = msg0 + s t r ( t imes t amp )
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’ ’ ’
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r " )
p r i n t ( "DEBUG: TIMESTAMP FOR VERIFICATION : {0} \ r " . f o rma t (
t imes t amp ) )
msg = msg + s t r ( t imes t amp )
p r i n t (msg )
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r " )
’ ’ ’
groupObj = Pa i r i ngGroup ( ’MNT201 ’ )
b l s = BLS01 ( groupObj )
w i th open ( " pub l i c k e y1 . t x t " , " rb " ) a s r f i l e 1 :
g = r f i l e 1 . r e ad ( )
r f i l e 1 . c l o s e ( )
w i th open ( " pub l i c k e y2 . t x t " , " rb " ) a s r f i l e 2 :
gx = r f i l e 2 . r e ad ( )
r f i l e 2 . c l o s e ( )
p r i n t ( " Conve r t i n g D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e E lemen t s from BYTE
OBJECT to P a i r i n g Element . . . \ r " )
s i g = by t e sToOb j e c t ( s i g , group )
g = by t e sToOb j e c t ( g , group )
gx = by t e sToOb j e c t ( gx , group )
p r i n t ( " Conve r s i on s u c e s s e s s f u l . . . \ r " )
a s s e r t b l s . v e r i f y ( g , gx , s i g , msg ) , " F a i l u r e ! ! ! \ r "
p r i n t ( " D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e V e r i f i c a t i o n S u c c e s s f u l . . . \ r " )
p r i n t ( " {0} i s a v a l i d message from {1} r e c e i v e d
o r i g i n a l l y a t {2} \ r \ n " . f o rma t ( msg0 , MMSI, t imes t amp ) )
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datetimeEND = d a t e t im e . now ( )
ENDtime = datetimeEND . s t r f t i m e ("%d−%b−%Y (%H:%M:%S ) " )
p r i n t ( "END TIME : {0} \ r " . f o rma t ( ENDtime ) )
r e t u r n
’ ’ ’
w i th open ( " m a s t e r p u b l i c . t x t " , " rb " ) a s r f i l e :
p u b l i c _ b y t e s = r f i l e . r e ad ( )
r f i l e . c l o s e ( )
p r i n t ( " Conve r t i n g D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e from BYTE OBJECT
to P a i r i n g Element . . . \ r " )
s i g n a t u r e = by t e sToOb j e c t ( s i g , group )
p r i n t ( " Conve r s i on s u c e s s e s s f u l . . . \ r " )
ma s t e r _ pub l i c _ k e y = by t e sToOb j e c t ( p u b l i c _ b y t e s ,
group )
a s s e r t wat . v e r i f y ( ma s t e r _pub l i c _key , MMSI, msg ,
s i g n a t u r e ) , " I n v a l i d s i g n a t u r e . . . \ r "
p r i n t ( " D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e V e r i f i c a t i o n S u c c e s s f u l . . . \
r \ n " )
r e t u r n
’ ’ ’
d e f conve r tTo6 (msg ) :
NMEA0183_alphabet = "0123456789: ; <= >?
@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW‘ abcde f gh i j k lmnopq r s t uvw "
encode = ""
f o r i i n r ange ( i n t ( l e n (msg ) / 6 ) ) :
k = i ∗6
ch = i n t ( " 0 0 " + msg [ k : k +6 ] , 2 )
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encode += NMEA0183_alphabet [ ch ]
r e t u r n encode
de f checksum ( s e n t e n c e ) :
s e n t e n c e = s e n t e n c e [ 1 : ]
s e n t e n c e = s e n t e n c e . encode ( " u t f −8")
csum = 0b0
f o r i i n r ange ( l e n ( s e n t e n c e ) ) :
csum ^= s e n t e n c e [ i ]
csum = s t r ( hex ( csum ) . uppe r ( ) ) [ 2 : ]
i f l e n ( csum ) != 2 :
csum = "0" + csum
r e t u r n csum
#ABM − Addressed b i n a r y and s a f e t y r e l a t e d message
#Used t o i n p u t NMEA fo rma t messages i n t o AIS t r a n s p o n d e r
# f o r o u t p u t a s RF .
# For AIS Message Types 6 , 12 , 25 , 26
#
#!AIABM, x , x , x , xxxxxxxxx , x , x . x , s−−s , x∗hh<CR><LF>
# | | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | | ‘−Number o f f i l l b i t s (0
−5)
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# | | | | | | ‘−−Enc ap s u l a t e d d a t a
# | | | | | ‘−−VHF d a t a l i n k message number
( 6 , 12 , 25 , 26) , s e e ITU−R M1371
# | | | | ‘−−AIS channe l f o r b r o a d c a s t o f t h e
r a d i o message (0 −3)
# | | | ‘−−The MMSI of d e s t i n a t i o n AIS u n i t f o r
t h e ITU−R M1371 message (9 d i g i t s ; 30 b i t s )
# | | ‘−− S e q u e n t i a l message i d e n t i f i e r , 0 t o 3
# | ‘−−Sen t ence Number , 1 t o 9
# ‘−−To t a l Number o f s e n t e n c e s needed t o t r a n s f e r
message , 1 t o 9
#BBM − UAIS b r o a d c a s t b i n a r y message
#Used t o i n p u t NMEA fo rma t messages i n t o AIS t r a n s p o n d e r f o r
o u t p u t a s RF .
# For AIS Message Types 8 , 14 , 25 , 26
#
#!AIBBM, x , x , x , x , xx , s−−s , x∗hh<CR><LF>
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | ‘−−Number o f f i l l b i t s (0 −5)
# | | | | | ‘−−Enc ap s u l a t e d d a t a
# | | | | ‘−−VHF d a t a l i n k message number ( 8 , 14 , s e e
ITU−R M1371
# | | | ‘−−AIS channe l f o r b r o a d c a s t o f t h e r a d i o
message
# | | ‘−− S e q u e n t i a l message i d e n t i f i e r , 0 t o 9
# | ‘−−Sen t ence Number , 1 t o 9
# ‘−−To t a l Number o f s e n t e n c e s needed t o t r a n s f e r
message , 1 t o 9
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de f c r e a t eC h a l l e n g e ( pay load , mmsi ) :
# C r e a t e t h e number o f NMEA s e n t e c e s r e q u i r e d t o ho ld
t h e AIS message
p r i n t ("############################################\ r " )
p r i n t ( " I n i t i a t i n g AIVDM to b i n a r y c o nv e r s i o n p r o c e s s . \ r
" )
p ay l o ad_b i n = createAIVDMBinary ( pay load )
p r i n t ( "AIVDM to b i n a r y c o nv e r s i o n p r o c e s s s u c c e s s f u l . \ r
" )
p r i n t ( " Checking g e n e r a t e d pay load b i n a r y f o r 6− b i t
a l i g nmen t . \ r " )
t o t a l = 1
f i l l = 0
i f l e n ( p ay l o ad_b i n ) % 6 != 0 :
f i l l = 6 − ( l e n ( p ay l o ad_b i n ) % 6)
p ay l o ad_b i n += "0" ∗ f i l l
p r i n t ( " Al ignment comp le t e . \ r " )
p r i n t ( " I n i t i a t i n g c o nv e r s i o n o f c h a l l e n g e message
pay load t o 6− b i t ASCII . \ r " )
AIABMpayload = conve r tTo6 ( p ay l o ad_b i n )
p r i n t ( " Conve r s i on t o 6− b i t ASCII comp le t e . \ r " )
p r i n t ( " Checking max 48 c h a r a c t e r pay load s i z e . \ r " )
i f l e n ( AIABMpayload ) > 48 :
t o t a l = i n t ( l e n ( AIABMpayload ) / 48)
i f l e n ( AIABMpayload ) % 48 != 0 :
t o t a l += 1
p r i n t ( " There a r e {0} t o t a l f r a gmen t s . \ r " . f o rma t ( t o t a l ) )
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f o r i i n r ange ( t o t a l ) :
i f i != ( t o t a l −1) :
AIABMpayload_send = AIABMpayload [ ( i ∗48) : ( ( i ∗48)
+ 48) ]
# Re s u l t w i l l be i n t h e form s p e c i f i e d i n t h e
# NMEA 0183 ABM sen t e n c e
s e n t e n c e = " !AIABM, " + s t r ( t o t a l ) + " , " + s t r ( i
+ 1 ) + " , " + "0" + " , " + s t r ( mmsi ) + " , " +
"1" + " , " + "12" + " , " + AIABMpayload_send +
" , " + "0"
e l i f i == ( t o t a l −1) :
AIABMpayload_send = AIABMpayload [ ( i ∗ 48) : ]
# R e s u l t w i l l be i n t h e form s p e c i f i e d i n t h e
# NMEA 0183 ABM sen t e n c e
s e n t e n c e = " !AIABM, " + s t r ( t o t a l ) + " , " + s t r ( i
+ 1 ) + " , " + "0" + " , " + s t r ( mmsi ) + " , " +
"1" + " , " + "12" + " , " + AIABMpayload_send +
" , " + s t r ( f i l l )
# c a l c u l a t e checksum f o r p a ck e t
s e n t e n c e += "∗" + checksum ( s e n t e n c e )
p r i n t ("−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−\ r " )
p r i n t ( " Send ing c h a l l e n g e message t o : {0} \ r " . f o rma t (
mmsi ) )
p r i n t ( " Cha l l e nge Message : {0} \ r " . f o rma t ( s e n t e n c e ) )
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p r i n t ( " Cha l l e nge Message Pay load : {0} \ r " . f o rma t (
AIABMpayload ) )
p r i n t ( " I n t e r r o g a t e d Message : {0} \ r " . f o rma t ( pay load ) )
p r i n t ( " T r a n sm i t t i n g c h a l l e n g e message t o t r a n s p o n d e r
. \ r " )
t r a n sm i t 2T r a n s p o n d e r ( s e n t e n c e )
r e t u r n
de f t r a n sm i t 2T r a n s p o n d e r ( txmsg ) :
p r i n t ( " T ran sponde r has message f o r t r a n sm i s s i o n . \ r " )
s e r i a l S t r e am = s e r i a l . S e r i a l ( ’ / dev / ttyUSB1 ’ , b a u d r a t e
=38400 , t imeou t =1)
i f s e r i a l S t r e am :
s e r i a l S t r e am . f l u s h I n p u t ( )
s e r i a l S t r e am . f l u s hOu t p u t ( )
txmsg = txmsg + " \ r \ n "
s e r i a l S t r e am . w r i t e ( txmsg . encode ( ) )
s e r i a l S t r e am . c l o s e ( )
p r i n t ( " Message T r an sm i s s i o n Complete . . . \ n " )
p r i n t ("−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−\ r \ n " )
r e t u r n
################################
#### CRYPTO PORTION START ####
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################################
c l a s s BLS01 ( IBSig ) :
d e f _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , groupObj ) :
IBSig . _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f )
g l o b a l group
group = groupObj
de f dump ( s e l f , ob j ) :
r e t u r n ob j e c tToBy t e s ( obj , g roup )
de f v e r i f y ( s e l f , g , gx , s i g , message ) :
M = s e l f . dump ( message )
h = group . hash (M, G1)
i f p a i r ( s i g , g ) == p a i r ( h , gx ) :
r e t u r n True
r e t u r n F a l s e
’ ’ ’
# | From : "B . Waters − E f f i c i e n t i d e n t i t y −based e n c r y p t i o n
# | w i t h ou t random o r a c l e s "
# | P u b l i s h e d i n : EUROCRYPT 2005
# | Av a i l a b l e from : Vol 3494 of LNCS, pages 320−329
# | Notes :
#∗ t y p e : s i g n a t u r e ( ID−based )
#∗ s e t t i n g : b i l i n e a r g roups ( a symmet r i c )
# : Au tho r s : J . Ayo Ak inye l e
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# : Date : 11 /2011
c l a s s Wate r sS ig :
d e f _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , groupObj ) :
g l o b a l group , lam_func
g l o b a l wa t e r s
g l o b a l z




lam_func = lambda i , a , b : a [ i ] ∗∗ b [ i ]
wa t e r s = Waters ( group , z , l )
d e f s i g n ( s e l f , mpk , sk , M) :
m = wa t e r s . hash (M) # r e t u r n l i s t from m1 , . . . , mz
( k1 , k2 ) = sk
s = group . random (ZR)
S1 = k1 ∗ ( ( mpk [ ’ u2t ’ ] ∗ do t p r od ( 1 , −1 , mpk [ ’ z ’ ] ,
lam_func , mpk [ ’ u ’ ] , m) ) ∗∗ s )
S2 = k2
S3 = mpk [ ’ g1 ’ ] ∗∗ −s
r e t u r n { ’S1 ’ : S1 , ’S2 ’ : S2 , ’S3 ’ : S3}
de f v e r i f y ( s e l f , mpk , ID , M, s i g ) :
k = wa t e r s . hash ( ID )
m = wa t e r s . hash (M)
( S1 , S2 , S3 ) = s i g [ ’ S1 ’ ] , s i g [ ’ S2 ’ ] , s i g [ ’ S3 ’ ]
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A, g2 = mpk [ ’A’ ] , mpk [ ’ g2 ’ ]
comp1 = do t p r od ( 1 , −1 , mpk [ ’ z ’ ] , lam_func , mpk [ ’ ub
’ ] , k )
comp2 = do t p r od ( 1 , −1 , mpk [ ’ z ’ ] , lam_func , mpk [ ’ ub
’ ] , m)
l h s = ( p a i r ( S1 , g2 ) ∗ p a i r ( S2 , mpk [ ’ u1b ’ ] ∗ comp1 ) ∗
p a i r ( S3 , mpk [ ’ u2b ’ ] ∗ comp2 ) )
# i f ( ( p a i r ( S1 , g2 ) ∗ p a i r ( S2 , mpk [ ’ u1b ’ ] ∗ comp1 ) ∗
p a i r ( S3 , mpk [ ’ u2b ’ ] ∗ comp2 ) ) == A) :
i f l h s == A:
r e t u r n True
r e t u r n F a l s e
’ ’ ’
# a s s e r t wat . v e r i f y ( ma s t e r _pub l i c _key , MMSI, msg , s i g ) , "
i n v a l i d s i g n a t u r e "
###############################
#### CRYPTO PORTION END ####
###############################
de f main ( own_mmsi ) :
g l o b a l t i m e _ d i c t
wh i l e no t message_queue . empty ( ) :
raw_message = message_queue . g e t ( )
a i s _ d a t a = raw_message . s p l i t ( " , " ) [ 5 ] # AIVDM
Pay load
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a i s_admin = raw_message . s p l i t ( " , " ) [ 6 ] # AIVDM F i l l
b i t ∗Checksum
a i s _ f i l l = i n t ( a i s_admin . s p l i t ( " ∗ " ) [ 0 ] ) # AIVDM
F i l l b i t s
a i s _ d a t a _ b i n = conve r tToB ina r y ( a i s _ d a t a ) # Conve r t s
AIVDM Pay load t o 6− b i t b i n a r y
mmsi_bin = a i s _ d a t a _ b i n [ 8 : 3 8 ] # e x t r a c t s mmsi
b i n a r y
msg id_b in = a i s _ d a t a _ b i n [ 0 : 6 ] # e x t r a c t s message i d
b i n a r y
mmsi = i n t ( mmsi_bin , 2 ) # c o n v e r t s b i n a r y t o base
10 i n t .
msgid = i n t ( msgid_bin , 2 ) # c o n v e r t s b i n a r y t o base
10 i n t .
p r i n t ( " Message from {0} \ r " . f o rma t (mmsi ) )
p r i n t ( " Message t ype : {0} \ r " . f o rma t ( msgid ) )
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r \ n " )
i f msgid == 12 and mmsi != own_mmsi :
p r i n t ("####################################\ r " )
p r i n t ( " I n i t i a t i n g AIVDM message a n a l y s i s . . . \ r " )
p r i n t ("##################################\ r \ n " )
g l o b a l ch a l l e nged_mes s age
cha l l e nged_mes s age = raw_message
da t e t imeOb j = d a t e t im e . now ( )
r e c e i v e d _ t im e = da t e t imeOb j . s t r f t i m e ("%d−%b−%Y
(%H:%M) " )
t im e _ d i c t . upda t e ( { raw_message : r e c e i v e d _ t im e } )
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p r i n t ("####################################\ r " )
p r i n t ( " Message r e c e i v e d a t / on : {0} \ r " . f o rma t (
r e c e i v e d _ t im e ) )
p r i n t ( " Message i s from : {0} \ r " . f o rma t (mmsi ) )
p r i n t ( "AIVDM Message Pay load : {0} \ r " . f o rma t (
a i s _ d a t a ) )
p r i n t ( " Au t oma t i c a l l y i n i t i a t i n g AIVDM message
c h a l l e n g e p r o c e s s e s . \ r " )
p r i n t ("##################################\ r \ n " )
p r i n t ( " C a l l i n g c r e a t e C h a l l e n g e ( ) . \ r " )
combo = a i s _ d a t a + " , " + a i s_admin
c r e a t e C h a l l e n g e ( combo , mmsi )
p r i n t ( " Cha l l e nge message c r e a t i o n & t r a n sm i s s i o n
comple t e . \ r \ n " )
p r i n t ("##################################\ r \ n " )
e l i f msgid == 14 and mmsi != own_mmsi :
p r i n t ( " \ n " )
p r i n t ( " Response Message De t e c t e d . \ r " )
s i g n a t u r e _ p a y l o a d _ b i n = a i s _ d a t a _ b i n [ 4 0 : ]
i f a i s _ f i l l != 0 :
a i s _ f i l l = − a i s _ f i l l
s i g n a t u r e _ p a y l o a d _ b i n =
s i g n a t u r e _ p a y l o a d _ b i n [ : a i s _ f i l l ]
s i g n a t u r e _ b i n _ q u e u e . pu t ( s i g n a t u r e _ p a y l o a d _ b i n )
i f s i g n a t u r e _ b i n _ q u e u e . f u l l ( ) :
t o t a l b i n = ""
152
f o r i i n r ange ( 5 ) :
add = s i g n a t u r e _ b i n _ q u e u e . g e t ( )
t o t a l b i n += add
s i g n a t u r e _ p a y l o a d _ b i n = t o t a l b i n
s i g n a t u r e _ASCI I = conver tToASCII (
s i g n a t u r e _ p a y l o a d _ b i n )
p r i n t ( " \ r " )
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r " )
p r i n t ( " D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e : \ r " )
p r i n t ( s i g n a t u r e _ASCI I )
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r " )
p r i n t ( " D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e t o ASCII c o nv e r s i o n
comple t e . \ r " )
p r i n t ( " I n i t i a t i n g s i g n a t u r e v e r i f i c a t i o n
p r o c e s s . \ r " )
s i g n a t u r e _ASCI I = s i gn a t u r e _ASCI I . encode ( )
p r i n t ( s i g n a t u r e _ASCI I )
# S i gVe r i f y (mmsi , c h a l l e nged_mes s age )
S i gVe r i f y ( cha l l enged_mes sage ,
s i gna t u r e_ASCI I , mmsi )
i f __name__ == " __main__ " :
t i m e _ d i c t = d i c t ( )
c h a l l e nged_mes s age = ’ ’
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p a r s e r = Argumen tPa r se r ( d e s c r i p t i o n =" I n p u t one ’ s own
MMSI . " )
p a r s e r . add_argument ("−mmsi " , "−−mmsi " , d e s t ="mmsi " ,
n a r g s =1 , t ype = s t r , h e l p ="MMSI va l u e " )
a r g s = p a r s e r . p a r s e _ a r g s ( )
# Check f o r minimum argumen t s
i f l e n ( sy s . a rgv ) == 1 :
p r i n t ( " I n p u t MMSI va l u e \ r " )
q u i t ( )
s i g n a t u r e _ b i n _ q u e u e = queue . Queue ( 5 )
message_queue = queue . Queue ( )
own_mmsi = a r g s . mmsi [ 0 ]
wh i l e True :
s e r i a l S t r e am = s e r i a l . S e r i a l ( ’ / dev / ttyUSB1 ’ ,
b a u d r a t e =38400 , t imeou t =1)
r e c e i v e d = s e r i a l S t r e am . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
i f " !AIVDM" i n r e c e i v e d :
p r i n t ( " \ n " )
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r " )
p r i n t ( "AIVDM message r e c e i v e d : {0} \ r " . f o rma t (
r e c e i v e d ) )
message_queue . pu t ( r e c e i v e d )
ma i n_ f un c t i o n = mu l t i p r o c e s s i n g . P r o c e s s ( name= ’
main_f ’ , a r g s =own_mmsi , t a r g e t =main ( own_mmsi )
)
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ma in_ f un c t i o n . daemon = True
ma i n_ f un c t i o n . s t a r t ( )
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APPENDIX H:
A_Challenger.PY Process Flow Graph
This appendix features the processes and functions found within A_Challenger.py. This
figure intends to logically organize the flow and construction of the Python source code.
Figure H.1. A_Challenger.py Process Flow Graph
157




This appendix displays the code utilized for the FA-150 proposed AIS system.
impo r t s e r i a l
impo r t queue
impo r t m u l t i p r o c e s s i n g
impo r t b i n a s c i i
impo r t s y s
impo r t random
impo r t t ime
from a r g p a r s e impo r t Argumen tPa r se r
’ ’ ’
from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t Pa i r i ngGroup , ZR ,G1 , G2
, p a i r
from charm . t o o l b ox . i t e r a t e impo r t do t p r od
from charm . t o o l b ox . hash_module impo r t Waters
’ ’ ’
# Th i s impo r t i s f o r BLS_04 Imp l emen t a t i o n
from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t Pa i r i ngGroup , ZR ,G1 , G2
, p a i r
from charm . t o o l b ox . IBSig impo r t ∗
from charm . co r e . e ng i n e . u t i l impo r t ∗
#ABM − Addressed b i n a r y and s a f e t y r e l a t e d message
#Used t o i n p u t NMEA fo rma t messages i n t o AIS t r a n s p o n d e r f o r
o u t p u t a s RF .
# For AIS Message Types 6 , 12 , 25 , 26
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#
#!AIABM, x , x , x , xxxxxxxxx , x , x . x , s−−s , x ,∗ hh<CR><LF>
# | | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | | ‘−Number o f f i l l b i t s (0
−5)
# | | | | | | ‘−−Enc ap s u l a t e d d a t a
# | | | | | ‘−−VHF d a t a l i n k message number
( 6 , 12 , 25 , 26) , s e e ITU−R M1371
# | | | | ‘−−AIS channe l f o r b r o a d c a s t o f t h e
r a d i o message (0 −3)
# | | | ‘−−The MMSI of d e s t i n a t i o n AIS u n i t f o r
t h e ITU−R M1371 message (9 d i g i t s ; 30 b i t s )
# | | ‘−− S e q u e n t i a l message i d e n t i f i e r , 0 t o 3
# | ‘−−Sen t ence Number , 1 t o 9
# ‘−−To t a l Number o f s e n t e n c e s needed t o t r a n s f e r
message , 1 t o 9
#BBM − UAIS b r o a d c a s t b i n a r y message
#Used t o i n p u t NMEA fo rma t messages i n t o AIS t r a n s p o n d e r f o r
o u t p u t a s RF .
# For AIS Message Types 8 , 14 , 25 , 26
#
#!AIBBM, x , x , x , x , xx , s−−s , x ,∗ hh<CR><LF>
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | |
# | | | | | | ‘−−Number o f f i l l b i t s (0 −5)
# | | | | | ‘−−Enc ap s u l a t e d d a t a
# | | | | ‘−−VHF d a t a l i n k message number ( 8 , 14 , s e e
ITU−R M1371
# | | | ‘−−AIS channe l f o r b r o a d c a s t o f t h e r a d i o
message
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# | | ‘−− S e q u e n t i a l message i d e n t i f i e r , 0 t o 9
# | ‘−−Sen t ence Number , 1 t o 9
# ‘−−To t a l Number o f s e n t e n c e s needed t o t r a n s f e r
message , 1 t o 9
de f conver tToASCII ( b i n a r y ) :
p r i n t ( " Conve r t i n g NMEA−0183 6− b i t b i n a r y t o 8− b i t ASCII
. \ r " )
r e t u r n ’ ’ . j o i n ( ch r ( i n t ( b i n a r y [ i ∗8 : i ∗8+8] , 2 ) ) f o r i i n
r ange ( i n t ( l e n ( b i n a r y ) / 8 ) ) )
d e f convertNMEAToNMEABinary ( a i s _ d a t a , a i s _ f i l l ) :
# Th i s f u n c t i o n c o n v e r t s t h e 6− b i t ASCII c h a r a c t e r s
# i n t o i t s 6− b i t b i n a r y e q u i v a l e n t and t a k e i n t o
# a c coun t f i l l b i t s
NMEA0183_alphabet = "0123456789: ; <= >?
@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW‘ abcde f gh i j k lmnopq r s t uvw "
p r i n t ( a i s _ d a t a )
decode = ""
a i s _ f i l l = −abs ( i n t ( a i s _ f i l l ) )
f o r c i n a i s _ d a t a :
decode += ’{0: b } ’ . f o rma t ( NMEA0183_alphabet . f i n d ( c ) ) .
r j u s t ( 6 , ’ 0 ’ )
i f a i s _ f i l l != 0 :
decode = decode [ : a i s _ f i l l ]
decode = decode [ 7 2 : ]
r e t u r n conver tToASCII ( decode )
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de f conve r tToB ina r y ( a i s _ d a t a ) :
# Th i s f u n c t i o n c o n v e r t s t h e 6− b i t ASCII c h a r a c t e r s
# i n t o i t s 6− b i t b i n a r y e q u i v a l e n t
NMEA0183_alphabet = "0123456789: ; <= >?
@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW‘ abcde f gh i j k lmnopq r s t uvw "
decode = ""
f o r c i n a i s _ d a t a :
decode += ’{0: b } ’ . f o rma t ( NMEA0183_alphabet . f i n d ( c ) ) .
r j u s t ( 6 , ’ 0 ’ )
r e t u r n decode
de f c h e c k f i l e ( pay load , a i s _ f i l l ) :
# Must f i r s t c o n v e r t r e c e i v e d pay load s t r i n g back i n t o
# o r i g i n a l NMEA−0183 6− b i t pr ime .
p r i n t ("############################################\ r " )
p r i n t ( " The Cha l l e nge Message pay load i s c u r r e n t l y i n t h e
wrong fo rma t . \ r " )
p r i n t ( " C a l l i n g convertNMEAToNMEABinary ( ) . \ r " )
lookup = convertNMEAToNMEABinary ( pay load , a i s _ f i l l )
lookup = " !AIVDM, 1 , 1 , ,A, " + lookup
p r i n t ( " Checking t o s e e i f {0} e x i s t s i n o u t f i l e . \ r " .
f o rma t ( lookup ) )
s e n t t im e = ""
s t a t u s = 0
wi th open ( ’ O u t f i l e . t x t ’ , ’ r ’ ) a s s e a r c h f i l e :
f o r l i n e i n s e a r c h f i l e :
162
l i n e = l i n e . r s t r i p ( )
i f lookup i n l i n e :
p r i n t ( " {0} e x i s t s i n o u t f i l e . . . \ r " . f o rma t (
lookup ) )
s e n t t im e = l i n e . s p l i t ( " | " ) [ 0 ]
s t a t u s = 1
s e a r c h f i l e . c l o s e ( )
r e t u r n s t a t u s , s e n t t ime , lookup
p r i n t ( " {0} does no t e x i s t i n o u t f i l e . . . \ r " . f o rma t (
lookup ) )
s e a r c h f i l e . c l o s e ( )
r e t u r n s t a t u s , s e n t t ime , lookup
de f S i gC r e a t i o n (msg , t imes t amp ) :
p r i n t ("############################################\ r " )
p r i n t ( " I n i t i a t i n g D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e c r e a t i o n now . \ r " )
p r i n t ("##########################################\ r \ n " )
groupObj = Pa i r i ngGroup ( ’MNT159 ’ )
#wat = Wate r sS ig ( groupObj ) # For Waters Imp l emen t a t i o n
b l s = BLS01 ( groupObj ) # For BLS_04 Implemena t i on
msg = msg+ t imes t amp
wi th open ( " p r i v a t e k e y . t x t " , " rb " ) a s r :
x = r . r e ad ( )
r . c l o s e ( )
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’ ’ ’
w i th open ( " pub l i c k e y1 . t x t " , " rb " ) a s pk1r :
g = pk1r . r e ad ( )
pk1r . c l o s e ( )
w i th open ( " pub l i c k e y2 . t x t " , " rb " ) a s pk2r :
gx = pk2r . r e ad ( )
pk2r . c l o s e ( )
’ ’ ’
’ ’ ’
w i th open ( " ShipONE . t x t " , " rb " ) a s r : # Ensure t o change
t h e f i l e n ame t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e AIS t r a n s p o n d e r
one_by t e s = r . r e ad ( )
r . c l o s e ( )
w i th open ( " m a s t e r p u b l i c . t x t " , " rb " ) a s r f i l e :
p u b l i c _ b y t e s = r f i l e . r e ad ( )
r f i l e . c l o s e ( )
’ ’ ’
xx = by t e sToOb j e c t ( x , group )
# ma s t e r _ pub l i c _ k e y = by t e sToOb j e c t ( p u b l i c _ b y t e s , g roup )
# For Waters Imp l emen t a t i o n
# s i g = wat . s i g n ( ma s t e r _pub l i c _key , s e c r e t _ k e y , msg )
# For Waters Imp l emen t a t i o n
s i g = b l s . s i g n ( xx , msg )
p r i n t ( " S i g n a t u r e c r e a t i o n s u c c e s s f u l . . . \ r " )
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s i g = ob j e c tToBy t e s ( s i g , group )
p r i n t ("############################################\ r " )
p r i n t ( " S i g n a t u r e By tes : \ r " )
p r i n t ( s i g )
p r i n t ("############################################\ r " )
p r i n t ( " S i g n a t u r e Length : {0} \ r \ n " . f o rma t ( l e n ( s i g ) ) )
r e t u r n s i g
de f conve r tTo6 (msg ) :
NMEA0183_alphabet = "0123456789: ; <= >?
@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW‘ abcde f gh i j k lmnopq r s t uvw "
encode = ""
p r i n t ( " Response Message Pay load Conve r s i on i n i t i a t i n g . \ r
" )
f o r i i n r ange ( i n t ( l e n (msg ) / 6 ) ) :
k = i ∗6
ch = i n t ( " 0 0 " + msg [ k : k + 6 ] , 2 )
encode += NMEA0183_alphabet [ ch ]
p r i n t ( " Response Message Pay load Conve r s i on S u c c e s s f u l . \ r
\ n " )
r e t u r n encode
de f checksum ( s e n t e n c e ) :
s e n t e n c e = s e n t e n c e [ 1 : ]
s e n t e n c e = s e n t e n c e . encode ( " u t f −8")
csum = 0b0
f o r i i n r ange ( l e n ( s e n t e n c e ) ) :
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csum ^= s e n t e n c e [ i ]
csum = s t r ( hex ( csum ) . uppe r ( ) ) [ 2 : ]
i f l e n ( csum ) != 2 :
csum = "0" + csum
r e t u r n csum
de f c r e a t eRe s pon s e ( NMEApayload , f i l l ) :
# C r e a t e t h e number o f NMEA s e n t e n c e s r e q u i r e d t o ho ld
t h e AIS message
p r i n t ( " Response Message C r e a t i o n I n i t i a t i n g . \ r " )
p r i n t ( " Checking maximum s i z e t o no t exceed 57 c h a r a c t e r s
. \ r " )
t o t a l = 1
i f l e n ( NMEApayload ) > 57 :
t o t a l = i n t ( l e n ( NMEApayload ) / 57)
i f l e n ( NMEApayload ) % 57 != 0 :
t o t a l += 1
p r i n t ( "AIBBM message exceed s 57 c h a r a c t e r s . \ r " )
seq_num = s t r ( random . r a n d i n t ( 0 , 10) )
f o r i i n r ange ( t o t a l ) :
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i f i != ( t o t a l −1) :
NMEApayload_send = NMEApayload [ ( i ∗ 57) : ( ( i ∗
57) + 57) ]
# Re s u l t w i l l be i n t h e form s p e c i f i e d i n t h e
NMEA 0183 ABM sen t e n c e
s e n t e n c e = " !AIBBM, " + "1" + " , " + "1" + " , " +
"0" + " , " + "1" + " , " + "14" + " , " +
NMEApayload_send + " , " + "0"
# s e n t e n c e = " !AIBBM, " + s t r ( t o t a l ) + " , " + s t r ( i
+ 1 ) + " , " + seq_num + " , " + "1" + " , " +
"14" + " , " + NMEApayload_send + " , " + "0"
e l i f i == ( t o t a l −1) :
NMEApayload_send = NMEApayload [ ( i ∗ 57) : ]
s e n t e n c e = " !AIBBM, " + "1" + " , " + "1" + " , " +
"0" + " , " + "1" + " , " + "14" + " , " +
NMEApayload_send + " , " + s t r ( f i l l )
# s e n t e n c e = " !AIBBM, " + s t r ( t o t a l ) + " , " + s t r ( i
+ 1 ) + " , " + seq_num + " , " + "1" + " , " +
"14" + " , " + NMEApayload_send + " , " + s t r (
f i l l )
# c a l c u l a t e checksum f o r p a ck e t
s e n t e n c e += "∗" + checksum ( s e n t e n c e )
p r i n t ( " B r o a d c a s t i n g c h a l l e n g e message : " + " \ r " )
p r i n t ( s e n t e n c e )
p r i n t ( " Response Message C r e a t i o n S u c c e s s f u l . . . \ r " )
p r i n t ( " Send ing Response Message t o T ran sponde r . . . \ r \
n " )
167
t r a n sm i t 2T r a n s p o n d e r ( s e n t e n c e )
t ime . s l e e p ( 4 )
r e t u r n
de f t r a n sm i t 2T r a n s p o n d e r ( txmsg ) :
s e r i a l S t r e am = s e r i a l . S e r i a l ( ’ / dev / ttyUSB0 ’ , b a u d r a t e
=38400 , t imeou t =1)
i f s e r i a l S t r e am :
s e r i a l S t r e am . f l u s h I n p u t ( )
s e r i a l S t r e am . f l u s hOu t p u t ( )
txmsg = txmsg + " \ r \ n "
s e r i a l S t r e am . w r i t e ( txmsg . encode ( ) )
s e r i a l S t r e am . c l o s e ( )
p r i n t ( " Message T r an sm i s s i o n Complete . . . \ n " )
r e t u r n
#################################
#### CRYPTO PORTION START ####
#################################
’ ’ ’
# | From : "B . Waters − E f f i c i e n t i d e n t i t y −based e n c r y p t i o n
w i t h ou t random o r a c l e s "
# | P u b l i s h e d i n : EUROCRYPT 2005
# | Av a i l a b l e from : Vol 3494 of LNCS, pages 320−329
# | Notes :
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#∗ t y p e : s i g n a t u r e ( ID−based )
#∗ s e t t i n g : b i l i n e a r g roups ( a symmet r i c )
# : Au tho r s : J . Ayo Ak inye l e
# : Date : 11 /2011
c l a s s Wate r sS ig :
d e f _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , groupObj ) :
g l o b a l group , lam_func
g l o b a l wa t e r s
g l o b a l z




lam_func = lambda i , a , b : a [ i ] ∗∗ b [ i ]
wa t e r s = Waters ( group , z , l )
d e f s i g n ( s e l f , mpk , sk , M) :
m = wa t e r s . hash (M) # r e t u r n l i s t from m1 , . . . , mz
( k1 , k2 ) = sk
s = group . random (ZR)
S1 = k1 ∗ ( ( mpk [ ’ u2t ’ ] ∗ do t p r od ( 1 , −1 , mpk [ ’ z ’ ] ,
lam_func , mpk [ ’ u ’ ] , m) ) ∗∗ s )
S2 = k2
S3 = mpk [ ’ g1 ’ ] ∗∗ −s
r e t u r n { ’S1 ’ : S1 , ’S2 ’ : S2 , ’S3 ’ : S3}
’ ’ ’
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c l a s s BLS01 ( IBSig ) :
" " "
>>> from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t P a i r i ngGroup
>>> group = Pa i r i ngGroup ( ’MNT224 ’ )
>>> messages = { ’ a ’ : " h e l l o wor ld ! ! ! " , ’b ’ : " t e s t
message " }
>>> i b = BLS01 ( group )
>>> ( pub l i c_key , s e c r e t _ k e y ) = i b . keygen ( )
>>> s i g n a t u r e = i b . s i g n ( s e c r e t _ k e y [ ’ x ’ ] , messages )
>>> i b . v e r i f y ( pub l i c_key , s i g n a t u r e , messages )
True
" " "
de f _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , groupObj ) :
IBSig . _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f )
g l o b a l group
group = groupObj
de f dump ( s e l f , ob j ) :
r e t u r n ob j e c tToBy t e s ( obj , g roup )
de f s i g n ( s e l f , x , message ) :
M = s e l f . dump ( message )
r e t u r n group . hash (M, G1) ∗∗ x
##############################
#### CRYPTO PORTION END ####
##############################
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de f main ( own_mmsi ) :
wh i l e no t message_queue . empty ( ) :
raw_message = message_queue . g e t ( )
a i s _ d a t a = raw_message . s p l i t ( " , " ) [ 5 ] # AIVDM
Pay load
a i s_admin = raw_message . s p l i t ( " , " ) [ 6 ] # AIVDM F i l l
b i t ∗Checksum
a i s _ f i l l = a i s_admin . s p l i t ( " ∗ " ) [ 0 ] # AIVDM F i l l
b i t s
a i s _ d a t a _ b i n = conve r tToB ina r y ( a i s _ d a t a ) # Conve r t s
AIVDM Pay load t o 6− b i t b i n a r y
mmsi_bin = a i s _ d a t a _ b i n [ 8 : 3 8 ] # e x t r a c t s
mmsi b i n a r y
msg id_b in = a i s _ d a t a _ b i n [ 0 : 6 ] # e x t r a c t s
message i d b i n a r y
mmsi = i n t ( mmsi_bin , 2 ) # c o n v e r t s
b i n a r y t o base 10 i n t .
msgid = i n t ( msgid_bin , 2 ) # c o n v e r t s
b i n a r y t o base 10 i n t .
p r i n t ( " Message from {0} \ r " . f o rma t (mmsi ) )
p r i n t ( " Message t ype : {0} \ r " . f o rma t ( msgid ) )
i f msgid == 12 and mmsi != own_mmsi :
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r \ n " )
p r i n t ("####################################\ r " )
p r i n t ( " Cha l l e nge Message De t e c t e d \ r " )
p r i n t ( " Cha l l e nge Message from : {0} \ r " . f o rma t (
mmsi ) )
p r i n t ( " Cha l l e nge Message Pay load : {0} \ r \ n " .
f o rma t ( a i s _ d a t a ) ) # Th i s i s t h e AIVDM t h a t
was s e n t from encode r . py
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p r i n t ("##################################\ r \ n " )
STATUS , SENTTIME , LOOKUP = c h e c k f i l e ( a i s _ d a t a ,
a i s _ f i l l ) # Th i s f u n c t i o n checks t h e
t r a n sm i s s i o n f i l e t o l o c a t e
# t h e
raw_message .
i f STATUS == 1 : # STATUS = 1 ; s i g n i f i e s t h a t
t h e message was s e n t ou t
# p r e v i o u s l y .
# D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e C r e a t i o n
P o r t i o n :
z e r o = b ’0 ’
s i g n a t u r e = S i gC r e a t i o n (LOOKUP, SENTTIME) #
Combina t ion o f t h e message i n c h a l l e n g e
& t h e s e n t t ime
s i g n a t u r e = ze r o + s i g n a t u r e
# c o n v e r t t o b i n a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
s i g _ b i n = b in ( i n t ( b i n a s c i i . h e x l i f y ( s i g n a t u r e
) , 16) ) [ 8 : ]
# C a l c u l a t e f i l l b i t s t o ma i n t a i n 6− b i t by t e
a l i g nmen t
f i l l = 0
i f ( l e n ( s i g _ b i n ) ) % 6 != 0 :
f i l l = 6 − ( l e n ( s i g _ b i n ) % 6)
s i g _ b i n += "0" ∗ f i l l
# Conve r t t o 6 b i t NMEA 0183 a l p h a b e t
r e s p on s eP ay l o a d = conve r tTo6 ( s i g _ b i n )
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c r e a t eRe s pon s e ( r e spon s ePay l o ad , f i l l ) #
C r e a t e s t h e B ro adc a s t e d r e s p on s e message
e l s e :
p r i n t ( "No a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s t a k en . " )
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r \ n " )
i f __name__ == " __main__ " :
p a r s e r = Argumen tPa r se r ( d e s c r i p t i o n =" I n p u t one ’ s own
MMSI . " )
p a r s e r . add_argument ("−mmsi " , "−−mmsi " , d e s t ="mmsi " ,
n a r g s =1 , t ype = s t r , h e l p ="MMSI va l u e " )
a r g s = p a r s e r . p a r s e _ a r g s ( )
# Check f o r minimum argumen t s
i f l e n ( sy s . a rgv ) == 1 :
p r i n t ( " I n p u t MMSI va l u e \ r " )
q u i t ( )
message_queue = queue . Queue ( )
own_mmsi = a r g s . mmsi [ 0 ]
wh i l e True :
s e r i a l S t r e am = s e r i a l . S e r i a l ( ’ / dev / ttyUSB1 ’ ,
b a u d r a t e =38400 , t imeou t =1)
r e c e i v e d = s e r i a l S t r e am . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
i f " !AIVDM" i n r e c e i v e d :
p r i n t ("∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ \ r " )
p r i n t ( "AIVDM message r e c e i v e d . " )
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p r i n t ( r e c e i v e d )
message_queue . pu t ( r e c e i v e d )
ma i n_ f un c t i o n = mu l t i p r o c e s s i n g . P r o c e s s ( name= ’
main_f ’ , a r g s =own_mmsi , t a r g e t =main ( own_mmsi )
)
ma i n_ f un c t i o n . daemon = True
ma i n_ f un c t i o n . s t a r t ( )
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APPENDIX J:
B_Challenger.PY Process Flow Graph
This appendix features the processes and functions found within B_Challenger.py. This
figure intends to logically organize the flow and construction of the Python source code.
Figure J.1. B_Challenger.py Process Flow Graph
“
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APPENDIX K:
A_Challenger.PY CPU Load Data
This table displays the measured systemmetrics of the proposed AIS authentication system.
The data was captured over 30 mins at 10 second intervals on the CAMINO-701’s laptop.
Table K.1. A_Challenger.py ’s Measured CPU Performance Over Time
Passive Idle Active Passive Idle Active
Seconds CPU Load Percentages Average: 1.0 0.6 3.1
0 3 1.5 1.9 Mode: 0.2 0.4 0.4
10 0.4 1.2 1.2 Median: 0.6 0.4 2.7
20 1.1 0.4 0.6 Std: 1.1 0.9 3.0
30 0.2 0.1 3.4 Var: 1.3 0.8 9.0
40 2.9 0.6 8.7 Min: 0.0 0.0 0.1
50 1.6 0.6 1.7 Max: 6.1 7.5 17.2
60 0.4 0.3 3.4
70 0.1 0.3 1.1
80 0.7 0.3 0.2
90 2.1 0.3 5.3
100 0.4 0.7 1.8
110 0.1 0.1 1.2
120 0.3 0.4 0.6
130 0.1 0.4 0.2
140 2.9 0.4 0.2
150 1.2 0.2 5.3
160 0.4 0.4 9.4
170 0.9 0.3 2.5
180 0.3 0.5 1.2
190 0.6 0.3 3.4
200 0.8 0.7 5.3
210 0.5 0.8 2.3
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Passive Idle Active Passive Idle Active
220 4.4 0.4 4
230 0.8 0.2 0.5
240 1.2 0.4 0.9
250 0.1 0.3 3.2
260 0.7 0.6 5.1
270 0.3 1 1.2
280 0.7 1.3 3.4
290 0.5 0.1 0.4
300 0.8 0.5 0.7
310 1.4 0.4 3.3
320 0.8 0.3 11.4
330 0.3 0.2 1
340 1 0.4 4.1
350 0.5 0.3 0.4
360 1.2 0.3 1.2
370 0.5 0.3 3
380 0.9 0.4 12
390 0.1 0.2 1.4
400 3.1 0.3 4.1
410 0.9 0.3 0.6
420 0.6 0.5 5.5
430 0.2 0.2 3.4
440 0.7 0.5 10.9
450 0.2 0.2 0.7
460 0.5 0.3 4
470 0.2 0.2 0.3
480 0.6 0.6 1
490 0.3 0.3 3.1
500 3.5 0.6 5.5
510 1.8 0.2 1
520 0.7 0.6 3.3
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Passive Idle Active Passive Idle Active
530 0.3 0.5 0.4
540 0.6 0.6 0.9
550 0.2 0.5 2.7
560 0.7 0.3 12.2
570 0.2 0.4 1.2
580 4.5 1.1 4.1
590 1.1 4.7 0.4
600 1 0.4 0.8
610 0.9 0.5 3.3
620 6 0.9 5.6
630 0.9
640 1.3 0.9 3.7
650 1 1.1 0.4
660 0.3 0.2 0.5
670 0.8 0.8 2.9
680 0.4 0.3 5.3
690 1.1 0.7 1.2
700 4.1 0.3 3.4
710 0.2 0.6 0.3
720 0.1 0.6 1.8
730 0.1 0.6 2.8
740 0.3 0.5 17.2
750 0.3 0.7 0.8
760 2.6 0.3 4.3
770 0.7 0.4 0.3
780 0.1 0.1 4.3
790 0.2 1 2.8
800 0.2 0.8 5.3
810 0.2 0.7 0.8
820 0.2 0.2 3
830 3 0.3 0.5
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840 0.3 0.2 0.6
850 1.4 0.5 2.8
860 3 0.4 11.7
870 1.1 0.7 0.6
880 0.6 0.6 4.3
890 0.3 0.4 0.3
900 0.6 0.2 0.7
910 0.2 0.5 2.9
920 0.6 0 12.9
930 0.5 0.7 1.2
940 5.8 1 4.3
950 1.6 7.1 0.4
960 3.6 0.5 0.9
970 2.8 0 2.4
980 6.1 5
990 0.4 1.2 1.3
1000 0.6 7.5 3.3
1010 0.3 1 0.4
1020 0.4 3 2
1030 0.1 0.7 2.7
1040 1.1 3.3 5.1
1050 0.2 0.2 1.1
1060 0.4 0.8 3.7
1070 0.3 0 0.1
1080 0.6 0.4 0.8
1090 0.7 0.4 2.9
1100 0.8 0.6 5.2
1110 1 0.2 2.4
1120 4 0.6 3.5
1130 1.2 0.4 0.7
1140 0.5 0.5 3.7
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1150 0.4 0.4 2.3
1160 0.5 0.6 7
1170 0.5 0.1 1
1180 0.8 0.5 5.1
1190 0.2 0.2 4
1200 0.6 0.4 1.3
1210 0.1 0.3 3.5
1220 3.4 0.7 4.9
1230 0.9 0.4 1
1240 0.6 0.5 3.4
1250 2.3 0.3 0.5
1260 0.7 0.3 0.4
1270 0.1 0.1 2.9
1280 0.6 0.7 5
1290 0.4 0.5 1.2
1300 2.8 0.4 4.9
1310 1 0.2 0.7
1320 1.3 0.5 1.7
1330 0.3 0.3 6.4
1340 0.8 0.7 10.7
1350 0.3 0.3 1.7
1360 0.5 0.5 3.2
1370 0.2 0.2 0.7
1380 0.4 0.5 0.2
1390 0.4 0.2 3.3
1400 0.6 0.6 12
1410 0.2 0.2 1.7
1420 0.7 0.4 3.7
1430 0.3 0.6 0.5
1440 0.4 0.4 0.5
1450 0.5 0.1 3
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1460 1.2 0.7 10.9
1470 0.2 0.2 1.6
1480 3.7 0.5 3.5
1490 1.2 0.2 0.5
1500 0.7 0.7 0.5
1510 0.2 0 4.6
1520 0.8 0.7 5.2
1530 0.3 0.3 0.9
1540 0.5 0.4 3.7
1550 0.1 0.2 3.7
1560 0.8 0.5 1.1
1570 0.2 0.1 3.5
1580 3.4 0.8 11.1
1590 0.9 0.3 1.3
1600 0.7 0.6 5
1610 0.5 0.2 5.5
1620 0.2 0.4 1
1630 0.7 0.2 3.3
1640 0 0.7 0.4
1650 0.7 0.1 0.9
1660 0.3 0.5 0.4
1670 0.7 0.1 0.1
1680 0.1 0.4 0.7
1690 0.6 0 0.5
1700 0.4 0.8 4.6
1710 0.5 0.2 5.2
1720 0.4 0.4 1.9
1730 0.6 0.2 3.7
1740 0.4 0.4 3.6
1750 0.4 0.2 5.7
1760 0.6 0.7 3.5
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1770 0.2 0.3 7.1
1780 0.7 0.9 4.2
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APPENDIX L:
B_Challenger.PY CPU Load Data
This table displays the measured systemmetrics of the proposed AIS authentication system.
The data was captured over 30 mins at 10 second intervals on the FA-150’s laptop.
Table L.1. B_Challenger.py ’s Measured CPU Performance Over Time
Passive Idle Active Passive Idle Active
Seconds CPU Load Percentages Average: 1.9 1.0 3.7
10 2.4 0.9 4.5 Mode: 1.4 1.2 2.4
20 1.3 1.3 5.8 Median: 1.6 1.1 3.3
30 2.6 2.3 3.9 Std: 1.1 0.6 2.3
40 1.1 0.7 6.9 Var: 1.3 0.4 5.1
50 1.5 1.4 5.9 Min: 0.5 0.2 0.8
60 1.9 1.2 3.7 Max: 9.7 6.1 24.1
70 4.5 1.3 2.4
80 2.3 1.3 2.4
90 6.7 2.1 2.4
100 4.3 1.5 2.4
110 2.2 1.8 5.2
120 2.3 0.4 3.3
130 2.2 1.4 2.2
140 1.9 0.9 2
150 1.3 1.7 2.4
160 1.8 0.3 2.8
170 2.4 1.1 5.2
180 2.1 0.4 3.3
190 2.3 1.1 4.2
200 3.2 1.1 2.6
210 2.2 1.4 3.3
220 1.9 0.5 2.2
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230 1.7 1.2 4.2
240 1.4 0.4 2.2
250 2.1 1.2 1.7
260 2.1 1.4 2.1
270 2 1.8 2.5
280 5.1 0.3 2.2
290 1.3 1.3 4.2
300 0.9 0.5 3.1
310 1.7 1.2 2.3
320 1.9 1 2.4
330 3.2 1.7 2.6
340 1 0.6 5.4
350 1 1.4 5.4
360 1 0.4 3.1
370 1.6 1.3 2.5
380 6.3 1.3 2.1
390 2.2 1.4 2
400 1.2 6.1 3.6
410 1.2 1.2 3.6
420 1.7 1.1 5.3
430 2.2 0.4 2.3
440 2 2.1 2.3
450 1.8 0.5 2.3
460 1.5 1 2.3
470 2.4 0.5 4
480 1.4 1.2 5.5
490 1.5 1.2 2.4
500 2.1 1.7 2.1
510 2.4 0.3 2.4
520 1.9 1.2 2.4
530 1.4 0.4 3.5
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540 1.4 1.3 3.4
550 1.3 1.7 2.3
560 1.7 1.5 1.9
570 4.7 0.5 1.9
580 1.1 1.2 2.8
590 1.5 0.4 3.8
600 1.6 1.3 5.6
610 1.2 1.6 9.8
620 2.6 1.8 4.1
630 1.2 0.2 4.5
640 1.7 1.3 3
650 1.7 0.2 2.7
660 2.8 1.2 6.2
670 0.7 1.1 5.6
680 2.3 1.7 5.4
690 2.6 0.3 3.9
700 0.9 1 3.1
710 1.1 0.5 3.1
720 1.5 0.8 2.9
730 1.5 1.2 5
740 2.2 1.4 4.2
750 2.2 0.5 2.9
760 1.4 1.3 3.4
770 2.1 0.3 13.1
780 2 1 3
790 1.3 1.1 3.9
800 1.8 1.2 2.9
810 1.7 0.6 2.9
820 1.6 1.1 3.6
830 1.9 0.4 2.8
840 1.7 1.4 3.4
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850 1.2 1.5 4.2
860 2.3 1.3 2.5
870 5 0.4 3.3
880 1.6 1 3
890 1.5 0.3 3.5
900 1.3 1.1 3.2
910 1.2 0.8 3.6
920 3.7 1.5 2.6
930 0.8 0.4 0.9
940 1.5 1.3 0.8
950 2 0.4 2.9
960 1.2 1.2 3.6
970 1.4 1.2 5.3
980 1.8 1.3 3.9
990 4.3 0.4 3
1000 1 1.2 2.5
1010 0.6 0.4 3.4
1020 1.1 1.5 3.9
1030 1.8 1.4 5.4
1040 0.8 0.9 3.8
1050 0.8 0.4 3.6
1060 1.6 1.2 2.9
1070 1 0.3 8.3
1080 0.5 0.9 3.8
1090 1.4 1.5 3.5
1100 0.9 2.2 3.3
1110 1.7 0.6 3
1120 2.1 1.3 2.3
1130 1.3 0.3 3.8
1140 3.3 1.3 3.5
1150 4.5 1.3 4.5
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1160 1.1 0.8 4.4
1170 1.2 0.4 24.1
1180 1.1 1 3.3
1190 1.2 0.2 3.8
1200 1.7 1.1 3.1
1210 1.9 1.8 3.4
1220 0.9 1.2 3.2
1230 1.4 0.4 3.2
1240 1.2 1.2 2.1
1250 0.9 0.3 2.8
1260 1.4 1.2 3.3
1270 1.3 1.2 3.6
1280 0.8 1.3 3.4
1290 1.3 0.3 3.1
1300 1 1.3 2.9
1310 1.1 0.2 3.6
1320 3.5 1.2 3
1330 4.1 1.2 3.6
1340 2.2 0.5 4.5
1350 2.8 0.3 4.8
1360 2.1 1.1 2.6
1370 0.9 0.5 9.4
1380 2.6 1.2 3.2
1390 2.2 1.6 3.8
1400 1.5 0.9 3.4
1410 1.8 0.6 3.2
1420 1.8 1 0.8
1430 1.4 0.4 1.5
1440 1.5 1.2 3.7
1450 9.7 1.7 5
1460 1.1 1.1 4.6
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1470 1.6 0.4 3.7
1480 1.8 1.1 3.4
1490 1.1 0.3 3.7
1500 2.2 1.3 2.8
1510 1.4 1.2 5.7
1520 1 1.3 3.7
1530 1.1 0.3 2
1540 1.5 1.4 2.6
1550 1.4 0.3 2.9
1560 2.4 1.2 2.6
1570 1.1 1.7 4.2
1580 1.3 1.1 2.8
1590 3.5 0.4 3.2
1600 3 1.1 2.2
1610 1.6 0.3 3.3
1620 2.5 1 3
1630 1.5 1.3 4.1
1640 1.1 1 3.5
1650 2.4 0.4 2.5
1660 1.4 1.1 2.1
1670 1.6 0.3 12.9
1680 2.1 1.3 3
1690 1.9 1.5 4.4
1700 1.5 1.3 2.7
1710 1.3 0.4 2.3
1720 1.3 2 2.1
1730 1.4 0.5 3.9
1740 1.8 1.5 3
1750 3.5 1.3 3.8
1760 2.4 1.2 3.4
1770 1.4 0.3 2.9
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Table L.1 continued from previous page
Passive Idle Active Passive Idle Active
1780 1.4 1.1 4.4
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This appendix displays our work and construction of an identity-based digital signature
based on the arithmetic proofs discussed in [40].
from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t Pa i r i ngGroup , ZR ,G1 , G2
, p a i r
from charm . co r e . e ng i n e . u t i l impo r t o b j e c tToBy t e s
from charm . t o o l b ox . IBSig impo r t ∗
debug = Fa l s e
c l a s s BLS01 ( IBSig ) :
d e f _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , groupObj ) :
IBSig . _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f )
g l o b a l group
group = groupObj
de f dump ( s e l f , ob j ) :
r e t u r n ob j e c tToBy t e s ( obj , g roup )
de f s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
g , x = group . random (G2) , group . random ( )
g_x = g ∗∗ x
mpk = { ’ g^x ’ : g_x , ’g ’ : g}
msk = { ’x ’ : x}
r e t u r n (mpk , msk )
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de f keygen ( s e l f , MMSI, x ) :
pk = group . hash (MMSI, G1)
sk = pk ∗∗ x
r e t u r n ( pk , sk )
de f s i g n ( s e l f , message , sk , g ) :
M = s e l f . dump ( message )
a l p h a = group . random ( )
S = sk + ( group . hash (M, G1) ∗∗ a l ph a )
T = g ∗∗ a l ph a
r e t u r n { ’S1 ’ : S , ’S2 ’ : T}
de f v e r i f y ( s e l f , message , S , g , pk , g_x , T ) :
M = s e l f . dump ( message )
h = group . hash (M, G1)
i f p a i r ( S , g ) == ( p a i r ( pk , g_x ) ∗ p a i r ( h , T ) ) :
r e t u r n True
r e t u r n F a l s e
de f main ( ) :
groupObj = Pa i r i ngGroup ( ’MNT159 ’ )
MMSI = "338999999"
m = "HELLO WORLD"
b l s = BLS01 ( groupObj )
(mpk , msk ) = b l s . s e t u p ( )
( pk , sk ) = b l s . keygen (MMSI, msk [ ’ x ’ ] )
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s i g = b l s . s i g n (m, sk , mpk [ ’ g ’ ] )
s i g _ b y t e s = ob j e c tToBy t e s ( s i g , group )
p r i n t ( l e n ( s i g _ b y t e s ) )
i f debug : p r i n t ( " Message : ’%s ’ " % m)
i f debug : p r i n t ( " S i g n a t u r e : ’%s ’ " % s i g )
a s s e r t b l s . v e r i f y (m, s i g [ ’ S1 ’ ] , mpk [ ’ g ’ ] , pk , mpk [ ’ g^x
’ ] , s i g [ ’ S2 ’ ] ) , " F a i l u r e ! ! ! "
i f debug : p r i n t ( ’SUCCESS ! ! ! ’ )








This appendix details our work and construction of a certificateless digital signature from
[37].
from charm . t o o l b ox . p a i r i n g g r o u p impo r t Pa i r i ngGroup , ZR ,G1 , G2
, p a i r
from charm . co r e . e ng i n e . u t i l impo r t o b j e c tToBy t e s
from charm . t o o l b ox . IBSig impo r t ∗
debug = Fa l s e
c l a s s C e r t i f i c a t e l e s s P K I ( IBSig ) :
d e f _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f , groupObj ) :
IBSig . _ _ i n i t _ _ ( s e l f )
g l o b a l group
group = groupObj
de f s e t u p ( s e l f ) :
P = group . random (G2)
s = group . random ( )
P_0 = P ∗∗ s
r e t u r n s , P_0 , P
de f P a r t i a l P r i v a t e K e y E x t r a c t ( s e l f , MMSI, s , P , P_0 ) :
Q_A = group . hash (MMSI, G1)
D_A = Q_A ∗∗ s
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# v a l i d i t y checks
i f p a i r (D_A, P ) == p a i r (Q_A, P_0 ) :
p r i n t ( " P a r t i a l P r i v a t e Key E x t r a c t i s c o r r e c t \ n
" )
r e t u r n D_A, Q_A
de f S e t S e c r e tV a l u e ( s e l f ) :
x_A = group . random ( )
r e t u r n x_A
de f S e t P r i v a t eKey ( s e l f , D_A, x_A ) :
S_A = D_A ∗∗ x_A
r e t u r n S_A
de f Se tPub l i cKey ( s e l f , x_A , P , P_0 ) :
X_A = P ∗∗ x_A
Y_A = P_0 ∗∗ x_A
r e t u r n X_A, Y_A
de f Sign ( s e l f , P , M, S_A) :
a = group . random ( )
r = p a i r ( ( P ∗∗ a ) , P )
v = group . hash (M, r )
U = (S_A ∗∗ v ) + ( P ∗∗ a )
r e t u r n U, v
de f Ve r i f y ( s e l f , X_A, P_0 , Y_A, P , v , U, M, Q_A) :
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i f p a i r (X_A, P_0 ) == p a i r (Y_A, P ) :
p r i n t ( ’ F i r s t V e r i f i c a t i o n Holds True \ n ’ )
r = p a i r (U, P ) ∗ ( p a i r (Q_A, −Y_A) ) ∗∗ v
i f v == group . hash (M, r ) :
r e t u r n True
r e t u r n F a l s e
de f main ( ) :
groupObj = Pa i r i ngGroup ( ’ SS512 ’ )
MMSI = "338999999"
M = "HELLO WORLD"
b l s = C e r t i f i c a t e l e s s P K I ( groupObj )
( s , P_0 , P ) = b l s . s e t u p ( )
p r i n t ( " debug 1 \ r " )
D_A, Q_A = b l s . P a r t i a l P r i v a t e K e y E x t r a c t (MMSI, s , P , P_0 )
p r i n t ( " debug 2 \ r " )
x_A = b l s . S e t S e c r e tV a l u e ( )
p r i n t ( " debug 3 \ r " )
S_A = b l s . S e t P r i v a t eKey (D_A, x_A )
p r i n t ( " debug 4 \ r " )
X_A, Y_A = b l s . Se tPub l i cKey ( x_A , P , P_0 )
p r i n t ( " debug 5 \ r " )
U, v = b l s . S ign ( P , M, S_A)
p r i n t ( " debug 6 \ r " )
a s s e r t b l s . Ve r i f y (X_A, P_0 , Y_A, P , v , U, M, Q_A) , "
F a i l u r e ! ! ! "
i f __name__ == " __main__ " :
main ( )
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